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Knowledge loss, or organizational forgetting, is often overlooked in knowledge 
management frameworks, yet it costs organizations money, personnel, efficiency, and 
customer service. The purpose of this mixed model case study was to understand, using a 
model of forgetting as the conceptual framework, where and why loss occurred and to 
examine performance implications. An inbound telephone contact center was studied 
because of prolific changes in that industry regarding knowledge complexity and 
performance. The researcher interviewed 20 participants, observed 63 calls, and reviewed 
3 months of performance data including average handle time, first call resolution 
percentages, and time spent on after call work. Key research questions addressed areas of 
loss, contributing factors, and operational impacts. Using theme-based coding and chi-
square goodness of fit analyses for the qualitative data coupled with descriptive analyses 
and frequency distributions for the quantitative data, results showed that loss occurred 
because of attitudinal resistance to change, unlearning, and lack of organizational 
standards. Average handle time and first call resolution metrics were negatively 
impacted. Contributing factors included culture, leadership support, and limited follow-
through from lessons learned. Recommendations include establishing a formal disposal 
process to remove outdated knowledge from knowledge management tools and 
establishing incentives to encourage employees to contribute knowledge, which can lead 
to higher staff engagement of those tools and improved customer service. The social 
change significance is that addressing knowledge loss can promote fiscal sustainability 
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Particular attention has been given to knowledge generation, capture, and storage 
in knowledge management frameworks (Argote, McEvily, & Reagans, 2003). This 
attention and focus has been replicated by organizations using these frameworks to 
establish knowledge management practices. Organizations, therefore, have focused 
knowledge management efforts on sharing and exchanging explicit and tacit knowledge 
to promote knowledge generation and capture and have also focused knowledge 
management efforts on technology tools that act as storage repositories (Davenport & 
Prusak, 2000; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). This zeal for capture and storage coupled with 
almost limitless storage capacities has led to what Baker (2006) called the infoglut. The 
infoglut is defined as “receiving or gathering an indigestible or incomprehensible amount 
of amount of information all at once” (Dictionary.com's 21st Century Lexicon, 2009).  
The infoglut is negatively impacting organizations because they are overwhelmed 
with information and data with inadequate mechanisms for access, assessing content 
accuracy, codification, and search functionalities (Pfeiffer, 2006; Saggese, 2004). 
Organizations are at risk of becoming less efficient because employees are spending too 
much time attempting to find information. A more serious risk is that there does not seem 
to be a knowledge management framework for organizations to adopt that promotes 
purposeful knowledge discard. Without one, the infoglut will continue to choke 
organizations via what they have worked so diligently to capture and store (Baker, 2006). 
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Researchers have an opportunity to develop frameworks where knowledge 
discard is an equal to generation, capture, and storage. Organizations can benefit from 
understanding how to approach knowledge discard so that the right information and data 
are routinely disposed, or at the very least archived, in order to maintain a manageable 
amount of data and to ensure currency (Pfeiffer, 2006). Before a more comprehensive 
framework can be established or a plan for discard can be put into action, however, both 
researchers and organizations must step back and gain awareness about a parallel but 
nonetheless impactful concept, knowledge loss (Martin de Holan, Phillips, & Lawrence, 
2004). 
Similar to knowledge discard, knowledge loss has been largely overlooked in the 
academic and management arenas. Yet it has significant potential to impact 
organizational performance, which researchers have demonstrated on a limited scale 
(Benkard, 2000; Darr, Argote, & Epple, 1995; Ibrahim, 2005; Martin de Holan & 
Phillips, 2004; Martin de Holan et al., 2004; Thompson, 2007). The body of research that 
does exist regarding knowledge loss is examined more closely in chapter 2.  
Some of the factors attributed to knowledge loss include accidental forgetting, 
purposeful resistance to new knowledge, lack of leadership support or reinforcement, 
employee turnover, and disuse. What is worthy of further research is how and in what 
ways these factors promote knowledge loss and how they contribute to individual and 
organizational capabilities to operate successfully (Martin de Holan et al., 2004). 
Moreover, because the literature is thin with regard to this concept, it is valuable to 
investigate it in a type of organization not previously studied. 
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Statement of the Problem 
  
The problem addressed in this study concerned the low awareness that 
organizations have of how knowledge loss occurs in their environment, how it impacts 
their performance, and how its omission in the routine practice of knowledge 
management by the organization creates knowledge gaps. Research conducted in both the 
manufacturing and hospitality industries revealed significant relationships between 
knowledge loss and organizational performance (Benkard, 2000; Darr et al., 1995; Martin 
de Holan & Phillips, 2004; Martin de Holan et al., 2004; Thompson, 2007). Martin de 
Holan and Phillips, for example, identified through case study research that 
organizational performance was impacted by organizational forgetting across knowledge 
workers in the Cuban tourism hospitality sector. Furthermore, this organizational 
forgetting, or knowledge loss, was often overlooked by organizations as a critical 
component of a comprehensive knowledge management plan.  
Although previous studies focused on the manufacturing and hospitality 
industries, the number of organizations was limited and the concept had not been 
explored through the lens of an inbound telephone contact center, which is a highly 
dynamic and knowledge intensive environment. The global contact center industry is 
currently undergoing prolific changes regarding knowledge complexity and performance 
measurement.  
Background to the Study 
    
Knowledge loss, or forgetting, is a fact of life. People forget things. Most of the 
time, knowledge loss is accidental, but some of the time, it is purposeful. People might 
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choose not to accept new knowledge and, through this choice, forget the new knowledge 
because of disuse or because of the very act of subverting or dismissing the knowledge 
(Martin de Holan et al., 2004). In personal situations, knowledge loss can cost people an 
extra trip to the grocery store, a missed birthday, or a late fee. In work situations, 
knowledge loss can accumulate so that it impacts an organization’s overall knowledge 
capabilities (Martin de Holan et al.). Despite studies that demonstrated a clear 
relationship between knowledge loss and organizational performance, knowledge 
management frameworks fail to incorporate knowledge loss as a key component or 
dimension of the framework (Argote et al., 2003; Hsu & Shen, 2005). 
 Organizational performance is watched by contact centers (Downing, 2004; 
Hillmer, Hillmer, & McRoberts, 2004; Kinnie, Hutchinson, & Purcell, 2000). The entire 
environment and culture of the contact center revolves around organizational 
performance, metrics, and key performance indicators (Kinnie et al., 2000). Indeed, in 
contact center work, organizational performance is often measured from the ground up. 
That is, the performance of the contact center as a whole is based on the aggregated 
performance of its agents and their accuracy, consistency, adherence to process and local 
protocol, and average handle time (Hillmer et al., 2004). For all of these indicators, 
knowledge plays a key role. If knowledge is lost or new knowledge is not assimilated, 
accuracy, consistency, adherence, and handle time can be negatively impacted (Downing, 
2004). Multiplication of these issues can impact overall customer service and that is an 




Contact centers offer a prime setting for research that moves well beyond the 
quantitative data available for study, particularly when one is studying a knowledge 
management-related concept like knowledge loss. This is because the contact center is a 
knowledge intensive firm. Higgins (2006) defined a knowledge intensive firm as one 
where knowledge is fundamental to economic success. Also, according to Higgins, “The 
knowledge intensive firm is both important economically and a source of great interest 
academically; it operates in high dynamic environments, which require the firm to 
construct new knowledge in order to respond to changes within the operating 
environment” (p. 189). Changing customer needs, technology, and workforce talent are 
examples of forces that drive change in a contact center’s operating environment and 
require new knowledge to be constructed. 
 The time to study contact centers is also ideal because of a growing knowledge 
crisis that is impacting these organizations. The Customer Contact Council (2007) noted 
that agents are expected to handle complex calls just as easily and as efficiently as they 
handle simple calls. “This shift toward complexity is driven not only by a migration of 
‘easier’ contacts to self-service but also by an increase in customer expectations” (p. 4, 
emphasis in original). According to the Council, this shift requires significant work for 
the contact center industry.  
 While the Customer Contact Council (2007) understood the role that knowledge 
management can play in the success of a contact center environment, it fails to address 
knowledge loss in its knowledge management process. Generation, refinement, feedback, 
and articulation of knowledge need are included, but knowledge loss is not, nor is it 
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mentioned as an issue impacting organizational performance. Including knowledge loss 
as an inherent part of the knowledge management cycle can positively impact the success 
of an organization engaged in knowledge management practices.  
Purpose of the Study 
 
 The purpose of this mixed model case study was to understand where and why 
loss occurs and to examine implications on performance metrics, which may help create 
better performance outcomes within organizations engaged in the practice of knowledge 
management. Leybourne (2006) stated that “what is needed is the creation and 
articulation of knowledge that can assist practitioners within organizations in the 
satisfactory execution of their duties” (p. 13). In addition, the purpose of this study was to 
contribute to literature related to knowledge loss, knowledge management, and contact 
center work by offering research directly related to those areas. 
Research Questions 
 
The primary research question asked about knowledge loss in the contact center 
and the operational impacts. More specifically, three subquestions associated with this 
primary question were: 
1. Where did knowledge loss occur at the individual and/or organizational level 
within the chosen organization? 
2. What were the contributing factors to knowledge loss?  






The qualitative case study that was completed by Martin de Holan et al. (2004), as 
well as the researcher’s experience with knowledge loss as a knowledge manager and 
practitioner in a contact center environment, were the stimuli for this study. Martin de 
Holan et al. produced a model of forgetting that served as the conceptual framework for 




Figure 1. Mode of forgetting matrix. From “Managing Organizational Forgetting,” by 
Martin de Holan, Phillips, and Lawrence, 2004, MIT Sloan Management Review, 45(2), 
p. 47. Copyright 2004 by MIT Sloan Management Review. Reprinted with permission.  
 
 Through their research, Martin de Holan et al. (2004) identified that forgetting, or 
knowledge loss, can be categorized along two dimensions, accidental versus intentional 
forgetting and new knowledge versus old knowledge. Within each of these dimensions, 
there are specific processes that “describe the range of organizational forgetting that can 
occur” (p. 47). These specific processes are described in more detail in chapter 2. To this 
researcher’s knowledge, this matrix has not been used in any other study of knowledge 
loss and organizational performance. Applying this framework to the present study 
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demonstrated the mode of forgetting and the source of knowledge as valid dimensions of 
knowledge loss. It also served to pinpoint specific areas of attention for the contact center 
organization and its knowledge management practices. 
Definitions 
 
Agent: refers to an individual responsible for handling the inbound and outbound 
interactions in a contact center; also known as a customer service representative (CSR). 
 Contact center: refers to an organization responsible for inbound and outbound 
customer service interactions that may be phone based, web based (web chat, e-mail), or 
paper-based (written correspondence); also known as a call center. 
Culture: “a set of attitudes, values, assumptions, and traditions that directly shape 
an environment” (Merriam-Webster, 2008). 
Dynamic environment: a setting that requires organizations to “construct new 
knowledge in order to respond to changes within the operating environment” (Higgins, 
2006, p. 190). 
Knowledge loss: refers to a concept or phenomenon where knowledge is 
accidentally or purposefully lost. 
Mixed methods research: “the class of research where the researcher mixes or 
combines quantitative and qualitative research techniques, methods, approaches, 
concepts, or language in a single study” (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004, p. 17). 
Mixed model: “mixed-model (mixing qualitative and quantitative approaches 
within or across the stages of the research process) [as opposed to] mixed-method (the 
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inclusion of a quantitative phase and a qualitative phase in an overall research study)” 
(Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004, p. 20, emphasis in original). 
Organizational performance: the “interaction between organizational knowledge 
(a function of individual training, knowledge and information processing capabilities) 
and organizational structure applied to the work of the organization” (Carley, 2002, as 
cited in Merrill-Matzner, 2006, p. 11, emphasis in original). 
Performance metrics: “any work performance data that can be quantified” 
(Downing, 2004, p. 171). 
Assumptions 
  
1. Organizational knowledge is inherently bound to the organization’s culture. 
 
2. Knowledge loss in an organization occurs at the individual level, the group or 
team level, and the organizational level. 
3. Explicit engagement of knowledge management practices by the contact center 
that participated in this case study were not germane to the study although there was an 
understanding that both explicit and tacit knowledge management practices were already 
in use. 
4. The contact center in this case study may not be explicitly representative of any 
other contact centers inside or outside of the United States, but it served as a general 
representation of a contact center organization.  
5. The case study sponsor understood the access to the organization, its people, 
and its data that was necessary for the researcher and made that access available. 
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Limitations of the Study 
 
 This study explored a contact center organization and the phenomenon of 
knowledge loss: where it existed, what factors contributed to it, and how performance 
metrics were influenced because of it. Because contact centers are often thought of as 
knowledge and learning organizations, it must be recognized that they are continually 
changing and that this study merely took a snapshot at one particular point in time and all 
research results are constrained to that particular snapshot and to that particular point in 
time. For example, even though Senge (2006) used the term learning organization, he 
said that organizations cannot proclaim that they have achieved the goal of being a 
learning organization because it is a continual process. In essence, organization members 
practice the art of being a learning organization, but there is no end point, the 
organization is always learning. Because only one contact center was under study, the 
research offers a generalized view of the contact center industry at large.  
 In any organization, knowledge loss is occurring (Kransdorff, 1999). Thus, by 
focusing only on one contact center organization, the research presents a limited view of 
how knowledge loss impacts organizational performance at large. Knowledge, moreover, 
has a tacit component that is more difficult to extract and analyze than explicit knowledge 
(Davenport & Prusak, 2000). As Carmichael (2007) cautioned: “Intellectual capacity or 
the talents of our knowledge workers are sometimes not easily identifiable on the surface, 
and to the naked eye, may be disguised, masked, or hidden” (p. 27). There is, therefore, 
tacit knowledge held by the individual and the organization that might not have been 
uncovered through this research. 
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 A mixed model case study design was used in this research. Weaknesses of mixed 
methods research include data integration issues and the lack of guidance on how to 
resolve discrepancies in the data. Also, the quantitative data collected for this study were 
used as a point of triangulation for the qualitative data. As such, the data were not 
empirically tested against a hypothesis or null hypothesis. Weaknesses of case study 
research include generalization issues, bias due to the researcher’s proximity to the 
participants, and time constraints to complete a thorough case study. The researcher 
entered the study with a full awareness of those weaknesses. Where appropriate, the 
researcher relied on the guidelines of Yin (2003) and Merriam (1998) to mitigate the 
weaknesses in the case study approach and relied on the guidelines of Creswell and Plano 
Clark (2007) and Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) to mitigate the weaknesses of mixed 
methods research. More information about the research design is included in chapter 3. 
Scope and Delimitations  
  
 The scope of the study involved a contact center in the midwestern United States 
whose employees were onsite and not working in an outsourced or offshore situation. 
Information was not collected from any other organizations or entities. Only those 
personnel directly related to the contact center and its work efforts were interviewed 
during field research. Those individuals included managerial staff, systems support 
technicians, knowledge team members, and the contact center agents. Any documentation 
or technology tools reviewed or observed were those that were directly used in the day-
to-day operations of the contact center. Any quantitative data collected were directly 
related to this contact center. 
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 Although turnover has been found to be a significant factor that contributes to 
knowledge loss, and Ibrahim (2005) presented a noteworthy study about knowledge loss 
and discontinuous membership and its affect in the construction industry, this study 
focused on knowledge loss that occurred with agents and organizational members with 
more permanent, continuous tenure. That is, this research was more focused on 
knowledge loss due to a changing environment with workers that persisted in the 
organization for more than 12 months. One can easily recognize that attrition and 
retirement impact knowledge loss, but this study attempted to fill a niche of knowledge 
loss and organizational forgetting that has implications for those in the field of 
knowledge management, learning management, and organizational change dealing with 
current employees and current organizational forgetting.  
This study was limited to knowledge loss. During the course of research, 
observations may have been made about an organization’s ability to generate knowledge, 
but knowledge generation was not the concept under study.  
The researcher is a knowledge manager in a contact center environment, which 
may be perceived as a source of bias. In an attempt to mitigate bias, the researcher did not 
select a contact center that was in her organization or under her management purview in 
any way. Moreover, the researcher did not know the case study sponsor on either a 
personal or professional level before initiating the study. All precautions were taken to 
limit bias and properly present the results of the research. 
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Significance and Social Change Implications 
 
Previous studies identified that knowledge loss impacts organizational 
performance (Benkard, 2000; Cha, 2007; Darr et al., 1995; Ibrahim, 2005; Martin de 
Holan & Phillips, 2004; Martin de Holan et al., 2004; Thompson, 2007). Building upon 
those studies, this study explored the phenomenon of knowledge loss, where it existed 
and why, what factors contributed to it, and how performance metrics were influenced 
because of it, in the highly dynamic, knowledge intensive environment of the contact 
center organization. This appeared to be the first study to apply the mode of forgetting 
matrix (Martin de Holan et al., 2004) to a contact center environment. This study 
contributes to the ongoing dialogue about the phenomenon of knowledge loss, what 
dimensions of loss and forgetting are prevalent, and organizational performance 
implications, thus bridging a gap in the literature about knowledge loss. 
The social change significance of this research is that it increases knowledge loss 
awareness, pinpoints specific areas of loss, and illustrates knowledge loss’s rightful place 
in knowledge management models for better performance outcomes. Specifically, the 
results of the study demonstrate that more awareness must be given to knowledge loss 
because it has direct implications on contact center organizational performance and cost 
per call. Moreover, knowledge loss at the organizational level because of lack of 
standardization and failure to learn from experience puts fiscal sustainability and the 
ability to generate new revenue at risk, which can lead to social change issues of 
downsizings, layoffs, and organizational closures.  
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Purposeful knowledge loss must be embedded into knowledge management 
frameworks and institutionalized as part of everyday knowledge and learning 
management practice. Failure to incorporate purposeful knowledge loss lengthens time to 
customer resolution because employees are unable to quickly locate relevant knowledge 
amid outdated knowledge and increases the risk that employees will abandon knowledge 
management systems due to obsolescence, thereby significantly reducing any return on 
investment of these systems, which are expensive to implement. 
The findings can lead to meaningful discussion about the place of knowledge loss 
in knowledge management models and how to manage accidental or purposeful 
forgetting using a combination of culture, human capital, and technology. The findings 
also provide some illumination on the ways to strategically structure an organization to 
minimize forgetting and call into question whether attitudinal resistance to change may 
be linked to the types of people employed in contact center positions and the pay that is 
provided in said positions to transfer knowledge that is becoming increasingly more 
complex, which is worthy of further study. For contact center organizations, 
understanding knowledge loss and ways to mitigate it can influence organizational 
performance and ensure that those working on the front lines with the customers are 
building brand loyalty through exceptional customer service that is directly supported by 
knowledge availability and the ability to resolve the initial call. Minimally, a basic 
understanding of knowledge loss and unlearning can benefit those contact center 
organizations undergoing a shift from production-based to quality-based metrics, which 




 Knowledge loss and its impact on organizational performance has been verified in 
the literature; however, the research is minimal. This study adds to the body of research 
and uses as its case an organization that had not been studied before with respect to 
knowledge loss, the contact center. 
Chapter 1 introduced the study and contained the problem statement, which 
concerned the low awareness that organizations have of how knowledge loss occurs in 
their environment, how it impacts their performance, and how its omission in the routine 
practice of knowledge management by the organization creates knowledge gaps. The 
chapter included the primary research question that asked about knowledge loss in the 
contact center and the operational impacts. It also included three subquestions associated 
with the primary question that asked where knowledge loss occurred at the individual 
and/or organizational level, what the contributing factors were, and how it influenced the 
contact center’s productivity and quality metrics. The limitations that were discussed 
involved weaknesses of both mixed methods and case study research, the limited view of 
how knowledge loss impacts organizational performance at large when only one 
organization is studied, and the difficulty with uncovering tacit knowledge. The scope of 
the study, which involved a contact center in the midwestern United States, was outlined. 
Delimitations included a focus on knowledge loss in individuals with continuous tenure 
in the organization and not on knowledge loss related solely to attrition. The researcher 
made known that she is currently a manager in a contact center environment. To mitigate 
perceived bias, the researcher did not select her own organization as the case under study. 
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Chapter 2 discusses the literature review, which speaks to the literature gap, and 
explores in detail the concept of knowledge loss and its relationship with organizational 
performance, culture, and change, as well as with knowledge and learning management. 
Chapter 3 describes the research methodologies that were used to address the problem 
statement and answer the research questions found in chapter 1. Chapter 4 contains the 
results of the study based on analysis of the qualitative and quantitative data collected 
from the field research, while chapter 5 includes a summary of the study, the conclusions 










 Organizational knowledge loss and its impact on organizational performance has 
been previously studied. From pizza makers and hotel staff to ship and airplane builders, 
other researchers have examined how knowledge loss influences franchise success, 
customer service in resort areas, and construction of large-scale transportation equipment 
(Benkard, 2000; Darr et al., 1995; Martin de Holan & Phillips, 2004; Martin de Holan et 
al., 2004; Thompson, 2007). The frequency with which it has been studied is slowly 
increasing and the way in which it has been studied is slowly expanding, but ultimately 
the topic remains scarce in the literature. To study knowledge loss and its impact on 
organizational performance, it was necessary to broaden the review of the literature to 
encompass knowledge and learning management, organizational culture and change, and 
the current state of the organization and its environment. While the organization and its 
environment are viewed from a macroscopic perspective, a specific type of organization 
and its environment, which is the contact center, is viewed from a microscopic 
perspective. 
 The literature review begins, then, with an examination of knowledge loss and 
how that term has been situated in the literature to date. Next, the concepts of knowledge 
and learning management are explored with respect to the theories and themes on 
knowledge loss. Literature related to organizational culture and change is also 
subsequently incorporated because of its natural intimacy and interconnectedness with 
knowledge and learning management. Throughout the review, attention is given to 
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methodologies used to investigate the issue of knowledge loss and organizational 
performance. Lastly, the current state of the organization, and more specifically the 
contact center organization, is investigated and addressed.  
 The strategy used for canvassing the literature involved searching Walden 
University’s Business Source Premiere online database for information related to the 
topic. Articles were collected and analyzed from 32 peer reviewed journals. The strategy 
also included searching Proquest for related, relevant dissertations, which yielded six 
results (Arnett, 2007; Carmichael, 2000; Cha, 2007; Ibrahim, 2005; Merrill-Matzner, 
2006; Nelson, 2007). Primary key word searches included knowledge loss, organizational 
forgetting, unlearning, call center (as well as call centre), and organizational 
performance. Secondary key word searches, which were often cross-referenced with the 
primary key word searches, included knowledge retention, organizational memory, and 
knowledge depreciation. Research is an iterative process so the collection of related 
literature continued throughout the dissertation process to ensure a comprehensive 
review. This continuous harvesting of the literature resulted in six additional articles that 
included information applicable to the case under study (Braff & DeVine, 2009; Cross, 
Barry, & Garavan, 2008; Kuhn & Jackson, 2008; Rowold, Hochholdinger, & Schilling, 
2008; Russell, 2007; Terry, 2007). Of those articles, four included further examples of 
case study research used to examine issues in the contact center environment (Cross et 
al.; Kuhn & Jackson; Rowold et al.; Russell).   
Focus was given to those articles that described knowledge loss issues and its 
impact on organizational performance as a result of human error, knowledge generation, 
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knowledge transmission, training, or lack thereof. Articles that focused solely on the 
ways in which people learn or the ways in which knowledge was or was not generated or 
articles that discussed training efficacy and did not deal in any way with specific 
knowledge loss ramifications were not selected as key source materials because, as noted 
in chapter 1, they were outside the scope of this study. 
Because a literature gap does exist with regard to knowledge loss, it was 
important to review not only academic journals, but also trade journals and magazines to 
enable the broadest view of the topic in the literature landscape. In addition, it was 
important to consult other information sources. These additional sources included 
organizations such as the Customer Contact Council, the International Customer 
Management Institute, and the Call and Contact Centre Association. Previous study on 
knowledge management, learning organizations, and organizational change from seminal 
authors like Lewin (1948/1951/1997), Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995), Schein (2004), and 
Senge (2006) rounded out the body of research. Chapter 3 contains a literature review of 
the selected research methodology and design. 
Knowledge Loss 
 People have been thinking about knowledge loss, forgetfulness, and the role of 
memory for a long time. Plato likened memory to birds in an aviary to describe loss (Shiu 
& Chan, 2006). In this metaphor, as more birds are added to the aviary, it becomes 
increasingly difficult to find specific birds. All the birds, however, remain in the aviary. 
According to Shiu and Chan, “This metaphor implies that forgetting is due to failure to 
retrieve, rather than memory being erased” (p. 193). Whatever implications are attributed 
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to forgetfulness or memory loss, it remains a human condition that is still being thought 
about, analyzed, and dissected today (Thompson, 2007). It not only impacts people in 
their personal lives, but also impacts people in their work lives related to individual and 
organizational performance (Martin de Holan & Phillips, 2004; Martin de Holan et al., 
2004).  
 Although the study of knowledge loss and its impact on organizational 
performance can be found in the literature, the number of recent studies is limited and the 
studies themselves split distinctly between customer service/strategic management theory 
(Darr et al., 1995; Martin de Holan & Phillips, 2004; Martin de Holan et al., 2004) and 
industrial production/economic theory (Benkard, 2000; Thompson, 2007). Martin de 
Holan and Phillips sparked interest in the area of knowledge loss for this researcher. 
Using Cuban hotel chains engaged in international alliances as their field of study, Martin 
de Holan and Phillips took a qualitative case study approach to exploring knowledge 
transfer within these alliances. They identified a gap in the research and literature 
surrounding organizational learning and organizational knowledge management. 
Although significant attention has been given to learning and knowledge access and 
acquisition, limited attention has been given to knowledge loss, or what the authors 
termed organizational forgetting. This is still the case today, as only one additional peer-
reviewed article by Thompson about this topic was found in the 3 years since Martin de 
Holan and Phillips published; in this article, Thompson revisited a case study of the 
World War II Liberty shipbuilding program. 
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 Almost a decade before Martin de Holan and Phillips’s (2004) article, Darr et al. 
(1995) also studied knowledge loss and its impact on organizational performance, but in a 
different service industry and with different terminology. They used knowledge 
depreciation to describe the impact on organizational performance in 36 pizza stores in 
Pennsylvania. Because the stores were owned by different people, the authors wanted to 
know if staff from pizza stores owned by one franchisee would learn from the 
experiences of staff from other stores owned by other franchisees. Similar to Martin de 
Holan and Phillips, this focus on knowledge transfer led naturally to a keener focus on 
knowledge loss. The authors hypothesized that “knowledge acquired through learning by 
doing may not persist indefinitely. Rather, knowledge may be lost through individual 
forgetting, misplaced manuals, personnel turnover and the like” (Darr et al., 1995, p. 
1753).  
In a quantitative study that analyzed 18 months worth of data from the stores, 
Darr et al. (1995) found that knowledge depreciation was substantial. Only one half of 
what was known at the beginning of the month remained at month’s end. “In fact, 
without continuing production to replenish the stock of knowledge, virtually all 
production knowledge would be lost by mid-year” (p. 1758). Like Martin de Holan and 
Phillips (2004), who noted that the problem of knowledge loss was “driven by turnover 
of critical personnel and their inability or unwillingness to create collective knowledge” 
(p. 1610), Darr et al. attributed much of the knowledge loss they found in the pizza stores 
to high staff turnover. According to the authors, turnover of line staff in the pizza stores 
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averaged 300% per year. Compounding the issue, the turnover rate in managerial staff 
averaged 50% per year.  
Staff attrition and its impact on knowledge loss is one component of the topic that 
is well documented in the literature, particularly in reference to staff attrition due to the 
impending retirements of the baby boomers and corporate downsizing (Kransdorff, 1999; 
Lesser & Prusak, 2001). Kransdorff stated, “Knowledge loss from staff turnover is now 
the single biggest source of know-how leakage out of companies” and the labor market is 
“now replacing almost the entire employee base of most organizations every five years” 
(p. 13). What remains a gap in the literature, however, is how knowledge loss impacts 
organizational performance for those employees with ongoing, continuous tenure. As 
Thompson (2007, citing Anderlohr, 1969) noted, “Although numerous explanations have 
been given for why organizations appear to forget in the face of interruptions to 
production, few have been given for continuous depreciation of knowledge” (p. 908). 
This gap was also identified by Benkard (2000), who stated that companies have some 
control over organizational forgetting that seems to be separate and distinct from 
forgetting caused by attrition. Regarding the larger gap on the topic of knowledge loss, 
Benkard mentioned that “the organizational forgetting hypothesis suggests that 
organizational human capital depreciates, an assumption often maintained in other lines 
of the literature but thinly studied empirically” (p. 1035).  
The impetus for closing this gap can be found in the strategic implications to the 
organization. Darr et al. (1995) and Martin de Holan et al. (2004) both called attention to 
these strategic implications of knowledge loss. Martin de Holan et al. said that the 
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“involuntary loss of organizational knowledge is costing companies millions of dollars 
every year” (p. 45). Moreover, the authors noted that companies cannot transform 
themselves if they are not able to forget old knowledge when new knowledge is 
generated. Darr et al. noted broad impacts to competitive strategy, productivity, retention, 
and downsizing. The authors also cautioned that knowledge is sometimes lost before it 
can be transferred. “In the extreme very rapid depreciation may eliminate a stock of 
knowledge before it can be transferred. Even less extreme depreciation rates may reduce 
a stock of knowledge sufficiently to restrict transfer” (p. 1753). Organizations risk losing 
knowledge in both the capture and transfer stages.  
Knowledge transfer is further examined in the studies of Benkard (2000) and 
Thompson (2007), although these studies are somewhat different than the studies 
completed by Darr et al. (1995), Martin de Holan and Phillips (2004), and Martin de 
Holan et al. (2004). Rather than studying the service industry, Benkard and Thompson 
focused on labor production in the areas of airplane building and ship building. In 
addition, both initiated their research by exploring and building upon prior research about 
organizational learning curves and learning by doing. What was noticed in the prior 
research and validated empirically by Benkard and Thompson using more comprehensive 
data sets was that production costs did not decrease in proportion to the decrease in the 
learning curve. Both authors, therefore, found support for knowledge loss and its impact 
on organizational performance. 
Thompson’s (2007) quantitative analysis revealed that organizational forgetting 
did occur with the Liberty shipbuilders although not to the extent previously reported in 
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similar industrial settings. Using new data on unit labor requirements, Thompson was 
able to recalculate the rate of knowledge depreciation. According to Thompson, 
knowledge depreciation, which was the term he used when discussing results, was 
between 3.6 and 5.7% per month (p. 917). What had previously been reported was a 
number closer to 25% per month. Regarding production and the strategic implication to 
the organization, Thompson stated that the evidence “suggests that knowledge 
depreciation can be economically significant, although it varies widely across cases” (p. 
908). What is noticeable about Thompson’s study is that staff attrition was not found to 
impact organizational forgetting. “Attempts to relate forgetting to labor turnover were 
unsuccessful. To the contrary, the inclusion of labor turnover data eliminates entirely any 
evidence of organizational forgetting” (p. 909). 
Benkard (2000), conversely, did find a correlation between turnover and 
organizational forgetting. In the airplane industry, however, there was a regimented 
structure and process around job placement rights, which impacted turnover. As Benkard 
explained, “Whenever employment changes, there is a domino effect throughout the 
company that has been known to affect as many as ten positions for just one job  
opening. . .under ‘bumping’, turnover rates are high, which leads to greater 
organizational forgetting” (p. 1037, emphasis in original). This meant that employees 
with higher seniority in the company could displace employees with lower seniority. This 
was called bumping and it created a chain effect as higher seniority employees displaced 
lower seniority employees until the employee with the lowest seniority had no one to 
displace and was subsequently unemployed. While turnover had an obvious impact on 
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organizational forgetting in this study, Benkard suggested that decreasing production 
rates also impacted organizational forgetting. If the quantity of airplanes being produced 
decreased, some organizational knowledge was lost because workers were not 
performing tasks as frequently. As a way to minimize the impact of this, airplane 
manufacturers attempted to maintain consistent assembly processes throughout the 
production cycle even if production volume fluctuated. While this continuity may be well 
served in an industrial, production-based setting, its efficacy in a highly dynamic 
customer service environment like the contact center may not be possible. With regard to 
contact centers and the close proximity between employee and customer and the balance 
between the two that must be maintained, Kinnie et al. (2000) noted, “The immediacy of 
the production process and its highly personal characteristics intensify and counterpose 
these conflicting demands in a way in which is often absent, camouflaged, or kept at arms 
length in organizations outside the service sector” (p. 980). 
 Benkard (2000) summarized the factors impacting organizational forgetting as 
“geographic turnover, company turnover, literal forgetting, and non reinforcement of 
routine” (p. 1042). Literal forgetting and nonreinforcement of routine are two phenomena 
that were researched in this study using the mode of forgetting matrix (Martin de Holan 
et al., 2004). Benkard also summarized the commonalties between the studies that had 
been previously completed related to knowledge loss and organizational performance. 
Those commonalities included labor intensive production, significant attention to 
learning at the individual level, and high turnover. Contact center organizations, which 
are discussed more in detail later in this chapter, have these issues in common as well; 
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therefore, Benkard’s hypothesis that these issues can be used to evaluate the impact of 
organizational forgetting on an industry were investigated in this study.  
Ibrahim’s (2005) mixed method research focused on the construction industry not 
from a labor perspective, but from a knowledge flow perspective. What Ibrahim 
discovered when studying knowledge loss remains true today. There is an “abundance of 
literature on knowledge creation, knowledge storage, and knowledge retrieval” (p. 91), 
but literature on knowledge transfer and knowledge loss is still sparse.  
Ibrahim focused on the initial architectural design and engineering phases of 
major construction projects within one company and identified that discontinuous 
membership in an organization facilitated knowledge loss. That is, knowledge shared 
with a principal during the architectural design component of a project was not 
transferred to other principals (i.e., the actual builder or project manager) in related 
phases. He talked of a situation where a playground was required to be built with the 
construction of new housing complexes. This information was relayed contractually at 
the outset of the project, but the playground was not built. The company was fined for 
this oversight. This failure to transfer knowledge, which ultimately led to forgetting, had 
a direct financial impact on the company. In his summary, Ibrahim stated that these issues 
of forgetting seemed more problematic for organizations that were dynamic. As indicated 
earlier, the contact center environment is dynamic and as such could experience similar 
fallout from cases of knowledge loss. 
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Individual Versus Organizational Forgetting 
 Several authors distinguish between individual forgetting and organizational 
forgetting when discussing not only knowledge loss but also knowledge and learning 
management (Allen, 2001; Benkard, 2000; Darr et al. 1995; Fedor, Ghosh, Caldwell, 
Maurer, & Singhal, 2003; Fiol & Lyles, 1985; Higgins, 2006; Hsu & Shen, 2005; 
Treleaven & Sykes, 2005). Fiol and Lyles argued that “some agreement exists that 
distinctions must be made between individual and organizational learning. Though 
individual learning is important to organizations, organizational learning is not simply the 
sum of each member’s learning” (p. 804). This systems view of learning is supported by 
Allen, Darr et al., Treleaven and Sykes, and Fedor et al. Personal knowledge and 
organizational knowledge, however, cannot necessarily be separated as one impacts the 
other. Carmichael (2000) noted this exception and cited Amidon (1997) as stressing that 
“every individual holds knowledge within the organization” (p. 27). As another example, 
Higgins noted that the knowledge intensive firm “relies not only on the formal 
knowledge of its agents, but draws heavily on the interaction between agents to create a 
knowledge capability” for the organization (p.193). 
 Although the individual and the organization are connected, other authors 
distinguish the focus of their studies to make explicit whether attention has been paid 
primarily to the individual or to the organization. Darr et al. (1995) mentioned that their 
research focused on the organization rather than the individual. Fedor et al. (2003) and 
Hsu and Shen (2005) approached knowledge management from different viewpoints on 
the topic of the individual versus the organization. Fedor et al. thought that the individual 
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had been largely overlooked in the knowledge management process while Hsu and Shen 
thought that organizations were at risk if they viewed knowledge management as the 
“management of individual learning instead of collective learning” (p. 354).  
 Due to the literature gap and the different perspectives from which to approach 
the individual and the organization as it pertains to knowledge loss, it is critical that 
researchers clarify their position on this topic so that the research can be appropriately 
verified, validated, and extended by others. As Benkard (2000) indicated, “It is entirely 
plausible that forgetting may occur both at the individual and organizational level” (p. 
1037). It is also critical that researchers take stock of the many different ways to which 
the term knowledge loss is referred. One of the contributing factors to the literature gap 
could be that researchers are using multiple terms to describe a singular phenomenon.  
Knowledge Loss Terminology 
 As stated in the introduction of this chapter, when conducting the literature review 
it was necessary to search multiple terms related to knowledge loss because researchers 
have not used consistent terminology when referring to the phenomenon. The three most 
prevalent terms used in the articles appeared to be knowledge loss, organizational 
forgetting, and unlearning. Initial searches using the term knowledge loss resulted in a 
return of 11 articles. Of those 11, 6 were focused on knowledge loss due to retirements 
and turnovers. Although the authors of those articles exposed the upcoming crisis in 
respect to the baby boomers exiting the workforce, none provided an academic argument 
as to the impacts of this crisis to the organization’s performance as a whole. Two articles 
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applicable to the topic under study were selected for this review (Lesser & Prusak, 2001; 
Treleaven & Sykes, 2005). The remaining three articles were not applicable.  
Searches using the term organizational forgetting yielded eight results; four of 
those articles were relevant to the topic and were selected for this review (Benkard, 2000; 
Martin de Holan & Phillips, 2004; Martin de Holan et al., 2004; Thompson, 2007). 
Searches using the term unlearning yielded a significant number of results, with 62 
academic journals and 31 other resources related to trade journals, magazines, and 
newspapers. Six articles regarding unlearning were relevant to the topic of knowledge 
loss (Akgun, Lynn, & Byrne, 2006; Kransdorff, 1999; Kuwada, 1998; Lei, Slocum, & 
Pitts, 1999; Sherwood, 2000; Shiu & Chan, 2006). The Martin de Holan and Phillips 
article was also cross-referenced with the term unlearning. Despite the number of articles 
returned in the search, Akgun et al. said as recently as 2006 that “unlearning, which first 
appeared almost 30 years ago as a subprocess of the organizational learning process, has 
received only limited attention in the literature” (p. 73).   
Although both Darr et al. (1995) and Thompson (2007) used the term knowledge 
depreciation prevalently throughout their articles, neither article was found under a search 
of that term. The search resulted in five articles and none of the articles were selected due 
to lack of relevancy. While knowledge depreciation was one of the terms that yielded the 
least results, knowledge retention resulted in 21 returns, but none were applicable. 
Of all the search terms used by this researcher to locate articles on knowledge 
loss, organizational memory yielded the most returns with 118 results. Only two articles 
(Ackerman & Halverson, 2000; Akgun et al., 2006 [cross-referenced with the term 
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unlearning]) were selected from the results, however, because the articles found under the 
search term were not relevant to the scope of this study. Perhaps this lack of relevancy 
can be attributed to use of the term itself; Ackerman and Halverson stated that “after 
nearly 10 years of research, ‘organizational memory’ (OM) has become overworked and 
confused” (p. 59, emphasis in original). 
For future research, it may be necessary to come to some type of consensus 
regarding knowledge loss and the terminology surrounding it. Even if researchers choose 
to use the term organizational forgetting instead of knowledge loss, cross-referencing the 
articles with relevant or predominant search terms would pull the body of research 
together in a more cohesive fashion. “Without addressing the question of integration, we 
run the risk of propagating a highly fractionated view” (Argote et al., 2003, p. 572). 
Despite the lack of consistency in terminology, research on knowledge loss 
should not be undermined by it. The impetus for continuing knowledge loss research is 
similar to continuing organizational memory research:  
Nonetheless, we do not argue for abandoning or ignoring OM as a concept. 
Despite the problems, there is something compelling about the idea. As Bannon 
and Kuutti state: That such a concept is appealed to across a wide range of 
studies, even if its definition is disputed, is testimony to the fact that even if 
people cannot agree on what exactly the term means, there must be some set of 
issues. . .that people feel are important and worth discussing. (Ackerman and 
Halverson, 2000, citing Bannon & Kuutti, 1996, p. 60) 
 
In an interesting parallel, regarding the practice of knowledge management, Fluss (2002) 
said, “That KM [knowledge management] is still around and keeps being reincarnated 
shows its durability in theory if not its practical value” (p. 40). Continuing research on 
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knowledge management and its various dimensions, like knowledge loss, is important 
and worth discussing, as is showing its practical value. 
At present, articles that could significantly contribute to the body of research 
about knowledge loss might be missed in a literature review due to the lack of consistent 
terminology. “Moreover, a limited appreciation of the links across disciplinary 
perspectives can prove to be inefficient as researchers fail to take advantage of ideas 
produced in other areas and simply ‘rediscover’ what is known already” (Argote et al., 
2003, p. 572, emphasis in original). Adding complexity to this issue is that the term 
knowledge loss itself can be thought of from two unique perspectives. Knowledge loss 
can be accidental, but it can also be purposeful. 
Accidental and Purposeful Knowledge Loss 
Martin de Holan and Phillips (2004) indicated that that there are three concepts 
related to organizational forgetting, avoiding forgetfulness for knowledge that has been 
introduced but not yet documented, maintaining documented organizational knowledge, 
and discarding knowledge when it is no longer useful or applicable. Within any of these 
concepts, organizational forgetting is either accidental or purposeful. Martin de Holan et 
al. (2004) stated that there is a fundamental difference between the two.  
Accidental forgetting occurs because of memory decay or failure to capture. 
Sometimes, knowledge is accidentally lost by individuals and by the organization. 
Benkard (2000) mentioned that knowledge loss sometimes occurs because of disuse and 
Martin de Holan et al. (2004) discussed that issue in their article by noting that 
information decays if it is not used regularly. In other situations, knowledge is 
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accidentally lost because it has not been transferred and institutionalized into 
organizational memory, a point that Darr et al. (1995) also made when discussing 
knowledge transfer. Regarding this situation, Martin de Holan et al. said that 
“information must be captured from individuals and made institutional—a process that 
involves a range of activities to routinize, codify and store knowledge” (p. 48).  
While accidental forgetting has negative strategic implications for the 
organization, intentional forgetting can have positive strategic implications. This is 
because intentional forgetting, according to Martin de Holan et al. (2004), is a set of 
actions that are actively managed at the organizational level. If knowledge is harmful to 
the organization, the organization can work to promote intentional forgetting by the 
employees and the organization after a period of time. The authors indicated that 
organizations can do this by promoting unlearning and avoiding bad habits. Promoting 
unlearning has ramifications for learning management and those ramifications will be 
discussed in the next section. In order to avoid bad habits, which has knowledge 
management consequences, also discussed in the next section, Martin de Holan et al. 
stated that “routines, practices, ideas and values that are counterproductive” must be 
identified and addressed (p. 50). As an example, a bad habit manifested by an 
organization would be its continued failure to incorporate lessons learned into the 
organization’s collective memory because it cannot articulate why a project succeeded or 
failed. 
What Martin de Holan et al. (2004) did not address in regard to intentional 
forgetting showcases their focus on the organization and organizational forgetting rather 
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the individual and individual forgetting. Consider that some employees may choose to 
intentionally forget something at the individual level that consequently has an impact to 
the organizational level from the perspective of performance. Although Martin de Holan 
et al. posited intentional forgetting in a positive way, there could be a more negative side 
to organizational forgetting that is tied to unlearning, intentional forgetting, and the 
individual’s engagement in his or her position with the organization. Thompson and 
Heron (2005) noted how the level of employee engagement impacted knowledge sharing 
while the Equal Employment Opportunities Trust (2007) noted how that level impacted 
productivity, which was called discretionary effort by the Trust. Citing the Corporate 
Leadership Council, the Trust noted that “70% of members [are] reporting increased 
concern with what they describe as spiritual turnover: although physically present in the 
workplace employees may not be deeply engaged in their work” (p. 17). This is not to say 
that the employee is acting in a sinister or unethical way, but perhaps is not engaged or is 
choosing to intentionally forget something because he or she is resistant to the unlearning 
and subsequent change that it brings, whether in process, routine, or values. Unlearning 
and employee engagement, therefore, and in the broader sense, knowledge loss, and its 
symbiosis with organizational culture and organizational change cannot be overlooked. 
Thompson and Heron and the Trust specifically pointed out how culture, change, and 
leadership support impact employee engagement.  
In addition to the mode of forgetting, whether it is accidental or intentional, 
Martin de Holan et al. (2004) also spoke to the source of knowledge as another 
component or dimension of organizational forgetting. According to the authors, there is a 
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difference between new knowledge, which “lives a more ephemeral life in the minds of 
individuals” and entrenched knowledge, which can be “deeply embedded, both culturally 
and technologically” (p. 46). Allen (2001) discussed the transient nature of knowledge 
when he said, “Anything that has to interact with an environment and with other living 
things in order to survive will find that the value of any piece of knowledge is ephemeral” 
(p. 177). Here again is a connection between the organization as a system, its collective 
knowledge and culture, and the phenomenon of forgetting.  
Martin de Holan et al. (2004) argued that organizations must understand all 
dimensions of forgetting and all dimensions of sources of knowledge, which are shown in 
Figure 1. The authors called this the mode of forgetting matrix and stated that the matrix:  
Highlights the four processes stemming from the intersection of the two 
dimensions: memory decay, failure to capture, unlearning and avoiding bad 
habits. Together, they describe the range of organizational forgetting that can 
occur. Each is associated with a distinct set of processes and contexts that results 
in a specific set of challenges. As such each of the four processes must be 
managed differently. (p. 47) 
 
In order for organizations to understand the dimensions of the mode of forgetting matrix, 
there is a need to have an understanding of learning management, knowledge 
management, organizational culture, and organizational change as these are all elements 
that contribute to this phenomenon of knowledge loss.  
Understanding Learning and Knowledge Management Implications  
 In his discussion of the knowledge intensive firm, Higgins (2006) applied a 
similar multidimensional framework to knowledge and learning that Martin de Holan et 
al. (2004) applied to organizational forgetting. Higgins stated that knowledge is 
“multifaceted and complex, being situated and abstract, implicit and explicit, distributed 
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and individual, developing and static, verbal and encoded. Analysis of the relationships 
between these different perspectives of knowledge is as important as any delineation of 
their differences” (p. 190). Misunderstanding and misapplication of learning and 
knowledge management in an organization can contribute to knowledge loss. 
Organizations must recognize the role and relationship that these concepts play in loss 
and forgetting.  
 One of the ongoing issues in learning and knowledge management is the failure to 
recognize knowledge loss as a critical piece of any learning and knowledge management 
framework. When Argote et al. (2003) created a theoretical framework for organizing 
research in this area, they included knowledge creation, retention, and transfer. 
Knowledge loss, or knowledge discard, was not included in that framework. The authors 
implied that knowledge retention included within it elements of knowledge loss, but in 
order to bring full attention to this issue, it needs to be clearly identified and called out in 
the frameworks that are created, presented, and discussed in the literature. Even though 
Argote et al. did not explicitly include knowledge loss in the framework, they recognized 
the importance of the concept when they stated that “research is needed on how 
properties of units, properties of relationships, and properties of knowledge affect 
whether knowledge persists through time or whether it depreciates. . .whether or not 
knowledge depreciates has important implications for both operational and strategic 
decisions of firms” (p. 579). 
 Another ongoing issue or point of discussion is what is sometimes portrayed as 
the dichotomous relationship between the individual and the organization. Earlier in this 
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chapter, the relationship between individual and organizational forgetting was discussed. 
The discussion of that relationship is also relevant here in terms of the individual or the 
organization as related to learning and knowledge management. Higgins (2006) paid 
particular attention to this topic when discussing the knowledge intensive firm. His 
definition of a knowledge intensive firm was one that exists in a highly dynamic 
environment where the firm must create new knowledge to achieve success. Operating 
from a holistic, systems view similar to Senge, whose 1990 work is cited by the author, 
Higgins presented a more harmonious view of the individual and the organization.  
One of the most important areas of the learning organization is a shift in mind set: 
from seeing ourselves as separate from the whole, to being connected to the 
whole, from seeing problems caused by someone ‘out there to seeing how our 
own activities create problems we experience’ (Senge, 1990: 12-13) thereby 
illustrating the fact that people act upon a system of which they themselves are an 
inseparable part, so the observer and the observed are belonging to the one and 
the same complex dynamical system. (p. 200, emphasis in original) 
  
For the concept of knowledge loss, then, as well as learning and knowledge 
management, attention needs to be given to both the individual and the organization 
because they are one organism acting together for the performance of the organization. 
“By understanding the dynamic complexity of knowledge it is possible to comprehend 
the whole organization and its activities in knowledge development through learning and 
interaction” (Higgins, 2006, p. 205). Organizations must work, in their application of 
learning and knowledge management processes and techniques, to ensure that there is a 
balance between the individual and the organization.  
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Technology, Leadership Support, and Tacit Knowledge 
 
Three other points warrant discussion here regarding learning and knowledge 
management—technology, leadership support, and tacit knowledge. The first two are 
specific issues that are often talked about when discussing learning and knowledge 
management (Davenport & Prusak, 2000; Schein, 2004). They are addressed here 
because some authors have identified in their studies of knowledge loss that technology 
use can minimize the rate of depreciation while other authors have identified the 
importance of leadership as a way to minimize the rate of depreciation (Benkard, 2000; 
Darr et al., 1995; Martin de Holan & Phillips, 2004). Darr et al. claimed that “knowledge 
embedded in the technology may be more resistant to depreciation than knowledge 
embedded in individual workers or in other aspects of the organization” because their 
data showed that the rate of knowledge depreciation was slower in pizza stores using 
more advanced technology (p. 1761). The authors go on to indicate that technology can 
act as a channel that fosters knowledge transfer not only throughout an organization but 
throughout an industry. Assigning appropriate leadership to learning and knowledge 
management can foster that knowledge transfer as well.  
Martin de Holan and Phillips (2004) found that knowledge loss in the hotel 
industry was greater if leadership support was lacking. Specifically, they found that 
“without constant managerial attention, the new routines would slip away and old 
routines would be activated” (p. 1607). In order to foster knowledge transfer and 
maintain retention of new knowledge, the changes have to be reinforced, not only 
38 
 
through learning and knowledge transfer, but through consistent messaging from 
management and adequate leadership support.  
In their study of the effects of knowledge management on project success, Fedor 
et al. (2003) learned that teams facing limited knowledge transfer needed leadership 
support to overcome obstacles to transfer. It may be that leadership is critical to help 
teams move beyond the confusion that exists surrounding knowledge transfer. This is 
because “people do not just receive new knowledge passively; they interpret it actively to 
fit their own situation and perspective. . .as a result there is continual confusion as new 
knowledge is diffused in an organization” (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995, p. 15). Indeed, 
Higgins (2006), highlighting the role management plays in knowledge generation, stated 
that “the creation of knowledge requires rule-breaking, improvisation and multiple 
voices. If knowledge work is intrinsically learning-based and experiential, then one must 
be aware of ways in which managers identify and negotiate uncertainty to establish new 
areas of knowledge” (p. 194).  
While technology and leadership can foster knowledge transfer, organizations 
should not solely rely on one or the other as a singular solution to a multifaceted problem. 
That type of focus would go directly against what scholars and researchers have taught 
about learning and knowledge management; it requires a blended stream of attention to 
technology, culture, and people (Davenport & Prusak, 2000; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). 
Moreover, that type of simplistic view implies that knowledge is explicit when, in reality, 
knowledge is both tacit and explicit (Hsu & Shen, 2005; Tsoukas, 1996). Per Tsoukas, 
“Tacit knowledge is the necessary component of all knowledge; it is not made up of 
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discrete beans which may be ground, lost, or reconstituted. . .to split tacit from explicit 
knowledge is to miss the point—the two are inseparably related” (p. 101). 
Tacit knowledge and its role in knowledge loss has been explored and has been 
shown to be of significant impact to organizational performance with sometimes 
catastrophic impacts (Thompson et al., 2001; Treleaven & Sykes, 2005). In a qualitative 
case study examining loss of organizational knowledge in the service organization of 
Australian Christian Community Services (ACCS), Treleaven and Sykes noted that “the 
loss of such tacit and heuristic knowledge of staff working in client services affects not 
only the meaningful engagement with clients, but also the capability of the organization 
to provide effective service in many situations” (p. 362). This loss was the result of 
reorganization that placed greater financial emphasis on the organization and its 
employees. The focus on the client became subservient to the global financial needs of 
the organization and its focus on strategic management once the business environment 
became competitive. A necessary output of this focus was the need for more stringent 
data collection. Agency employees, therefore, reported that more time was spent 
attempting to get data entered into or retrieved from a $10 million software package than 
was spent serving the client. Despite Thompson et al. (2001) stating that “interactive 
service work requires the presence of social and tacit knowledge, but the profitable 
practice of such knowledge is still a matter of negotiation between workers and 
managers,” the new financially-focused managers that were brought in to ACCS did not 
have the type of tacit knowledge that was critical to effectively serving clients (p. 937). 
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Ultimately, from an academic perspective, most researchers call for additional 
empirical analysis including Fedor et al. (2003): “Unfortunately, aside from a few notable 
exceptions, much of the literature on organizational learning and knowledge management 
is not at the operational or empirical level” (p. 514). What is barely known, and what 
needs to be examined more thoroughly, is how learning and knowledge management 
practices can be used to champion knowledge creation, retention, transfer, and loss. That 
examination must include all facets of theory and practice, including considerations of 
implementation and maintenance costs and, just as important, organizational 
performance. “While knowledge management can require significant resources to do 
well, ultimately ignorance can apparently be much costlier” (Fedor et al., p. 514).  
Knowledge Transfer and Unlearning 
To combat the costliness of knowledge loss to an organization, overcompensating 
in the area of knowledge transfer without an understanding of learning and knowledge 
management can be detrimental. Overcompensation, in fact, can lead to what 
Loewenstein, Moore, and Weber (2003) called the curse of knowledge. The authors 
stated that many organizations operate from the assumption that more knowledge is good 
because “decision-makers can ignore information that is not valuable or that should not 
be used” (p. C1). In their quantitative study, however, they demonstrated that this was not 
the case and problem-solving became much more difficult as additional knowledge was 
introduced.  
To balance a tendency toward overcompensation, Hsu and Shen (2005) advocated 
managing both the body of knowledge and the process flows that surround transfer to 
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avoid knowledge loss. They cautioned that “having knowledge transferred is not just a 
matter of acquiring it. It requires intensive and laborious interactions among people. In 
other words, merely moving documents around can never generate knowledge” (p. 353). 
This reproach can also apply to the need make this a qualitative study and establish those 
interactions, even if brief, among people to discover how the phenomenon of knowledge 
loss is occurring. Hsu and Shen did go on to state that access does not imply 
understanding: “People still have to select, integrate and augment information to create 
understandings and knowledge” (p. 353). During this process of selection, integration, 
and augmentation, unlearning may need to occur.  
Unlearning is, in many cases, not a smooth process for the individual and the 
organization. Unlearning can be extremely difficult. For those who have researched 
unlearning, the theme that is most prevalent is that of change and breaking away from 
current process or routine (Akgun et al., 2006; Dixon, 2002; Fiol & Lyles, 1985; 
Kransdorff, 1999; Lei et al., 1999; Sherwood, 2000). Per Akgun et al., “The team’s 
mindsets, routines, and knowledge. . .can act as a straight jacket or source of rigidity” (p. 
75). Breaking through this rigidity is what can make the process of unlearning so 
difficult. 
Sherwood (2000) drew attention to the arduous task of unlearning by calling it an 
act of destruction. The old knowledge must be destroyed in order for the new knowledge 
to be adopted. Destruction of knowledge in an organization is inherently challenging 
precisely because the individual and the organization are so intertwined. Also, it is 
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challenging because new knowledge is not passively accepted and the old knowledge not 
passively abandoned.  
And someone who is even wiser still will spot that the most difficult baggage of 
the past to discard is not the physical stuff, but the mental, political, and 
emotional stuff—the ‘rules’ or the procedures, the sacred cows, the prejudices, the 
beliefs, the ‘way we do things around here’. (p. 35, emphasis in original)  
 
This difficulty, this laboriousness, however, may be inherently fundamental for 
the unlearning to occur. Fiol and Lyles (1985) stated that “a certain amount of stress is a 
necessary if learning is to occur” (p. 805). Citing several authors, Fiol and Lyles said 
evidence exists that crisis is necessary for learning to occur. Unlearning, specifically, is 
what results after some type of organizational crisis. Although a crisis could be 
categorized as something as significant as a buyout or the implementation of a new 
management structure, a crisis could also be categorized as new knowledge being 
introduced into the organization that causes individuals to question routines, beliefs, 
values, and assumptions (Akgun et al., 2006). The assumption “that receivers would 
accept new ideas without probing the reasoning and data behind them denies the reality 
that people cannot implement what they do not thoroughly understand” (Dixon, 2002, p. 
40).  
When routines, beliefs, values, and assumptions are undergoing change, it is an 
organization’s culture that is undergoing change as well. The culture must be able to 
support change. Organizations cannot just will unlearning onto its employees. “Creating 
and sharing knowledge are intangible activities that can neither be supervised nor forced 
out of people. Thus, it is necessary for organizations to provide a learning culture, 
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infrastructure, and appropriate incentives to generating and disseminating knowledge” 
(Hsu & Shen, 2005, p. 354). 
 The timing of unlearning must also be considered to prevent knowledge loss 
(Akgun et al., 2006). If cultural elements are in flux, organizations must ensure that 
individuals are ready to receive new knowledge in order to unlearn old knowledge. If 
knowledge is introduced inaccurately or at inappropriate times, the transfer will fail and 
knowledge will be primed for loss. This event can be seen very explicitly in failed 
implementations of technology solutions. Downing (2004) presented one such case from 
a contact center. The technology that was introduced to make contact workers more 
efficient at their jobs and to bring knowledge to their desktops failed. Not only did the 
technology not work properly, the knowledge that it contained was inaccurate. Initial 
knowledge know-how on how to use the tool depreciated because the contact center 
agents stopped using it. Although unlearning was attempted, the timing was not 
appropriate because the tool was not ready for use in a production environment. As 
Akgun et al. point out, “Unlearning does not always generate good returns in the time 
desired” (p. 84). 
 Although difficult to plan for an unexpected or unknown crisis and the requisite 
time related to the unlearning that should appropriately accompany said crisis, 
organizations may fare better and mitigate knowledge loss if they think of unlearning 
specifically, and learning and knowledge management more generally, from an 
organizational change perspective. For example, when Davenport and Prusak (2000) 
talked about linking learning management and knowledge management, they identified a 
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primary benefit. Both systems seek to change or enhance culture and both focus on 
people and behavioral issues. This change and focus can drive knowledge generation, 
transfer, and retention. Loss, of course, still exists within the cycle, but it may be more 
planned and purposeful loss as opposed to accidental loss.   
Understanding Organizational Culture and Change Implications 
“Change dynamically produced by the everyday actions of organizational 
members engaged in their work, dramatically, but nevertheless continuously, recreates 
and replaces organizational knowledge” (Treleaven & Sykes, 2005, p. 356). To facilitate 
change, an organization’s culture must nurture it, support it, and manage it. From an 
organizational culture and change perspective, authentic learning and authentic 
knowledge sharing can drive change forward. Organizational change and organizational 
culture can be used to promote purposeful knowledge loss and to prevent accidental 
knowledge loss.  
The same concept of breaking away that was applied to unlearning earlier in this 
chapter can also be applied to organizational change. According to Lewin (1951/1997), if 
there is to be any type of change in a group’s performance, the group must move through 
three specific steps of change: unfreezing, moving, and freezing. It is during the first step, 
unfreezing, where the concept of breaking away is applicable. This step sometimes 
requires deliberate action to shake the group from its complacency or inertia. An event 
must happen for the group to be motivated to change. “To break open the shell of 
complacency and self-righteousness it is sometimes necessary to bring about deliberately 





The churning of emotions that Lewin (1951/1997) referred to during times of 
organizational change is the reason why organizational change cannot be oversimplified. 
For example, although Lewin’s three-step model may lead people to believe it is a 
simple, linear process, an enormous amount of work happens between each step. “The 
implementation process is messy. Things don’t proceed exactly as planned; people do 
things their own way, not always according to the plan; some people resist or even 
sabotage the process” (Burke, 2002, p. 2).  
Some authors (Burke, 2002; Weick and Quinn, 1999, as cited in Burke, 2002) 
claim that there are two types of change, which further prevents simplifying or reducing 
change to an easy process. Burke spoke of revolution (transformation) versus evolution 
(transaction). It is during revolution and transformation that culture is truly impacted and 
large organizational change occurs. Revolution and transformation occur during periods 
of episodic change (Herman, 2007). Weick and Quinn, as cited in Burke, 2002, agreed 
that Lewin’s (1951/1997) three-step change model is applicable to this concept of 
revolution and transformation and episodic (as opposed to continuous) change. For 
evolutionary, continuous change, the authors applied Lewin’s model in a new way. When 
the organization is focused on continuous change, the model for change becomes one of 
freeze-rebalance-unfreeze.  
To freeze continuous change is to find patterns in day-to-day life in the 
organizations and to reinforce them. To rebalance is to change the patterns so that 
few restraints and barriers are present and the continuous change can flow more 
freely. To unfreeze after the rebalancing is to innovate and find new ways of 
ensuring continuous change. (Weick and Quinn, 1999, as cited in Burke, 2002, p. 
141, emphasis in original) 
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Although knowledge loss could certainly be caused by revolutionary change, which may 
be the change that will result from the baby boomers leaving the workforce, this study 
focused on the knowledge loss that is caused by evolutionary change, in the day-to-day 
life of the organization and its employees.  
Whether the change is considered revolutionary or evolutionary, those involved in 
implementing change must recognize that it must be at the group level. “If a sufficiently 
deep and permanent change is to be accomplished, the individual will have to be 
approached in his capacity as a member of groups. It is as a member of a group that the 
individual is most pliable” (Lewin, 1948/1997, p. 47). This is a clear directive in the 
research to look not only at the individual and how knowledge loss impacts the 
individual, but to also look at the group and the organization and how knowledge loss 
impacts the system in total. 
Leadership Support 
 
If evolutionary change is appropriately managed at the organizational level, the 
possibility of knowledge loss can be reduced. Consider the qualitative case study 
completed by Martin de Holan and Phillips (2004) where lack of leadership support 
contributed to knowledge loss. If emphasis on leadership support was part of an 
organizational change initiative, and the culture was subsequently influenced and 
changed, knowledge loss could be positively impacted as there is a close connection 
between leadership and culture.  
Leaders face enormous pressure. Not only are they responsible for being thought 
leaders and for building and sustaining culture, they are also responsible for sensing a 
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culture in trouble and subsequently regenerating that culture or creating a completely new 
culture (Herman, 2007).  
Once cultures exist they determine the criteria for leadership and thus determine 
who will or will not be a leader. But if elements of a culture become 
dysfunctional, it is the unique function of leadership to be able to perceive the 
functional and dysfunctional elements of the existing culture and to manage 
cultural evolution and change in such a way that the group can survive in a 
changing environment. (Schein, 2004, p. 23) 
 
Leaders are pivotal in managing the anxiety caused by change. As Schein said, “The 
leader may not have the answer, but he or she must provide temporary stability and 
emotional reassurance while the answer is being worked out” (p. 407). 
Resistance to Change 
What everyone must remember, including leaders, is that people can become 
comfortable in the organizational culture in which they work. When there is a change to 
that culture, people may resist. “It’s a paradox of evolution or development that the more 
we learn how to do things and to stabilize what we have learned, the more unwilling or 
unable we become to adapt, change, and grow into new patterns” (Schein, 2004, p. 83). It 
is this resistance that can lead to purposeful knowledge loss. People can choose to forget 
something that they have learned because they resist what is changing and this can have 
significant ramifications for organizational performance. If there is understanding of what 
causes resistance to change, those causes can be addressed by the organization in order to 
positively promote change.   
The implications of Isabella’s (1990) research are insightful when considering the 
causes of resistance to change (Herman, 2007). Her findings indicated that “resistances to 
change might alternatively be viewed, not as obstacles to overcome, but as inherent 
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elements of the cognitive transition occurring during change” (p. 34). Other authors 
(Burke, 2002; Lewin, 1951/1997; Schein, 2004; Senge, 2006) shared this view. Lewin 
said that: 
The lack of a cognitively clear structure is likely to make every action a 
conflicting one. The individual, not knowing whether the action will lead him 
closer or farther away from his goal, is necessarily uncertain as to whether or not 
he should carry it out. (p. 266) 
 
This uncertainty can lead to knowledge loss because the individual, having no resolution 
to the uncertain state, discards the knowledge. As Fiol and Lyles (1985) stated: “Changes 
in behavior may occur without any cognitive association development; similarly, 
knowledge may be gained without any accompanying change in behavior” (p. 806). 
Galpin (1996) provided readers with Neider and Zimmerman’s resistance 
pyramid. The pyramid contains three levels and resistance lessens at each level if people 
feel satisfied that lower levels have been addressed. It is referenced here because there 
are parallel concepts between resistance to change and knowledge management. The 
lowest level is not knowing. If people do not have knowledge, if other organization 
members such as management are not communicating and are not telling the story of 
change, there is a high level of resistance. From a knowledge management perspective, 
no knowledge is being shared or transferred at this level. If knowledge is provided to 
members, the resistance lessens but can be experienced again at the next level of the 
pyramid, which is not able.  
Within this level, organization members have received knowledge that verifies an 
event. Now they are concerned that they will not be able to meet the challenges of the 
changes inherent in the event. In essence, they think or feel that there is a gap in their 
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skills. The way the organization addresses this level of resistance is to provide training 
and learning opportunities for these members. After the needs for this level have been 
met, the last level of the resistance pyramid is not willing. Willingness to change 
increases if knowledge is shared and if training and experience improve abilities to meet 
job requirements. 
Levinson (1976, as cited in Burke, 2002) took a unique approach to resistance. He 
reminded people that change equals loss. In fighting resistance to change, most 
organizations do not want to deal with this aspect of change. Yet it is a very real 
component of change. “All change is nevertheless a loss experienced, particularly for a 
loss of familiar routines. And the more that what one leaves behind is psychologically 
important, the more likely one’s behavior will take this form of resistance” (Burke, 2002, 
p. 92). 
 Levinson’s (1976, as cited in Burke, 2002) reference to behavior leads back to 
beginning of the section and back to the beginning of the discussion on knowledge loss. 
Knowledge management and learning management seek to change or enhance culture 
and both focus on people and behavioral issues (Davenport & Prusak, 2000). Knowledge 
loss is a key component of any knowledge management framework; however, it has often 
been overlooked in the literature and infrequently connected to organizational 
performance. In the service industry, its application to organizational performance has 
been limited to two service organizations, hotels and food franchises. This study extends 
the application of knowledge loss and organizational performance to the contact center 





  Although any service industry organization could be selected and an examination 
of knowledge loss and its impact on organizational performance conducted, choosing 
contact centers as the organization under study is significant. At this moment, contact 
centers are undergoing phenomenal change and are ripe for study. The growth of contact 
centers, the ongoing debate about whether service work is knowledge work, the 
immediacy of the job, and the constant performance monitoring converges into a 
dynamic environment where knowledge, learning, culture, and change collide. Some 
have also pointed to a literature gap that exists with this workforce. According to 
Downing (2004), “Less attention has been paid to another essential type of knowledge 
worker. These are low-paid, relatively unskilled customer support technicians who staff 
the phones for credit card companies, banks, utilities, and countless help desks across the 
country” (p. 166).  
Since the first center opened in the aviation industry in the 1960s, contact centers 
have undergone significant change. Contact center statistics vary, but it is estimated that 
contact centers employ 3% of all workers in the United Sates, which equals about 7 
million agents (Downing, 2004; Hillmer et al., 2004; Tschida, 2005). The number of 
contact center organizations in the United States has been reported as high as 100,000 
(Downing, 2004). Tschida (2005) noted that a report said the industry was valued at 
$40.1 billion and recorded a 7.4% increase in growth between 1999 and 2003. It was 
predicted in the report that contact center growth outside of the United States would be 
substantial. In Europe, Africa, and the Middle East, contact centers are expected to 
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number near 45,000 with 2.1 million agents; growth is also expected in Canada, the 
Caribbean, and Latin America (UK Department of Trade and Industry Study, 2004).  
 Hillmer and Kocabasoglu (2007) noted that contact centers are significant to 
study because they employ such a large population of the workforce in some countries. 
The authors also emphasized the strategic role that the contact center plays in an 
organization with respect to sales, marketing, and customer support. Moreover, they 
noted the significant amount of data that is routinely captured on employee performance. 
Because of these three elements, contact centers offer a rich landscape from which to 
learn.  
The Environmental State 
 Contact centers are certainly not exempt to issues that are concerning the business 
world right now with respect to the epidemic of data and information that must somehow 
be managed. “After three decades of aggressive computerization, companies are 
drowning in data; indeed, many companies have begun to conclude that they can no 
longer benefit sufficiently from the vast amount of information they maintain” 
(Rothfeder, 2006, p. 19). Baker (2006) said that every Chief Information Officer is 
dealing with “how best to generate, collect, analyze, distribute, store, and finally do away 
with the mountains of information their organizations work with daily” (p. 15). Given 
what researchers have said regarding the lack of emphasis on knowledge loss, it would 
seem that more attention has been paid to generation, collection, and storage. There is 
still much to be done with distribution and discard.  
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 What is evident, however, is that the massive amount of data and information that 
is available to people is negatively impacting their performance and costing organizations 
money. Laff (2007) included a comment from Gladwell about this phenomenon: 
Wikipedia and Google are 21st century solutions to 19th century problems. 
They’re just more updated libraries that allow you to use more space. They’re a 
solution to a problem we didn’t have. The real issue in the 21st century is how to 
make sense of all that information. We need to be able to analyze all of that 
information intelligently. (p. 41) 
 
Pfeiffer (2006) referenced e-mails, instant messages, blogs, and videos as items of 
unstructured data that fall outside of what is routinely captured and stored by 
organizations. If capture is necessary to facilitate knowledge transfer, the knowledge loss 
that is occurring because transfer is not happening could be monumental. Not only is 
knowledge loss a somewhat predictable outcome of this issue, but productivity is also 
compromised. Pfeiffer noted that “many attempts have been made to put a dollar figure 
on the productivity loss associated with looking for old e-mails or tracking down 
important company memos” (p. 48). One estimate indicated that a company could recoup 
$2.5 million in lost productivity if it improved the search engine on its intranet thereby 
reducing the time employees spent searching for data. From the knowledge management 
lens, Bailor (2007) cited a report of knowledge management processes in 117 
organizations that showed that over half of all content available was unused.  
 Even with data to validate the non-use of available content, the focus continues to 
be on generating and capturing more and more knowledge. This is true in the contact 
center environment where the push is “about harnessing information that already exists 
inside the organization to deliver exceptional levels of service” (Saggese, 2004, p. 13). 
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Saggese did not talk about what do with the sheer quantity of information that could 
result from this round-up. Instead, he invoked the worn out catch-phrase of knowledge 
management practice, getting the right information to the right people at the right time, 
which sounds simple enough, but which fails to deal with the complexity of knowledge, 
the diverse human factors at play, and the polychronic nature of time “where seconds to 
resolutions, not minutes or hours, are emphasized” (Customer Contact Council Best 
Practices Research, 2007, p. 23).  
 Complexity of knowledge is an area that is of particular interest in the contact 
center industry. In order to increase efficiency as well as customer service satisfaction, 
many contact centers are attempting to drive to something called first call resolution, 
where an agent is able to resolve the caller’s question or issue without having to transfer 
the caller to another agent and without having to initiate a callback to the caller. The 
whole premise of first call resolution, however, seems to be on shaky ground if not a 
fallacy altogether. That is because the simple, easy-to-resolve issues have been moved to 
self-service Interactive Voice Response (IVR) systems or to website pages of frequently 
asked questions. It is the most complex customer issues that are now being routed to the 
agents. Knowledge bases, technology, and appropriate staffing are not keeping up with 
the promise of first call resolution. This is important because contact centers must expand 
the knowledge of the agents to be able to effectively handle almost any call on the first 
contact without transferring. If the contact center has knowledge gaps due to knowledge 
loss, but is not aware of where those losses occur, expanding the knowledge of the agents 
has the potential to magnify the gaps and impact customer service and performance. 
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From the staffing perspective, Hillmer et al., (2004) noted that agents need to be 
better skilled than they have been in the past in order to meet the requirements of a 
multichannel contact center. In these multichannel environments, agents may be taking 
inbound calls as well as inbound inquiries from the organization’s website or mail room. 
They stated, “CSRs must handle elevated customer expectations, understand complex 
products and services, explain creative pricing strategies, navigate sophisticated 
technology, operate within regulatory limitations, and meet or exceed challenging 
individual performance expectations for variables such as talk time and sales quotas” (p. 
36). Compounding this issue is the huge fiscal responsibility that looms over the contact 
center, which means that the pace of the job is extremely rapid and agents are often on 
back-to-back calls. 
Contact Center Culture 
 
 The rapidity of the job, the required skill set, and constant attention to 
performance makes the contact center culture unique. Although organizations have 
worked to improve culture, there is still a high level of frustration with contact center 
work and with the culture, which has been discussed and debated in the literature 
(Callaghan & Thompson, 2002; Dawson, 2005; Downing, 2004; Heyes, 2002; Kinnie et 
al., 2000; Sturdy & Fleming, 2003; Thompson et al., 2001; van den Broek, 2004).   
The rapidity or pace of the job impacts culture as the contact centers struggle to 
find ways to transfer complex knowledge to the agents. This issue is exacerbated by the 
continual pressure to manage the amount of time that agents spend on the call.  
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For example, if the cost per minute of a call is $1.00 and the average handle time 
increases from 6 minutes to 8 minutes, a cost of $2.00 has been added to every call. 
When centers are dealing with 3 million calls per month, this difference can cost an 
additional $6 million. Therefore, in the contact center environment, a very close watch is 
kept on the average handle time of each call (Herman, 2006).  
This focus on average handle time influences the contact center culture. Callaghan 
and Thompson (2002) and Dawson (2005) mentioned this influence. In a qualitative case 
study, Callaghan and Thompson examined how recruitment techniques are combined 
with training to retain employees in a banking call center. Although bank management 
talked about wanting a pool of employees with diverse talents and experiences, CSRs 
talked about how those diverse talents and experiences were not valued because everyone 
was expected to perform the same. Specifically, one of the CSRs that they interviewed 
expressed frustration with the contact center management team expecting such a diverse 
workforce to be molded into a model bank CSR.  
Callaghan and Thompson (2002) acknowledged that while some companies are 
working to change these issues, most have accepted that these are the cultural issues that 
are faced in numerous contact center environments and have resigned themselves to 
dealing with the recruitment and retention issues that result. Indeed, Dawson (2005) 
indicated that working around the issue of average handle time and efficiency is a contact 
center way of life.  
 This way of life means that turnover in the contact centers is high because several 
factors contribute the stress levels of agents. These include “time pressures to resolve 
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(often irate) customer problems, the complexity and constant change within the   
products. . .and the knowledge that a manager may, at any time, monitor one of their calls 
for quality assurance purposes” (Downing, 2004, p. 173). Pushing out more training to 
the agents may not be the right solution. As Osterloh and Frey (2000) have noted, 
“Experimental research shows that the speed of learning and conceptual understanding 
are reduced when people are monitored” (p. 540). According to Hillmer et al. (2004), 
“All of these factors combine to create a highly structured and stressful work 
environment resulting in turnover ratios in the industry as frequently as high as 60 
percent to 80 percent annually” (p. 36).  
Organizational Performance 
 
 Despite the high turnover in agents, contact centers will stay closely focused on 
organizational performance although the locus of performance is shifting. Whether that 
shift has a positive impact on contact center culture or the turnover rate is unknown 
because monitoring is still very much a part of performance. According to the Customer 
Contact Center Council (2006, 2007), there is a gradual switch occurring right now in the 
contact center industry. “Contact centers are shifting their individual performance metrics 
away from productivity-style metrics such as average handle time, and towards quality-
style metrics such as customer satisfaction and quality assurance scores” (Customer 
Contact Council, 2006, p. 8). The Council noted that 90% of its members are focusing on 
quality metrics over productivity metrics.  
 The difference, as outlined by the Customer Contact Council (2006), is that key 
performance indicators have moved from average handle time and independent quality 
57 
 
assessments to time to resolution and customer-measured quality assessments. More 
specifically, sample quality metrics can include: call handling score, accuracy rate, 
customer satisfaction score, and first call resolution rate. Note the presence of the first 
call resolution rate, which is included despite the increasing complexity of initial 
inquiries to the contact center because less complex inquiries are triaged through IVRs 
and website portals. This is a change from previous productivity metrics, which included: 
call handle time, average speed of answer, after call work, and utilization rate.  
This movement impacts more than just key performance indicators. The 
associated core skills of the agents and the knowledge that they must possess changes as 
well. Agents must be adept at non-linear problem resolution and must have a stronger 
understanding of products and tools. The Customer Contact Council (2006) predicted that 
frequent changes in knowledge will be required. If this is the case, knowledge loss could 
increase if the information is not easily accessible to the agent or if unlearning has not 
been embraced so that old knowledge is replaced with new knowledge.  
  During this transition, things may temporarily get worse for culture and for 
turnover. The Customer Contact Council (2006) stated that recruitment needs to change 
to support the transition. “When ‘productivity agents’ are placed into quality 
environments, customer frustration increases, and staff turnover drifts higher” (p. 8, 
emphasis in original). It is not just the agents who are impacted. More emphasis is being 
placed on the supervisory staff and on the quality/coaching staff. While retention is a 
significant driver in a productivity-based environment, coaching is the most significant 
driver in a quality-based environment. Coaching, where individuals or very small groups 
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of agents receive feedback from supervisors and managers, requires those supervisors and 
managers to make time for coaching. As Tschida (2005) pointed out:  
The industry is abuzz with the notion that increased coaching is the way to 
improve productivity and customer experience. Yet in a recent survey by Contact 
Professional, only 4% of respondents whose job it is to coach said they do so 
more than 50% of the time. (¶17) 
 
 In what the Customer Contact Council (2006) called the 75% quality/25% 
productivity world, contact center organizations are instructed to focus more on retention 
strategies and coaching. The Council noted that increasing job opportunities for agents 
and effective coaching were drivers to retention. Regarding coaching, the Council noted 
that “companies strive to increase time spent coaching, but coaching effectiveness, not 
time, has the greatest impact on performance” (p. 65). Instead of increasing the time 
spent coaching, contact centers need to increase the quality of coaching by better training 
supervisors and managers in the skills of effective coaching.  
 Ultimately, how a contact center measures its organizational performance is 
shifting and with this shift comes an opportune time to step back from the hard metrics 
and investigate how the agents and the organization are managing this change when there 
is increasing knowledge complexity. Working toward an understanding of the role of 
knowledge loss in this environment and its impact on the ability to perform successfully 
in said environment could benefit the contact center industry while also narrowing the 
literature gap.  
Chapter Summary 
  
Chapter 2 highlighted the literature gap that exists about knowledge loss and its 
impact on organizational performance while drawing attention to the few studies that 
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have been completed (Benkard, 2000; Darr et al., 1995; Martin de Holan & Phillips, 
2004; Martin de Holan et al., 2004; Thompson, 2007). The review covered an 
examination of knowledge loss and how that term has been situated in the literature to 
date. It also covered how knowledge and learning management applied to knowledge loss 
and how organizational change and culture applied to the concepts of knowledge and 
learning management, and, ultimately, knowledge loss. Further, a review of 
organizational performance was completed that highlighted the contact center as the 
organization under study. Chapter 3 includes a review of the mixed methods research 
used in this case study. Chapter 4 contains the results of the study based on analysis of 
the qualitative and quantitative data collected from the field research, while chapter 5 
includes a summary of the study, the conclusions that were drawn, recommendations for 
further research, and implications for social change.  
 
 




 This mixed model case study explored how knowledge loss can influence 
performance metrics in the knowledge intensive contact center environment, identified 
what factors contributed to knowledge loss, and identified specific knowledge loss 
dimensions present in the contact center using Martin de Holan et al.’s (2004) mode of 
forgetting matrix.  
Previous research in both production and service industry organizations revealed 
significant relationships between knowledge loss and organizational performance 
(Benkard, 2000; Darr et al., 1995; Ibrahim, 2005; Martin de Holan & Phillips, 2004; 
Martin de Holan et al., 2004; Thompson, 2007). However, as the problem statement in 
chapter 1 indicated, organizations have low awareness of how knowledge loss occurs in 
their environment, how it impacts their performance, and how its omission in the routine 
practice of knowledge management by the organization creates knowledge gaps. Further, 
the organizations addressed in previous studies were limited and the concept had not been 
explored through the lens of the contact center. Although the researchers noted above 
have used quantitative, qualitative, and mixed methodologies to explore the phenomenon 
of knowledge loss in various organizations and have used these same methodologies to 
separately explore contact center issues, it appeared that none had used it to explore 
knowledge loss specifically in the contact center and none had used Martin de Holan et 
al.’s (2004) mode of forgetting matrix as a conceptual framework to identify specific 
areas where knowledge loss occurs.
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This chapter contains a discussion of the mixed model case study methodology 
that was used in the research, the role of the researcher in the process, detailed 
descriptions of the case and participants under study, data collection procedures, data 
collection instruments, and finally a description of the data analysis procedures. 
Research Design 
  
On the surface, because of its readily available quantitative data about customer 
service scores, quality measures, call times, call accuracy, and so on, it might seem that a 
quantitative study would have been the most suitable approach for this research. A 
quantitative study would not, however, have enabled an exploration of the subtleties, 
nuances, and contextual situations inherent in knowledge management processes, 
including knowledge loss and knowledge discard, which are intimately connected to 
organizational culture, organizational change, and human involvement. As Downing 
(2004, citing Adria & Chowdhury, 2002) noted, “Although there are templates and 
decision-trees. . .in the end, it is the call-center worker who must decide the sequence of 
events that will lead to satisfactory resolution of an inquiry from a customer” (p. 175). 
Yet a researcher would be remiss to neglect the quantitative data available and the ability 
to use mixed methods research to “offset the weaknesses of both quantitative and 
qualitative research. . .and provide more comprehensive evidence” (Creswell & Plano 
Clark, 2007, p. 9).  
Other researchers have chosen the qualitative approach when studying the contact 
center environment despite the vast availability of numbers, statistics, percentages, and 
scores (Ackerman & Halverson, 2000; Callaghan & Thompson, 2002; Cross et al., 2008; 
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Kuhn & Jackson, 2008; Rowold et al., 2008; Russell, 2007; Sturdy & Fleming, 2003; 
Thompson, Warhurst, & Callaghan, 2001; van den Broek, 2004). Callaghan and 
Thompson used a qualitative approach because it enabled them to “explore both the 
formal and informal processes that may be hidden in more quantitative analyses and 
develop conceptualizations that can aid further research” (p. 237). Sharing the same focus 
on process, Sturdy and Fleming noted that their “qualitative research approach enabled a 
more in-depth engagement with everyday organizational processes and it was particularly 
in this informal sphere that [they] discovered the technical efficacy of ‘mere’ talk” (p. 
769, emphasis in original).  
The discourse, the talk, that occurs through qualitative interviews and 
observations is what allows researchers to explore and uncover the rich context that may 
help explain how a phenomenon like knowledge loss occurs and what factors promote or 
prevent the event. Furthermore, using sound knowledge management principles to elicit 
tacit knowledge can be more fully realized through the qualitative approach. Face-to-face 
interaction and inquiry can promote a unique relationship where it is readily apparent to 
the participant that their information is valid, valued, and important. Per Dixon (2002): 
One of the things that makes it difficult to get knowledgeable people to write out 
what they know so that it can go into a knowledge repository is that databases 
don’t provide a way for the individual to feel a sense of appreciation. It can, in 
fact, make the individual feel that his or her knowledge has gone into a black 
hole. (p. 38) 
 
The qualitative perspective, therefore, seems to coalesce with the knowledge 
management perspective to create an environment where ideas and information are 
naturally shared and exchanged. Adair (2004, citing Ackerman et al., 2003) stated, “One 
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can’t isolate knowledge from its social context without denaturing it, without stripping it 
of the social resources and social knowledge that contribute to its utility” (p. 573). 
 The quantitative perspective does remain relevant and researchers involved in 
previous contact center case studies supplemented their qualitative research with 
quantitative information, which provided some direction for this study. Downing (2004), 
in a descriptive case study, used quantitative performance metrics from the contact center 
as a point of triangulation for the qualitative data. The quantitative data revealed that 
average handle time of a call increased rather than decreased after technology 
implementation, which supported the qualitative findings but contradicted management 
claims that it would decrease average handle time. Kinnie et al. (2000), in an earlier case 
study, also used quantitative contact center performance metrics to help explain the 
background of the study and support the qualitative findings that morale had improved 
and working conditions were better as evidenced through lower attrition, higher 
productivity, and increased customer satisfaction.  
Ultimately, when choosing a research design, researchers must consider the 
research questions under study, the overall intent of the study, the time and resources 
available to accomplish the study, and their alignment with certain philosophical and 
phenomenological beliefs. Several authors provide guidelines and decision-making 
matrices to help direct researchers through the process (Burns, 2000; Merriam, 1998; 
Merriam & Simpson, 1995; Yin, 2003). When considering all of those aspects, the mixed 
methods approach seemed most appropriate for this study and was the methodology used 
to conduct this research. Selecting a mixed methods approach offers researchers the 
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ability to bring the strengths of qualitative research and quantitative research together in 
one study. This is the key tenet of mixed methods research. “According to this principle, 
researchers should collect multiple data using different strategies, approaches, and 
methods in such a way that the resulting mixture or combination is likely to result in 
complementary strengths and nonoverlapping weaknesses” (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 
2004, p. 18). Choosing only the qualitative method would have diminished the analytical 
power of understanding the relationship between knowledge loss and organizational 
performance using actual contact center data. Moreover, because data are readily 
available in the contact center, are used to drive operations, and are intimately bound with 
contact center culture, the study was strengthened by the addition of quantitative 
information. Choosing only the quantitative method would have diminished the 
explanatory power of the discourse, the talk, that occurs through qualitative interviews 
and allows researchers to explore and uncover the rich context that may help explain how 
a phenomenon like knowledge loss occurs and what factors promote or prevent the event. 
Mixed Method Design Decisions 
 
According to Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004), “To construct a mixed-method 
design, the researcher must make two primary decisions: (a) whether one wants to 
operate largely within one dominant paradigm or not, and (b) whether one wants to 
conduct the phases concurrently or sequentially” (p. 20). In mixed methods research, 
attention can equally be given to both the qualitative and quantitative methodologies or 
one methodology can be emphasized over another. In addition, data can be collected 
sequentially (e.g., qualitative data are collected first followed by quantitative data) or 
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concurrently (e.g., both quantitative and qualitative data are collected at the same time). 
There are no specific formulas for making either of these decisions. The decisions are 
based on what the researcher thinks will work best given the research questions and the 
topic under study. As noted by Johnson and Onwuegbuzie:  
We do not believe that mixed methods research is currently in a position to 
provide perfect solutions. Mixed methods research should, instead (at this time), 
use a method and philosophy that attempt to fit together the insights provided by 
qualitative and quantitative research into a workable solution. (p.17) 
 
In this research design, the dominant method was qualitative and the collection of 
both qualitative and quantitative data occurred concurrently. Collection and analysis of 
qualitative research data identified areas where knowledge loss was most prevalent and 
what factors contributed to knowledge loss. Collection and analysis of secondary, 
supporting quantitative research data identified how contact center performance metrics 
were influenced by the phenomenon of knowledge loss. Dominance was given to the 
qualitative methodology because it enabled exploration of the subtleties, nuances, and 
contextual situations inherent in knowledge management processes, including knowledge 
loss, which could not have been uncovered by quantitative data alone. 
Authors writing about mixed methods research (Creswell, 2003; Creswell & 
Plano Clark, 2007; Johnson & Christensen, 2004; Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004; 
Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998) have more specifically defined six mixed method strategies 
that researchers can select based on implementation (sequential, concurrent), priority 
(equal, dominant, secondary), and integration point (where the data are actually mixed 
during the research). Based on these definitions, the design strategy used in this study 
was the concurrent nested strategy. This meant that the qualitative and quantitative data 
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were collected at the same time during the research but the non-dominant methodology, 
which was quantitative for this study, was nested within the research. “The premises of 
this design are that a single data set is not sufficient, that different questions need to be 
answered, and that each type of question requires different types of data” (Creswell & 
Plano Clark, p. 67). In an earlier publication, Creswell noted this strategy is selected by 
the researcher to “gain broader perspectives” by using both methodologies as well as to 
study different groups of people or different levels of an organization (p. 218).  
The applicability of this strategy to this study was as follows: qualitative data 
were collected from individual contact center staff while quantitative data were collected 
at the contact center level and the data were mixed during the analysis and interpretation 
stage. “As long as both quantitative and qualitative research approaches are used within 
the same investigation, the study moves from being monomethod to at least a partially 
mixed method, even if one of the research approaches is used only minimally” (Johnson 
& Christensen, 2004, p. 413). Because mixing among and between stages was occurring, 
this design was called a mixed model design rather than a mixed method design (Johnson 
& Onwuegbuzie, 2004). The qualitative methodology was dominant because research 
questions pertaining to how or why were being answered and the intent was to study a 
specific real-life situation laden with context and these are two hallmarks of qualitative 
research per Burns (2000) and Yin (2003).  
With regard to intent, the intent of the study was not to operate from the locus of 
production or economic theory similar to Benkard (2000) or Thompson (2007). The 
intent of the study was to qualitatively understand where knowledge loss occurs, to 
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qualitatively examine the factors that promote or prevent knowledge loss, and to 
quantitatively explore its influences on contact center performance metrics. Its locus was 
more firmly situated in knowledge management practice and customer service/strategic 
management theory similar to Martin de Holan and Phillips (2004), Martin de Holan et 
al. (2004), and Downing (2004).  
Downing (2004) used a mixed model nested case study design when exploring 
why contact center representatives had not embraced new knowledge management 
technology. Like this study, qualitative data were dominant and quantitative data were 
secondary. Downing may have selected a mixed model nested qualitative-dominant case 
study design because it not only worked for the research under study, but also because it 
supported his philosophical and phenomenological beliefs.  
When designing a research study, the strategy is guided by the researcher’s 
epistemological, theoretical, and methodological choices. In mixed methods research, the 
epistemological choice and how that shapes the research is influenced by pragmatism and 
pragmatic knowledge claims (Creswell, 2003; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). That is, 
“pragmatists consider the research question to be more important than either the method 
they use or the worldview that is supposed to underlie the method” (Tashakkori & 
Teddlie, p. 21). Citing Patton (1990), Creswell said that “there is a concern with 





Similar to the reasons why a researcher might select mixed methodology, the 
qualitative inquiry may be selected because it supports a philosophical orientation he or 
she has regarding the construction of knowledge. “Your beliefs about the nature of reality 
and how knowledge is constructed, in addition to the problem you have identified and the 
question(s) you seek to answer, determine the selection of your research design” 
(Merriam & Simpson, 1995, p. 99). In addition, in selecting qualitative inquiry, the 
researcher may subscribe to an interpretive view of learning where multiple realities and 
multiple ways of knowing are valid.  
The key philosophical assumption upon which all types of qualitative research are 
based is the view that reality is constructed by individuals in interaction with their 
social worlds. Thus, there are many realities rather than the one observable, 
measurable reality which is key to research based in the positivist paradigm. 
(Merriam & Simpson, 1995, p. 97) 
 
In his study of learning from the past and the transferability of crisis leadership, 
Arnett (2007) indicated that a quantitative approach was not appropriate because “it could 
not be assumed that all the social realities of leadership are relatively constant across time 
and settings” (p. 79). Citing Gall et al. (2006), he added that “causal relationships among 
the social phenomena…could not be limited to perspectives that could only be analyzed 
by statistical methods” (p. 79). It is this way with the social realities of knowledge as 
well. 
Another consideration, in addition to the philosophical assumptions held by the 
researcher, is the environment within which he or she operates. “Qualitative methods are 
especially well suited for investigations in applied fields such as adult education and 
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training because we want to improve practice” (Merriam & Simpson, 1995, p. 97). As 
scholar-practitioners or practitioners, there is a desire to identify ways to solve an 
immediate practical problem. Qualitative methods enable the practitioner to focus on the 
organic wholeness and context of the problem under study instead of only statistics. This 
again aligns with the reasons why this researcher, knowledge manager, and scholar-
practitioner chose a mixed model qualitative approach. There was a what works best 
mentality as far as choosing the methodology in order to answer the research questions, 
as noted by Creswell (2003) and Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998), and there was the desire 
to investigate the issue organically and holistically beyond what a mono-method 
quantitative approach might yield. Moreover, there was a natural match in using a 
dynamic mixed model qualitative approach in the dynamic knowledge intensive 
environment of the contact center.  
Today’s research world is becoming increasingly interdisciplinary, complex, and 
dynamic; therefore, many researchers need to complement one method with 
another, and all researchers need a solid understanding of multiple methods used 
by other scholars to facilitate communication, to promote collaboration, and to 
provide superior research. (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004, p. 15) 
 
Using the Case Study for Qualitative Inquiry 
 
There are different types of qualitative inquiry methods available to researchers. 
Given its ability to allow for rich contextual information to be collected and analyzed as 
evidence, the case study was the specific form of qualitative inquiry used in this study. 
Although there are other qualitative strategies available (e.g., experiment, survey, 
archival analysis, and history), selection of the case study aligned with Yin’s (2003) 
guidelines: the form of the primary research question asks how, the focus is on 
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contemporary events, and it does not require the researcher to control behavioral events. 
Yin has said that that the “case study’s unique strength is its ability to deal with a full 
variety of evidence—documents, artifacts, interviews and observations” (p. 8). 
Observation may be one of the most critical components of the case study. Yet Yin also 
noted that case studies can incorporate quantitative data and stated that “regardless of 
whether one favors qualitative or quantitative research, there is a strong and essential 
common ground between the two” (p. 15). 
Yin (2003) and Merriam (1998) each discussed the inherent inclusion of context 
in qualitative case study research. Merriam stated that “a case study design is employed 
to gain an in-depth understanding of the situation and meaning for those involved. The 
interest is in process rather than outcomes, in context rather than a specific variable, in 
discovery, rather than confirmation” (p. 19). Yin added to this discussion of a process-
based focus when he said that “the case study method allows investigators to retain the 
holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events—such as individual life cycles, 
organizational and managerial processes, neighborhood change, international relations, 
and maturation of industries” (p. 2). When researching contact centers using the 
qualitative approach, van den Broek (2004) stated:  
The focus on qualitative research derived from a concern to capture the specific 
processes around the implementation of labour management practices rather than 
a broad picture of trends (Yin, 1984). Incorporating employees’ and managers’ 
own accounts of the policies and practices adopted within the two 
telecommunications organizations reinforces this strength. (p.5) 
 
Two additional examples illustrate this connection between the need for context 
and the decision to use a qualitative case study approach. In the first example, Rosenblatt 
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(as cited in Gilbert, 2001) noted that knowledge is “always provisional and inseparable 
from the linguistic, social, and other contexts in which it arises” (p. 127). Because 
knowledge and knowledge loss were key points of examination in this study, the ability 
to weave contextual information into the entire process was powerful. In the second 
example, from a knowledge management perspective, Guba and Lincoln (as cited in 
Merriam, 1998) said that because the case study is so contextual, it “illuminates meaning 
and can communicate tacit knowledge” (p. 39). Illuminating tacit knowledge may seem 
to be a stretch, but the holistic representation and contextual information afforded by case 
study research and the resulting case study report do have the ability to allow readers to 
take an in-depth journey into a process or situation.  
Even after the application of the case study is determined, researchers still have 
choices to make regarding the intent of the case study and whether the study will be a 
single-case study or a multi-case study. To discuss intent further, Merriam (1998) listed 
description, interpretation, and evaluation as possible intents of a case study. In the 
descriptive case study, which was the case study approach employed here, the 
researcher’s goal is to provide key details that accurately represent the situation. 
Downing (2004), who studied adoption of knowledge management tools in the contact 
center environment, successfully used the descriptive case study methodology to 
showcase that tools faced adoption challenges because they impacted the agents’ 
workplace identities and decision-making capabilities and were often introduced in beta 
versions, which reduced the efficacy of the tools as being useful resources for the agents. 
In a descriptive case study, the focus is not hypothesis application or hypothesis 
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generation. Rather, the case is descriptive and the researcher aims to present information 
in an area of limited literature and limited research. As noted in chapters 1 and 2, 
literature on knowledge loss is limited.  
It could be argued that there is an element of interpretative intent with this study. 
Per Merriam (1998), the interpretative intent has at its core the desire by the researcher to 
explore theoretical assumptions and offer hypotheses. “The level of abstraction and 
conceptualization in interpretive case studies may range from suggesting relationships 
among variables to constructing theory” (p. 39). In this study, the relationships between 
accidental and purposeful forgetting, leadership support, reinforcement, and adaptability 
to change were researched. Arnett (2007) used a qualitative research design that was part 
interpretative and part narrative, demonstrating that elements of both can effectively 
combined. 
Yin’s (2003) guidelines helped the researcher determine whether a single-case or 
multi-case was applicable. Yin specifically provided five rationales for selecting the 
single-case. If, as a single unit of analysis, the case can challenge or extend a theory, it 
would be considered a critical case. If the situation under study is unique or rare, a single-
case study is usually warranted. The single-case is also applicable to situations that are 
representative of other situations. That is “lessons learned from these cases are assumed 
to be informative about the experiences of the average person or the average institution” 
(Yin, p. 41). The last two of the five rationales include access to a case study situation by 
the researcher, which Yin calls relevance, and longitudinal cases where one situation is 
studied at different points in time. Researchers select multi-case studies, often called 
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comparative case studies, cross-case, or collective case studies (Merriam, 1998), because 
they have access, they have time and resources, and because the nature of the study is 
strengthened by the ability to analyze multiple variations of the same phenomena 
(Herman, 2006). This was a single-case study with one organization. The assumption was 
made that this contact center was generally representative of other contact centers and as 
such met the guidelines to select as a single case per Yin’s rationale.  
Limitations of Mixed Model Case Study Research 
 
Limitations of mixed model research include challenges with integrating disparate 
qualitative and quantitative data in the analysis and interpretation phases as well as 
reconciling incongruities between the two. For the nested design, however, Creswell and 
Plano Clark (2007) stated that its intent is “not to converge two different data sets 
collected to answer the same question. Researchers using a [nested] design can keep the 
two sets of results separate in their reports” (p. 70). The quantitative approach used in this 
study answers a different question than the qualitative approach. 
What remains an issue is that there are limited guidelines for researchers to follow 
when any situations arise in mixed model research (Creswell, 2003). Moreover, Creswell 
and Plano Clark (2007) have noted that “few examples exist and little has been written 
about embedding quantitative data with traditionally qualitative designs” (p. 71). By that 
very nature, this study contributes to the gap in guidelines by offering other researchers 
another example of a mixed model nested design where quantitative data were included 
within a larger qualitative study.  
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The researcher entered the study with a full awareness of the limitations of mixed 
model research. Where appropriate, there was reliance on the guidelines of Creswell 
(2003), Creswell and Plano Clark (2007), and Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998) for the data 
collection, analysis, and interpretation stages. In addition, there were examples from the 
literature review where qualitative methodology played a dominant role and quantitative 
methodology played a secondary role (Downing, 2004; Kinnie et al., 2000; Miles & 
Huberman, 1994; Senne & Rikard, 2002; Yin, 2003). 
Limitations of case study research include the issue of generalization, bias due to 
the researcher’s proximity to the participants, and time constraints to complete a thorough 
case study. Critics question how generalizations can be made based on one case. Burns 
(2000) and Yin (2003) responded to this criticism with a discussion about the nature of 
the case study. Case studies are generalizable to theory or theoretical propositions and not 
to people. As such, the goal is to focus on extending theoretical information rather than 
presenting statistical analysis. Yin cited Lipset, Trow, and Coleman (1956), “The goal is 
to do a generalizing and not a particularizing analysis” (p. 11). 
Another criticism of case study research involves bias because the researcher is so 
closely involved with the research and the research participants. As noted in chapter 1 
and noted at the outset of this section, the guidelines provided by Yin (2003) and 
Merriam (1998) were followed to mitigate any perceived bias. Both of those authors 
recognized the issue of bias, but Merriam countered the criticism: 
And because human beings are the primary instrument of data collection and 
analysis in qualitative research, interpretations of reality are accessed directly 
through their observations and interviews. We are thus ‘closer’ to reality than if a 
data collection instrument had been interjected between us and the participants. 
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Most agree that when reality is viewed in this manner, internal validity is a 
definite strength of qualitative research. (p. 203, emphasis in original) 
 
Validity (internal, external, construct) is often listed as one of the concerns about 
case study research in addition to reliability (Burns, 2000; Hittleman & Simon, 1997; 
Merriam, 1998; Yin, 2003). These are key issues that all researchers, quantitative or 
qualitative, should share as concerns. Fortunately, the body of literature that exists to help 
researchers tackle these concerns is broad, and the authors noted above offer suggestions. 
Merriam, for example, said that case study researchers can enhance internal validity 
though triangulation (multiple sources and multiple methods to confirm information), 
continuous checks with the participants to ensure appropriate interpretation, repeated 
observations, peer feedback, and participant involvement throughout the research cycle.  
Time is an issue with case study research and is often noted as a weakness. Yin 
(2003) and Burns (2000) added the issue of unreadable documents and information to the 
time criticism. Yin thought that case study reports have historically not been well written. 
Burns thought that the possibility exists for too much information to be collected. To 
assist researchers who are struggling with time, information, and report issues, Burns 
indicated that “the solution lies in choosing a manageable focus/theme/topic, specifying 
succinctly the initial proposition, identifying the essential observational settings and/or 
interviewees, and analyzing data as it comes rather than leaving it to the end” (p. 475).  
As noted with the mixed methodology, the researcher entered the study with a full 
awareness of case study research weaknesses. Where appropriate, there was a reliance on 




Additional limitations specific to this case study were discussed in chapter 1. Of 
note is that this study used the mode of forgetting matrix created by Martin de Holan et 
al. (2004) as its conceptual framework. Although included in the original study published 
by Martin de Holan et al., it did not appear that this framework had been further applied 
to any other knowledge loss situation in any other organizational environment. There was 
a risk that the application of the matrix would not yield the ability to identify specific 
areas of knowledge loss in the contact center, but this did not bear out in the actual 
research. Applying the matrix to areas of loss identified in the contact center did enable 
identification of specific loss areas.  
Role of the Researcher 
 
 Because of the qualitative nature of the study and because semi-structured 
interviews and onsite observation were dominant, primary components of the study, the 
researcher was the principal instrument involved in the collection of data. Interviews, in 
particular, were central to the study given that culture was one of the items considered as 
part of the overall context of the case. As van den Broek (2004) noted, “Undertaking such 
interviews was essential to understand how cultural initiatives were implemented and 
received at workplace level. Similarly attendance at team meetings allows for direct 
observation of managerial and employee communication, as well as inter-employee 
behavior” (p. 5). 
The researcher conducted all introductions and orientations to the case, conducted 
all of the interviews, and had sole responsibility for reviewing supporting evidence such 
as performance metrics. In addition, the researcher analyzed all obtained information and 
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was singularly responsible for the overall conduct of the case study from initiation 
through completion.  
Recommendations and guidelines outlined by Yin (2003) and Merriam (1998) 
were used when conducting the case study research to mitigate researcher bias and case 
study limitations. Moreover, the researcher used as qualitative models the previous 
research conducted by Martin de Holan and Phillips (2004) and Martin de Holan et al. 
(2004) for application of the mode of forgetting matrix and used as mixed method models 
the previous research conducted by Downing (2004), Kinnie et al. (2000), and Senne and 
Rikard (2002) among others, to appropriately integrate the qualitative and quantitative 
aspects of the study and report the outcomes in a clear, concise manner. 
 Creswell (2003) noted that researchers should “explicitly identify their biases, 
values, and personal interests about their research topic and process” (p. 184). Because 
this researcher currently works in a contact center organization and has 5 years of 
experience in that setting, there may be bias toward the processes and procedures used in 
the contact center under study. Evaluating those processes and procedures against the 
researcher’s current contact center environment was outside the scope of this study. By 
validating onsite observations with the participants involved in the study and by adhering 
strictly to interpretation of direct interview material and validating those interpretations 
with the participants, this bias was minimized. 
When working to determine possible cases to study, the researcher was able to 
locate an inbound contact center. An inbound contact center means that callers needing or 
using its services proactively contact the center through one of its contact channels rather 
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than the contact center agents placing outbound calls to customers. The researcher does 
have a bias against outbound sales and marketing contact centers because of a seemingly 
more aggressive relationship with the customer. The availability of the case and the 
agreement of the manager to work with the researcher precluded her from having to 
solicit an outbound contact center organization. However, this bias is made known. 
 As far as personal interests, the natural selection of the dissertation topic would 
seem to indicate an interest in said topic. As a knowledge management practitioner and as 
a contact center program manager, there is a natural interest held by the researcher in the 
field of knowledge management and in the contact center as a somewhat unique 
organization. To ensure that the passion of these personal interests did not impede the 
honest and ethical reporting of the data, information was validated with the participants 
involved, which Creswell (2003) refers to as member checking. In addition, guidelines 
provided through Johnson and Christensen’s (2004) discussion of reflexivity, which are 
to engage in critical self-reflection about personal biases and predispositions throughout 
the study, were followed. 
About the Case Under Study 
 
 To initiate this case study, it was necessary to identify a contact center 
organization that was willing to participate in the study and that was geographically 
situated in an optimal location for the researcher. The organization needed to be within a 
5- to 6-hour driving distance from the researcher’s home in the midwestern United States, 
so that she was able to easily commute to and from the organization during site visits 
without needing to expend significant monetary resources for travel. Although there were 
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elements of convenience sampling, where a sample is selected based on “time, money, 
location, availability of sites or respondents, and so on” (Merriam, 1998, p. 63), network 
sampling, where a researcher asks other people related to the topic under study to 
recommend potential participants, was used to identify contact centers that would 
possibly sponsor the study. E-mails were sent to known contact center professionals 
seeking the names of contact center organizations and contact center individuals that 
might be willing to participate in this study. Although not used, the services of the 
Customer Contact Council and the International Customer Management Institute were 
available to locate possible participants and contact had been made with both 
organizations in case that situation was realized.  
There were no contact centers that were considered too small or too large for the 
study; however, in larger contact centers, there would have been a greater majority of the 
population that would not have been able to participate in the study given the limited time 
and number of participants who could have been accommodated. Other than providing an 
optimal geographic location relative to the midwestern United States and providing 
access for the researcher, no other primary constraints were placed on the contact center 
that participated in the study.  
Based on those parameters and based on convenience and network sampling, one 
contact center organization was identified and the manager of that contact center agreed 
to participate in the case study. A Letter of Cooperation and a Data Use Agreement form 
were retained from the organization in accordance with Walden University Institutional 
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Review Board (IRB) policies. To protect the identity of the contact center under study, 
the name and specific city and state location of the organization are not included. 
 Located in the midwestern United States, this contact center comprises 1 
manager, 2 supervisors, 1 team lead, 8 agents (called product support specialists), 2 
knowledge team members, and 4 systems support technicians. Although it has satellite 
locations in two other areas of the Midwest, only the primary location was visited during 
the research. This contact center operates as an inbound information services/technical 
support helpline for state-based educational services software projects. It supports over 
120 different projects. Rather than specializing on a handful of projects, the agents are 
trained to be generalists and support all projects. This contact center does use a 
knowledge management tool on its agents’ desktops called Kaidara Advisor, a product of 
Kaidara Software, Inc. Use of a knowledge management tool was not required for 
participation in the study, but it did offer the ability to infer relationships with other 
evidence in the case. 
Access 
 
 During the dissertation proposal stage, the contact center manager agreed to 
provide onsite access to the researcher and a Letter of Cooperation was retained. Access 
in the organization was supervised by the manager and was restricted to only the common 
areas of the organization and the specific contact center department. The researcher was 
granted visitor badge access and was accompanied by an escort when traveling to and 
from the common areas to the specific department. The researcher was required to sign in 
and out from the building by entering at the front desk, signing a logbook, contacting the 
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escort, and then being escorted to the department. Upon completion of the day’s site visit, 
the researcher was required to be escorted back to the front desk, sign out of the logbook, 
and exit the building. 
Although telephone contact was initiated with the manager at the site under study 
to ensure her participation, and by proxy the participation of her contact center team, in 
the doctoral dissertation, and a Letter of Cooperation and a Data Use Agreement form 
were signed in accordance with Walden University IRB policies, a reintroduction 
between the manager and the researcher was necessary at the outset of the study because 
of the elapsed time between initial contact and final IRB approval (approval number 12-
19-08-0257791). Moreover, it was necessary to reorient the manager to the purpose of the 
study, as well as the time and participation necessary for the study. During this initial 
reintroduction, scheduled access to the pertinent site location was determined.   
The reintroduction also included a review of the consent form that all participants, 
including the manager, had to sign. Explanation was provided regarding the need for the 
participant to sign the consent form, that participation was voluntary, and that no pressure 
was to be placed on the participant to participate in the interviews or onsite observations. 
The consent form was created using a template from the Walden University IRB website, 
customized for the study, and modified and approved by the case study sponsor’s 
contracting officer during the proposal stage. 
Although a schedule was agreed upon at start of research, the schedule changed as 
dictated by call volume, business unit needs, and the unpredictable Midwest weather that 
produced some snowstorms during the research period. Flexibility in scheduling was 
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necessary to accommodate the interviews, which required agents to be taken off the 
phones. The researcher collected quantitative performance metrics for analysis and 
observed agents taking calls with the Data Use Agreement in place in addition to 
conducting interviews.  
The manager agreed to allow access to her organization in good faith for the 
explicit reason of conducting dissertation research. There was no requirement to sign any 
organizational documents other than the daily logbooks. To reciprocate this extension of 
good faith on the part of the manager, a research design was selected that included the 
highest measures of ethical protection for the participants.   
Case Study Participants 
 
 The participants of the case study included the sponsor of the study, which was 
the contact center manager, and the supervisors, the team leads, the agents, the 
knowledge team members, and the systems support technicians. The manager reserved 
the right to select the participants for the study. Although this introduced bias into the 
study because the manager might not have selected participants with known performance 
issues, and whose performance issues might somehow be related to knowledge loss, the 
researcher did not impose participant selection criteria on the manager provided that 
sufficient numbers of participants from each of the areas noted were made available to 
engage in the research.  
Sample 
  
 Merriam (1998) noted that the “question of how many people to interview, how 
many sites to visit, or how many documents to read concerns—more likely haunts—the 
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novice qualitative researcher” (p. 65) Using a homogenous sample selection (Johnson & 
Christensen, 2004), the sample consisted of those employed directly in the primary 
contact center site as manager, supervisor, team lead, agent, knowledge team member, or 
systems support technician with two exceptions. One member of the knowledge team and 
one team lead, both located in two separate satellite locations, participated in the study. 
The contact center manager recommended that the satellite knowledge team member be 
interviewed and one of the supervisors recommended that the satellite team lead be 
interviewed. Martin de Holan and Phillips (2004) interviewed 78 participants in a 
longitudinal study that lasted 4 years. Downing (2004) interviewed 47 participants within 
a 1-year period. Cross et al. (2008) interviewed 12 participants over a 2-week period. 
Given that this was not a longitudinal study and given that this was a doctoral dissertation 
that had to be completed in a finite amount of time, the researcher initially determined a 
sample of 16, which consisted of 1 contact center manager, 5 support staff (knowledge 
team members and system support technicians), and 10 agents for participation in the 
face-to-face interviews. The manager subsequently allowed and encouraged all of the 
contact center staff available in the primary location to participate in the research 
including the two employees at the satellite locations, which resulted in 20 total 
participants being interviewed: 1 contact center manager, 2 supervisors, 2 team leads, 3 
knowledge team members, 4 systems support technicians, and 8 agents. All participants 
except the two working at the satellite locations were interviewed in person. The satellite 
participants were interviewed by telephone. Regarding observation, the researcher 
observed a random sample of participants in their natural settings over several days for a 
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total of 16 hours of observation. Regarding documentation, the researcher reviewed the 
introductory training materials for one project and read some e-mails sent from 
management to employees during the onsite observation.  
Consent and Confidentiality 
 
Participants were asked to sign a consent form that explained the following 
aspects of the study: procedures involved in participation (e.g., meeting in a conference 
room and being asked a series of open-ended questions or having someone observe them 
while they were on a customer call), voluntary participation, risks and benefits of 
participation, compensation (none), and confidentiality. For the two interviews that 
occurred via telephone, signed consent forms were obtained via mail. All other consent 
forms were obtained in person at the time of the interview. 
During the research, participants were asked for permission to digitally record the 
interview for the purposes of explicitly preserving the information and enabling an 
electronic copy to be created by a transcriptionist, whose services were retained and who 
signed a confidentiality agreement. All participants agreed to the digital recording so it 
was not necessary to rely solely on handwritten notes of the participants’ responses to the 
interview questions. The digital recorder failed to capture one interview in its entirety. 
For that particular interview, the handwritten notes were used. Transcribed interviews 
were not directly shared with the manager but were shared with the individual participant 
as part of the member checking process, which is discussed more in detail in chapter 4. 




The researcher captured the names of the participants expressly for the purposes 
of keeping a participant log to ensure scheduling and interviewing of all participants and 
for asking any necessary clarifying questions either after the interview or once analysis 
had commenced. Participant names are not included here; job titles are used for 
identification purposes (e.g., manager, supervisor, team lead, knowledge team member, 
systems support technician, agent) where necessary. In order to protect the privacy of the 
participants given the small sample size, which mirrors the relatively small size of this 
contact center team, the generic term participant is primarily used.  
Tenure (length of service in the contact center department) was also used to 
classify participants. As noted in chapter 1, although turnover has been found to be a 
significant factor that contributes to knowledge loss, this study focused on knowledge 
loss that occurred with agents and organizational members with more permanent tenure. 
That is, this research was more focused on knowledge loss due to a changing 
environment with workers that persist in the organization. Because of this focus, it was 
necessary to explore the various tenures of the agents. Tenure is discussed in aggregate in 
chapter 4 so that individual participants can not be identified.  
Data Collection 
 
Although a concurrent approach to collect qualitative and quantitative data was 
used with respect to this mixed model design, for explanatory purposes in this chapter, 
the data collection processes and techniques are discussed sequentially, with qualitative 
procedures discussed first following its dominant role in the design and quantitative 
procedures discussed second following its secondary role in the design. Creswell and 
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Plano Clark (2007) have cautioned that bias can be introduced through concurrent data 
collection and researchers must be aware of this possibility. Because data were being 
gathered to answer different research questions in this study, steps were taken to 
minimize this bias, but the researcher still entered into the data collection process with 
awareness that bias could have been introduced at this point in the study. Data collection 
did not begin until official notification to commence research had been received from 
Walden University IRB. 
Qualitative Data Collection 
 
Qualitative data collection occurred through semistructured individual interviews 
with the participants, through onsite observation of live inquiries through the contact 
center channels and the agents’ use of desktop tools, job aids, and knowledge 
management support structures, and through review of some documentation that included 
training materials and e-mails from management and other agents. The qualitative data 
collection efforts were focused on answering these two research questions: Where did 
knowledge loss occur at the individual and/or organizational level? What were the 
contributing factors? 
The interview format was used to probe perceptions of knowledge loss among 
participants and their perceptions of where knowledge loss manifested itself in their 
contact center and what factors they thought might contribute to knowledge loss. Onsite 
observation and some review of e-mail and training materials were used to understand the 
factors that might have promoted or prevented knowledge loss in the center. All of the 
data analyzed were applied to Martin de Holan et al.’s (2004) mode of forgetting matrix, 
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shown in Figure 1, to identify specific areas of the contact center where knowledge loss 
occurred. Contact information for Martin de Holan was located, and he was contacted 
about the possibility of incorporating the matrix in this study in order to explain 
knowledge loss. Martin de Holan responded that this was acceptable under fair use 
doctrine and suggested that permission be obtained from either MIT Sloan Management 
Review or Management Science. Because the article in MIT Sloan Management Review 
included an illustration of the matrix, permission was requested and granted from this 
publication. A copy of the e-mail approval is included in Appendix A. 
On a more granular level, the focus of the research was on themes of knowledge 
loss (accidental and purposeful forgetting as well as the source of knowledge) directly 
related to the dimensions illustrated in the mode of forgetting matrix: memory decay, 
failure to capture, unlearning, and avoiding bad habits. Organizational culture (leadership 
support, reinforcement, adaptability to change), and knowledge and learning management 
(impediments to knowledge flow and diffusion) were also generally explored during the 
qualitative data collection process. 
Interviews and instrumentation. Participants were interviewed either in a private 
office or in a private area of the cafeteria. A total of 20 interviews were conducted (18 
face-to-face and 2 via telephone) yielding 16.5 total hours of interview data. One data 
collection instrument was used for the interviews and this instrument is located in 
Appendix B. Given the specific themes that were explored, questions were generally 
grouped into categories of demographics and job duties, contact center environment, 
knowledge access and need, and knowledge loss. Questions were both created by the 
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researcher and collected from other relevant research. Questions collected from other 
research include appropriate author citations immediately following. Nelson’s (2007) 
recent case study research on knowledge management provided a wealth of pertinent 
questions that were also applicable to this study. Permission to use these questions for the 
purpose of this research was granted by Nelson and a copy of the e-mail approval is 
included in Appendix A. 
 The focus of the demographics and job duties portion of the interview was to 
collect tenure information, obtain an understanding of previous experience, and to have 
participants describe their roles, responsibilities, and typical day in their own words. 
Table 1  
Demographics and Job Duties Interview Questions  
 
How long have you been with the organization in your current role? 
What previous background and experiences do you bring to this particular 
position? 
 
What do you see as your primary role and responsibility in this position? 
 
Describe a typical workday.  
 The focus of the contact center environment portion of the interview was to 
understand the contact center’s culture, leadership support, and performance 
measurements. It also offered an opportunity to discuss issues that provided additional 




Contact Center Environment Interview Questions 
 
Tell me about the kind of leadership support that you receive in your position 
from your manager and/or the organization. 
 
What are the top three issues that are impacting your work environment 
today? 
 
What knowledge, information, and/or tools do you need to be successful in 
your job and how do you define success?  
 
What knowledge, information, and/or tools do others in your department need 
to be successful in their job and how do you define success for those people? 
 
Tell me about how your performance is measured or monitored. 
 
Tell me what you would need from the people, tools, and/or knowledge 
available to you in this job to perform better. 
 
The focus of the knowledge access and knowledge need portion of the interview 
was to identify what information was necessary, how that information was obtained, who 
was involved, and a discussion of the challenges. All of the questions in this portion were 
obtained from Nelson’s (2007) study. 
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Table 3  
Knowledge Access and Knowledge Need Interview Questions 
 
What is the source of information and how do you access it? 
 
If you have questions, where do you go for answers? 
 
Who regularly asks you questions? What types of questions are asked?  
 
Who do you interact with most frequently (i.e., what individuals or 
departments) and for what reasons? 
 
What type of knowledge do you find or would you find valuable in helping 
meet your department’s mission and objective (i.e., what would make your 
job easier)? 
 
What is the most important type of knowledge, information, or data the 
organization could provide that would give you the greatest benefit overall on 
a day-to-day basis? 
 
What do you view as the most significant challenge to obtaining and 
managing the knowledge you need to accomplish your assigned duties? 
 
 The focus of the knowledge loss portion of the survey was to identify which 
dimensions of knowledge loss, as outlined in Martin de Holan et al.’s (2004) mode of 
forgetting matrix, were occurring and in what way. 
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Table 4  
Knowledge Loss Interview Questions 
 
What amount or percentage of your time do you spend finding knowledge for 
others in your department? In your organization? (Nelson, 2007) 
 
Tell me about a time when you weren’t sure how to complete a task or answer 
a call. What happened? 
 
Tell me about a time where you forgot how to do something on the job. What 
was it and what did you do?  
 
How do you share what you know with other coworkers? For example, if you 
learn something new while helping a customer, how do you let other 
coworkers know so that they can help a customer in the same situation? 
 
How is your performance measured on your ability to answer customer 
questions correctly and completely? How do you ensure that that knowledge 
you have is current? 
 
How do the people, processes, and tools that you use ensure that you have the 
knowledge you need to do your job? 
 
Describe a situation where the answer to a customer question may have 
changed because new information was known about the problem. How did 
you remember this new information? How did you forget the old 
information? 
 
How fast do you feel the answers to customer questions change? How do you 
handle these changes?  
 
Tell me about the administrative aspects of your position as far as collecting 
customer information or recording the specifics of a call. How are these 
aspects measured or monitored as part of your performance? 
 
How do you know which administrative processes to follow in your job? 
What happens if the processes change? How do you know?  
 
Describe any other examples that you feel are related to forgetting 
information on the job or not having the information that you need to answer 




Interview questions were validated by conducting pilot interviews at the contact 
center where the researcher works. This ensured that the actual case study participants did 
not have difficulty understanding the questions and allowed the researcher to gauge the 
average time of an interview. It also allowed for interviewing practice. Merriam (1998) 
observed that pilot interviews enable researchers to “quickly learn which questions are 
confusing and need reworking, which questions yield useless data, and which questions, 
suggested by your respondents, you should have thought to include in the first place” (p. 
75). Results from this pilot showed that a 1 hour time allotment was sufficient for the 
interview and that no questions required amendment.  
Onsite observation. The researcher sat with contact center agents and observed 
their interaction with desktop tools while also listening to calls through a headset 
connected to the agent’s phone. The purpose was to observe the agents’ use of the tools, 
identify areas where the agents may have had difficulty in accessing knowledge items, 
and, in general, and observe the agents’ interactions with others in seeking information 
and sharing information. In addition, the researcher listened to the affective queues of the 
caller to determine whether the knowledge provided by the agent met the caller’s needs. 
An observation form (Appendix C) was used to capture the actions of the agent. Sixteen 
hours of side-by-side observation yielded 63 unique calls. Personally identifying 
information about the caller was not captured as that information was not relevant to this 
study.   
 Documentation review. Reviewing documentation can better contextualize and 
deepen the research (Treleaven & Sykes, 2005). The researcher reviewed training 
93 
 
documentation for the agents on a new project. During onsite observation, the researcher 
was also able to look at some e-mails that the agents and support staff received from 
management to better understand the communication styles and patterns that were used, 
which can be a reflection of the organizational culture.  
Quantitative Data Collection 
 
Quantitative data collection occurred through receipt of both productivity-based 
and quality-based performance metrics captured for the contact center for a specific 
period in time. The quantitative data collection efforts were focused on answering the 
third and final research question: How did knowledge loss influence the contact center’s 
productivity and quality metrics? The quantitative data collected for this study were used 
as a point of triangulation for the qualitative data. As such, the data were not empirically 
tested against a hypothesis or null hypothesis.  
Performance metrics. Although the initial intent was to use the t test for 
independent samples to determine statistical significance between average handle times, 
first call resolution percentages, transfer percentages, and call topic frequency, the 
organization was limited in the data it could provide. The data that were received were 
aggregated data related to the following productivity-based performance metrics: average 
speed of answer, average after call time, and average handle time, which were provided 
in a monthly average. That is, the monthly average for speed of answer for March, April 
and May were provided. The one quality-based performance metric that was provided 
was related to first call resolution. The top five call topics were also provided along with 
attrition percentages. Therefore, rather than using inferential statistics, descriptive 
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statistics were used where the “researcher attempts to convey the essential characteristics 
of the data by arranging the data into a more interpretable form” (Johnson & Christensen, 
2004, p. 434). The data that were provided still allowed the researcher a point of 
triangulation with the qualitative data. 
 The collected quantitative data were for all agents and not just those agents who 
participated in the qualitative interviews. This is common in mixed methods research and 
is often why a researcher employs the nested design as noted earlier in this chapter. While 
necessary to interview agents to obtain the contextual aspects of knowledge loss, it was 
not as necessary to match performance metrics with an individual agent to explain any 
possible influences between knowledge loss and performance. Moreover, by looking at 
quantitative numbers for the entire center, it broadened the scope of the analysis and 
provided a more comprehensive picture of the contact center’s performance as a whole. 
Data Analysis 
 
The qualitative and quantitative data analysis process was ongoing concurrently 
throughout the research cycle. While the researcher was coding the qualitative data by 
listening for themes during the interviews and observations and by looking for themes 
when the transcriptions were available, she was also reviewing the quantitative 
performance metrics for insight and significance. The three-step process for mixed 
method analysis outlined by Creswell and Plano Clark (2007) was used. First, coding and 
theme development was completed for the interviews while descriptive analysis was 
completed for the performance metrics. Second, in this nested design, the datasets were 
merged and “the supportive dataset [was used to] reinforce or refute the results of the 
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primary dataset” (p. 136). Third, the researcher answered the research questions using the 
merged data. As in the data collection section, the qualitative data analysis is discussed 
first in this chapter followed by the quantitative data analysis. 
Coding Qualitative Data 
 
Noting patterns and themes in the interviews and the onsite observations was the 
primary method of coding the qualitative data. Miles and Huberman (1994) noted that 
this approach works well with text-based resources, such as the qualitative interviews that 
were transcribed and the onsite observation notes that were written during the course of 
this study. Downing (2004) was successful in coding qualitative data from interviews 
using a theme-based approach, which provided a practical example of Miles and 
Huberman’s recommendations. He created a descriptive table that illustrated the key 
themes that were identified, provided descriptions of each theme, and included the total 
number of different employees making comments related to the theme. He then provided 
interpretative information about the themes that were identified in relation to the 
organization in total (supporting documentation, culture), which also provided 
recommendations for further research.  
 Miles and Huberman (1994) recommended using words rather than numbers to 
conduct coding and pattern matching; therefore, the following primary categories were 
used to code information based on the purpose of the study, the research questions being 
asked, the interview questions, and the application of the mode of forgetting matrix as the 
conceptual framework: culture, knowledge, and performance. Within each primary 
category, there were subcategories. For culture, the subcategories included contact center 
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environment, corporate customs, economic conditions, leadership support, and 
organizational change. For knowledge, the subcategories included avoiding bad habits, 
failure to capture, memory decay, training, transfer, and unlearning. For performance, the 
subcategories included customer satisfaction, evaluation, standards, success, and 
technology. Table 5 lists the categories and subcategories that were used in the coding 
process along with the description of each category. 
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Table 5  






























Events or circumstances that shaped 




Event or circumstance primarily driven 
by the nature of the work; of 
specifically doing business as an 
inbound contact center 
 
Event or circumstance primarily driven 
by the current economy (e.g., 
reduction in state education budgets) 
 
Event or circumstance primarily driven 
by the corporation (e.g., new 
timekeeping system, new project 
implementation) 
 
Event or circumstance primarily driven 
by managerial or supervisor support in 
the execution of tasks 
 
Event or circumstance primarily driven 

































Evidence of knowledge acquisition, use, 




Adherence to or deviation from 
standard operating administrative 
procedure 
 
Evidence of standard or routine 
knowledge that was readily available 
to the participants, but not transferred 
 
Events that occurred related to 
forgetfulness, whether accidental or 
purposeful 
 
Formal and informal events used to 
assist staff with acquiring knowledge 
 
Actions where participants explicitly 
engaged in exchanging knowledge  
 
Actions that exhibited noncompliance 
with provided operating procedures or 
directions or exhibited resistance to 
new knowledge 
 










Measures of success, evaluation 
procedures, standards, supporting 




Evidence of customer satisfaction 
whether anecdotal or data driven 
 
Evidence of individual and team 



















Measures of success, evaluation 
procedures, standards, supporting 
technology, and customer satisfaction 
 
Evidence of performance standards 
and expectations 
 
Definitions of success for individuals, 
team, and company 
 
Use of technology to foster 
performance 
 
Coding was handled manually using paper copies of the transcriptions. Data were 
subsequently clustered together electronically so that they could be reviewed in aggregate 
by category and subcategory. Where necessary during coding, marginal notes were used 
to highlight specific subcategories. The selected categories enabled identification of 
knowledge loss themes, possible causes and explanations, and individual, team, and 
corporate relationships that had both cultural and environmental overtones. Although the 
use of qualitative data analysis software was considered, it was deemed not necessary 
given that the thematic analysis techniques outlined by Miles and Huberman (1994) and 
successfully used in practice by Downing (2004) was sufficient. It was understood that 
there were weaknesses to this approach that paradoxically had knowledge loss overtones:  
Nevertheless, data reduction processes necessarily involve abstraction, inevitably 
losing some of the situated and practical knowledge embedded in narrative forms, 
and thereby reflexively exhibit the very nature of knowledge loss through 
organizing that the study itself investigates. (Treleaven & Sykes, 2005, p. 359)  
 
The researcher cross-referenced the identified themes with Martin de Holan et 
al.’s (2004) mode of forgetting matrix, shown in Figure 1, to identify specific dimensions 
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or areas of knowledge loss in the contact center. This identification can lead to stronger 
knowledge management models for the contact center because it can help those 
organizations pinpoint areas of loss. 
Validity and reliability. Miles and Huberman (1994) stated that “qualitative 
analysis can be evocative, illuminating, masterful—and wrong.” Therefore, it was 
important during the analysis stage to ensure standards of quality were kept at the 
forefront and that those standards were met. To this end, Merriam (1998) provided 
researchers with strategies to enhance validity and reliability. The strategies employed 
here regarding validity included triangulation, member checks, and disclosure of 
researcher bias. Three different audiences (manager, agent, and support staff) were used 
as a way to confirm the emerging findings. Moreover, continuous checks with the 
participants were used to ensure appropriate interpretation. This included rephrasing the 
participant responses during the qualitative interviews to ensure accuracy and providing 
copies of the transcribed interviews for participant review as another way to ensure that 
the provided responses were accurately captured. In addition, the findings were discussed 
in aggregate with the case sponsor (i.e., the contact center manager) for additional 
triangulation. Throughout the dissertation, the researcher made biases known and 
clarified the epistemological, theoretical, and methodological decisions that shaped this 
study.  
The strategies employed here regarding reliability included use of a standard 
interview form (Appendix B), a standard onsite observation form (Appendix C), and a 
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careful and detailed accounting of the data collection and analysis process, which serves 
to guide other researchers wishing to replicate this study. 
Interpreting Quantitative Data 
 
 Performance metric data provided by the organization included the following 
productivity-based performance metrics: average speed of answer, average after call 
work, and average handle time. The one quality-based performance metric that was 
provided was related to first call resolution. The top five call topics were also provided 
along with attrition percentages. The data were arranged into a more interpretable form 
for triangulation with the qualitative data (Johnson & Christensen, 2004). This means that 
frequency distributions were calculated for the call topics and averages were calculated 
for average handle time, after call work, and first call resolution. 
 As in many mixed model approaches, another factor of the quantitative data 
analysis was that the data were qualitized, which means that one “converts quantitative 
data into narratives that can be analyzed qualitatively” (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998, p. 
126). For example, call topics were qualitatively categorized from the quantitative data 
and were compared to themes found in the qualitative coding and analysis. The 
quantitative data collected for this study were used as a point of triangulation for the 
qualitative data. As such, the data were not empirically tested against a hypothesis or null 
hypothesis.  
 Validity and reliability. Because the quantitative data were analyzed from a 
qualitative perspective, a primary strategy employed regarding validity was member 
checking directly with the case study sponsor. The case study sponsor, who was the 
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contact center manager, reviewed the analysis results and confirmed that the findings 
seemed appropriate given all of the data. Although the researcher could not 
independently confirm the reliability of the performance data that were provided by the 




 Chapter 3 described how the design of this study enabled exploration of 
knowledge loss’s influence on contact center performance metrics, identification of what 
factors contribute to knowledge loss, and identification of specific knowledge loss 
dimensions present in the contact center using Martin de Holan et al.’s (2004) mode of 
forgetting matrix.  
This chapter included a discussion of the mixed model case study methodology 
that was used in the research, the role of the researcher in the process, detailed 
descriptions of the cases and participants under study, data collection procedures, data 
collection instruments, and finally a description of the data analysis procedures. Chapter 
4 contains the results of the study based on analysis of the qualitative and quantitative 
data collected from the field research, while chapter 5 includes a summary of the study, 
the conclusions that were drawn, recommendations for further research, and implications 
for social change.  
 
 




The design selected to address the research questions was a mixed model case 
study that enabled an exploration of the subtleties, nuances, and contextual situations 
inherent in knowledge management processes, including knowledge loss and knowledge 
discard, which are intimately connected to organizational culture, organizational change, 
and human involvement. The primary research question asked about knowledge loss in 
the contact center and the operational impacts. More specifically, three subquestions 
associated with this primary question concerned where knowledge loss occurred at the 
individual and/or organizational level within the chosen organization, what the 
contributing factors were, and how it influenced the contact center’s productivity and 
quality metrics. 
This chapter begins with a summary of the field research activities that 
contributed to the body of knowledge that was available for analysis. Results are then 
discussed through the three broad categories of culture, knowledge, and performance. 
Within these three broad categories, specific findings are shared that show where loss 
occurred at the individual and organizational level, what factors promoted and prevented 
the event, and the relationship between loss and performance. 
Field Research Activities 
 
Upon notification of approval to conduct research from Walden University IRB, 
data collection or field research commenced at the site under study on January 12, 2009. 
This start date was approved by the case study sponsor. Between January 12, 2009 and
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January 30, 2009, a total of 20 interviews were conducted (18 face-to-face and 2 via 
telephone), 63 unique inbound calls were observed with various agents, and 3 months of 
performance metric data were provided for the center’s most recent spike or high call 
volume period, which was March through May of 2008. The researcher also reviewed 
training materials for a new project and reviewed some e-mails sent between 
management and staff. The majority of the interviews occurred during the first week 
while observations and documentation review occurred primarily during the second and 
third week of field research. Performance metric data were provided at the conclusion of 
the field research window.  
Interviews and Transcriptions 
 
Based on the pilot of the interview questions, in which the interviews averaged 1 
hour each, and the case study sponsor’s desire to keep the 1 hour average intact as much 
as possible during field research, the researcher focused on that duration but did not cut 
participants off at the 1 hour mark. For example, the average duration of the interviews 
was 51 minutes but three interviews exceeded the 60 minute mark with the longest 
interview lasting 91 minutes. The shortest interview lasted 30 minutes. 
As interviews concluded, digital recordings were hand delivered to the 
transcriptionist on CD-ROM. She began returning completed transcriptions in early 
February. As transcriptions were returned via e-mail in a Microsoft Word format, they 
were checked for content. For example, if the transcriptionist had noted that a portion of 
the recording was inaudible, the handwritten notes from the case study interview form 
were pulled and reviewed to determine if that portion of the recording could be 
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reconstructed. This was successful in many of the cases. Overall, the quality of the digital 
recordings was superior and there were very few instances where a participant’s response 
was inaudible. The digital recorder failed to capture one interview in its entirety. For that 
particular interview, the handwritten notes were used.  
After ensuring that the transcriptions were in appropriate condition for review 
(e.g., proper spelling of participant names, reconstruction of inaudible sections, correct 
formatting), they were e-mailed individually to the participants. The participants were 
notified in the e-mail that they were welcome to review the transcription to provide any 
additional comments or clarifications. They were given one week to review the 
transcription and it was noted that they were not obligated to provide any response to the 
researcher. It was also noted that the transcription was being provided to them 
individually and would not be shared with their manager, which was the case study 
sponsor. The e-mail further reminded the participants that every effort would be made to 
de-identify the information in the dissertation to protect their privacy. This meant that 
participants would not be identified by name in the dissertation but by randomized 
participant number and meant that comments from the participant interviews would not 
include information that would allow a participant to be easily identified. The return 
receipt feature was used to ensure that the e-mail had reached its intended recipient.  
Of the 20 participants, 5 responded to the e-mail indicating that they had no 
further comments. One of the five was concerned that the responses provided were 
rambling and not succinct. This participant asked if the information would be provided in 
a summary format in the dissertation to which the provided answer was yes. No 
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participants asked that their statements be retracted although the researcher was prepared 
for this possibility based on the guidance provided by Janesick (2004). An example of a 
complete transcription is included in Appendix D. Information has been de-identified in 
the transcription to protect the privacy of the organization under study and the privacy of 
the participant. 
Validity and reliability. Offering the participants the opportunity to review the 
transcripts was an important part of ensuring the validity of this study. Reliability was 
ensured through the use of the standard interview form (Appendix B), a standard onsite 
observation form (Appendix C), and a careful and detailed accounting of the data 
collection and analysis process, which serves to guide other researchers wishing to 
replicate this study. 
When the transcriptions were reviewed for content, they were also hand coded by 
the researcher. As noted in chapter 3, the following primary categories were used to code 
information based on the purpose of the study, the research questions being asked, the 
interview questions, and the application of the mode of forgetting matrix as the 
conceptual framework: culture, knowledge, and performance. Within each primary 
category, there were subcategories. For culture, the subcategories included contact center 
environment, corporate customs, economic conditions, leadership support, and 
organizational change. For knowledge, the subcategories included avoiding bad habits, 
failure to capture, memory decay, training, transfer, and unlearning. For performance, 




Both the paper copies of the interview form, which reflect the hand coding and 
marginal notes, and the digital recordings will be securely kept by the researcher for a 
period of 5 years from the date this dissertation is completed. The observation forms will 
also be securely kept for the same amount of time. 
Observation and Documentation Review 
 
 The researcher was able to sit with four agents and listen to phone calls, which 
resulted in 63 unique calls being heard. The contact center provided the researcher with a 
headset and she used the headset to link in to the agent’s phone in order to hear the agent 
and the caller. Caller names were not recorded because they were not necessary for the 
purpose of this research. The rate of calls being answered when the observation was 
taking place differed depending on the time of day. Agents were busier during morning 
observations and had many back-to-back calls. Afternoons were less busy and the calls 
were spaced farther apart. When the agent was not on a call, the researcher took that 
opportunity to ask about training materials or look at e-mail communication to and from 
management and peers. She would also observe what other agents were doing. Because 
the actual contact center department was concentrated in one area of the building, it was 
easy to observe the day-to-day interactions of the team. The manager’s office was 
immediately outside of the primary contact center area, which consisted of three small 
bays that each held four to five members of the team. Low walls between the bays 
fostered communication between the team and enabled the researcher to see and hear 
multiple interactions between team members. When the agents took their scheduled 
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break, the researcher often used this time to review the notes that were captured while 
listening to calls and to reflect on the activities around her.  
After the first day of observation, it became apparent that observing in 2 to 3 hour 
increments was ideal. Although not verbalized, it was perceived that the agents were 
ready to return to their workday sans someone looking over their shoulder. Moreover, 
diligent observation is tiring and the researcher sensed that her focus diminished past the 
3 or 4 hour mark; therefore, rather than doing two days of observation (8 hours each day), 
the observations were spread over 5 days to achieve the 16 hour duration. An example of 
a completed observation form is included in Appendix E. 
During field research, the contact center was preparing for the introduction of a 
new support project. The agents were required to take online training sessions in 
preparation for the launch of this project and this enabled the researcher to review online 
documentation related to training. Reviewing documentation can better contextualize and 
deepen the research (Treleaven & Sykes, 2005). The researcher was also able to observe 
management communication documents through review of e-mail that participants shared 
during the time that they were being observed to better understand the communication 
styles and patterns that were used, which can be a reflection of the organizational culture.   
Performance Metric Data 
 
At the conclusion of the field research, 3 months of performance metric data were 
provided in Microsoft Excel format. There were no specific external criteria used in 
selecting the time period of the performance metric data. Because of the volume of 
performance metric data available, it was necessary to collect a manageable amount of 
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data for analysis; therefore, a 3 month time period was selected. The contact center 
manager chose to provide 3 months of data from the most recent spike or high volume 
period, which was March through May of 2008. The data are shown in Appendix F. 
The organization was limited in the data that it could provide. Quality-based 
performance metrics, in particular, were largely not available as the contact center did not 
routinely track the quality performance (accuracy, adherence, customer satisfaction) of its 
agents. What was provided included one lone quality-based performance metric that was 
related to first call resolution, three productivity-based performance metrics that were 
related to average speed of answer, average handle time, and after call work, and data 
related to attrition and the top five call topics. The data that were provided, although 
scant on quality-based performance metrics, did permit a point of triangulation with the 
qualitative data. 
Researcher as Instrument 
  
 In qualitative research, the researcher is the primary data collection instrument 
(Merriam, 1998). As such, there is not only a focus on gathering the data to be able to 
address the research questions, but also a focus on and an awareness of how one is being 
regarded and received during the field research because it takes place in such an intimate 
setting with face to face interactions and exchanges. From the outset, the case study 
sponsor was responsive and accommodating to the needs of the researcher and was 
patient with the elapsed time of the dissertation process from initial contact in late 2007 
to welcoming the researcher onsite in early 2009 to conduct the study. The sponsor had 
alerted the team about the study and worked, despite her own busy schedule and 
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management responsibilities, to ensure that a sufficient number of participants were 
available to interview, that observations were scheduled, and that performance metric 
data were provided. She also made time to participate in the research by consenting to an 
interview.  
 This receptivity to the researcher was widespread, meaning that the participants 
seemed genuinely engaged in providing responses to the researcher. Many participants 
wished the researcher well at the conclusion of the interview and expressed interest in 
reviewing a final copy of the dissertation. Moreover, as the duration of the field study 
increased and the researcher was more frequently onsite, several participants shared 
unsolicited examples of documentation that they had discussed in the interview because 
they felt it important for the researcher to see. One participant recommended that the 
researcher speak to the individual primarily responsible for the selection and 
implementation of the Kaidara knowledge management system even though he was no 
longer a direct member of the team under study. This idea was fully supported by the 
case study sponsor and the researcher was able to understand the historical information 
about the system implementation as well as validate some of her early findings with that 
individual, who was a member of the organization’s management team and a peer of the 
case study sponsor. This openness to engage fully in the research was also evidenced by 
the case study sponsor’s decision to ensure that everyone in the field research location 
was able to participate in the interview process, including two remote employees, which 
enabled the sample size to increase from 16 to 20. 
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 If there was any challenge caused by this openness, it was maintaining the formal 
relationship between researcher and participant. The culture of the contact center was one 
where people quickly felt like they were part of the team because of the easy rapport 
between staff and the general positivity toward the working environment. Moreover, 
there was a willingness to candidly share knowledge with the researcher that fostered a 
high comfort level and enabled the researcher/participant relationship to flourish in a 
short amount of time. Although invited to partake in several of the team’s activities (a 
birthday celebration, a chili cook-off), the researcher declined to ensure that there was a 
clear line in the researcher/participant relationship. In addition, the researcher deflected 
personal questions that were asked of her during observations (in between phone calls) 
that were not related to the research to maintain the integrity of the relationship. 
 A final example of the team’s receptivity to the researcher occurred during one of 
the observation sessions. The participant handled a phone call that was an excellent 
example of something that had been discussed during the interview. When the call was 
over, the participant turned and said, “Here’s an example for you, Liz! This is a great 
example of us not being able to assist customers because the program team is 
unavailable” (January 23, 2009 observation). This enthusiasm spoke not only to the 
engagement of the participant in the research, but also to the culture of the team. That 
culture was generally positive given that the team had undergone reorganization and had 
acquired additional staff and projects to support through an acquisition a few months 
prior to the start of the field research. The results, which are discussed next, reflect those 
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changes and illustrate how culture intersects with knowledge loss, performance, 
leadership support, and organizational change. 
Presentation of Results 
The results presented in this section address the research questions and are 
discussed from the broad categories of culture, knowledge, and performance. Within each 
of these broad categories, the results are blended meaning that they are synthesized from 
all the artifacts of the case, the interviews, the observations, and the performance metric 
data to present a cohesive analysis. Answering the research questions using blended or 
merged data aligns with the mixed model methodology (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007). 
When statements are taken directly from interviews, the citation indicates a participant 
number (e.g., P1, P2). The number of the participant has been randomized and does not 
reflect the order in which the interviews were conducted to protect the privacy of the 
participants. This is also why specific interview dates are omitted from the citation. For 
the observations, the date of the observation is provided for the citation (e.g., January 23, 
2009 observation). Brackets are used to omit identifying information such as geographic 
locations or participant names or to clarify what the participant was saying and ellipses 
are used to edit proprietary information or nonessential information. 
Culture 
 
 Culture is defined as “a set of attitudes, values, assumptions, and traditions that 
directly shape an environment” (Merriam-Webster, 2008). One of the primary 
assumptions of this study was that organizational knowledge is inherently bound to the 
organization’s culture. Rowold et al. (2008) noted how culture plays a supporting role to 
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the learning organization. Therefore, to understand organizational knowledge, it was 
necessary to first understand the culture of the contact center under study.  
 During coding of qualitative data, which is summarized in Appendix G, 93 unique 
comments were coded under the primary category of culture. Within the primary 
category, those 93 comments were coded to a specific subcategory: contact center 
environment (29 comments), organizational change (20 comments), corporate customs 
(19 comments), leadership support (16 comments), and economic conditions (9 
comments). After categorizing and subcategorizing, the comments were analyzed by 
audience. That is, the comments were reviewed to determine attribution to management 
(manager, supervisors, and team leads), to support staff (systems support technicians and 
knowledge team members), or to agents. Of the 93 comments made, 37% were made by 
support staff, 35% were made by agents, and 28% were made by management. Although 
it appears based on the percentages alone that support staff made a higher number of 
comments related to the category of culture, when compared against the number of 
participants in each category, the number of comments are in line with what would be 
expected across each participant category, which was validated via a chi-square goodness 
of fit analysis x2(2, N = 93) = 1.22, p = .54). This chi-square analysis prevents 
overemphasis on support staff responses versus the responses of management and agents. 
Table 6 provides a visual summary of the coded data for the category of culture. 
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Table 6  




















Economic conditions   9 (10%) 
 
When compared to the researcher’s own knowledge of contact center culture and 
when compared to the evidence provided in the literature about contact centers 
(Downing, 2004; Hillmer et al., 2004; Kinnie et al., 2000), two atypical cultural traits 
were immediately evident. Attrition was less than that experienced by other contact 
centers and the focus on performance was much less explicit than in other contact center 
environments.  
 Attrition and tenure. Unlike other contact centers that can have attrition 
percentages averaging 23% or higher (Customer Contact Council, 2007), the attrition for 
this contact center in 2008 was 6% based on the performance metrics provided. Per the 
case study sponsor, that attrition was because one employee left to pursue her master’s 
degree and one employee left to work in another division of the organization. Attrition in 
2007 was zero. The tenure of the agents as shown in Table 7, therefore, was longer than 
what one would typically expect in a contact center. This supported the scope of the study 
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and the desire to explore knowledge loss in employees with more continuous tenure (12 
or more months) in the contact center environment. 
Table 7  
Tenure of Contact Center Agents  
 
Length of Tenure in Contact Center 
 
Number of Employees 












5 years or more 3 (15%) 
 
Although four employees had worked at the contact center for less than 12 months, those 
employees did not appear to be at risk of leaving. The length of tenure may be longer 
because of the leadership support that is provided. One participant said, “You know 
attrition is like none and that [says] a lot about the group and the way the group’s 
managed” (P7). Additional responses included: 
I think it’s the group. I think it’s the people that are here. I think with [manager] 
and [supervisor] I think it’s a very comfortable group to work with. They are very 
fair and we communicate and there’s a feeling of being cared for or looked out 
after. The managers look out for the employees in the call center, which I think is 
strong. (P18) 
 
Most of these folks have been here since the beginning or since they were hired, 
which is anywhere from 2004 on up or 2003 I should say in some cases because 
they were with the original group. Tight knit group, highly interested in solving 




The length of tenure may also be longer because the environment of this contact center is 
atypical from the perspective of performance monitoring and the employees recognize 
this. 
 Focus on performance. The rapidity of the job, the required skill set, and the 
constant attention to performance makes contact center culture unique. Although 
organizations have worked to improve culture, there is still a high level of frustration 
with contact center work and with the culture, which has been discussed and debated in 
the literature (Callaghan & Thompson, 2002; Dawson, 2005; Downing, 2004; Heyes, 
2002; Kinnie et al., 2000; Sturdy & Fleming, 2003; Thompson et al., 2001; van den 
Broek, 2004). This contact center is unique precisely because there is not constant 
attention to performance, which has created a more relaxed environment. The seven 
contact center environment questions asked of the participants during the interviews and 
the 29 unique comments collected highlight the difference in environment. Regarding 
attention to performance, one participant noted:  
It’s a relaxed atmosphere compared to a lot of them, from what I understand, I 
haven’t worked in other ones. But ours we try to make it relaxed, we try to make 
it kind of self-directing in that we’re not really on top of them to say you are a 
minute late from your break for example or anything like that. We try to keep it 
relaxed. (P12) 
 
Another participant said:  
 
From what I have heard from other call centers, it’s our, our environment is not a 
typical call center environment. Meaning, I would say they are a little bit more 
laid back when it comes to you know being back from break, you know kind of a 
call monitoring and those sorts of things. (P1) 
 
When the contact center was started, there was a decision made to structure it in a way 
that was atypical and different from other contact center environments. 
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I thought you know I don’t want the call center to be the call center that we 
typically think of as very strict, rigid, I’d really like to see them be self-directed in 
the sense that you know that they take ownership of their jobs and that it’s not just 
about taking calls but it’s about the bigger picture and [being] involved in other 
ways. (P19) 
 
In addition to the more relaxed atmosphere found in this contact center and the 
recognition by participants that other contact centers are not like this, job security and the 
current economy were offered as additional reasons why participants continued to work 
in this contact center.  
I think people have gotten comfortable with their positions. And fit the mold here 
and I would have to think probably, well especially now [given the economy], 
people are glad they have a job but I think those are some ideas why there hasn’t 
been a lot of turnover. (P17) 
 
 The economy. Although the questions prepared for the interviews did not include 
economic, financial, or budgetary inquiries, those topics appeared in participant interview 
responses nine times and showed that the current economic recession was on their minds 
as were changes being made by the parent organization to be more fiscally responsible 
and to have a better mechanism of charging and tracking costs. Several participants cited 
those topics as one of the top three challenges impacting their work environment. 
The third [challenge] I’d say recently it’s been a challenge but it’s actually been 
kind of interesting how we’ve been able to do work around it is the, I don’t know 
what you want to call it, the recession or the cut backs that [organization] is 
doing, they’ve cut back the budget quite a bit so you know there’s some things 
that we kind of have taken for granted in the past like travel and trainings and 
things like that, systems updates, tools that we use that we’ve kind of had to get 
creative about and it’s kind of been interesting some of the solutions that we have 
found. (P2) 
 
Right now one of the big things is the financials because that’s real big going into 
2009. So you know we have to be real careful on how we are going to spend 
money this year. And it’s really probably more so than it’s ever been since I’ve 
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been at [organization]. I know financials are always a concern but with the 
economy and everything going right now. (P7)  
 
But now this year is all new, we are charging back a cost per call to each program 
team based on the number of calls that we received. . .and then the unknown for 
the future is how will the economy impact the state budgets and what will that do 
to us. So again, we are all sitting wondering. And of course, the larger 
organization will be impacted by that as well if there are changes made so we just 
don’t know. (P19) 
 
There was concern about how state education budgets would be impacted by the 
economic recession as those budgets drive revenue for this contact center. Despite the 
concern about the unknown, the overall attitude of the contact center was upbeat and 
positive minus some frustrations with the reorganization that had occurred a few months 
prior to the start of this study.  
 A positive place to work. Leadership support, company benefits, friendly 
coworkers, and an overwhelming desire to serve the customer characterize this contact 
center from the perspective of the participants. Questions about leadership support during 
the interviews yielded 16 unique responses. Many of the participants praised the 
leadership direction provided by the contact center manager and noted that they got along 
well with her and that it was easy to talk with her. She was liked and respected by her 
team as evidenced in these responses: 
I think she has developed an open door policy you know just because she’s a 
manager doesn’t mean that she’s deemed isolated from the rest of us. She’s 
always willing to listen to ideas, suggestions, you know complaints. And as long 
as I have known her. . .nothing has changed, which is good. . .she’s developed an 
atmosphere where people can express their feelings freely. (P17) 
 
A huge amount of support from. . .our manager. Basically, [she] is the type who 
does a lot. . .I cannot say enough about how great she is. She is a great person. 
But she also leads in a great way too. Gets things done and enables us to get our 
jobs done correctly. (P9)  
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During the observations, which are summarized in Appendix H, the researcher noticed 
the manager frequently interacting with the team to both obtain information and share 
information and to provide direction. It was evident that she was a hands-on manager. 
Moreover, when participants shared e-mails with the researcher that had been sent by 
management staff, the e-mails were positive in nature and were used to communicate 
updates to the team about the new project, provide reminders about corporate policies 
like timesheet entry, and to encourage participation in team events. 
Participants commented on their appreciation for the organization in how it 
treated its employees particularly as it related to work life balance, in the general benefits 
it offered including tuition reimbursement, and in its fair wages. Participants also 
commented on the general camaraderie of the team, which the researcher witnessed 
during observations. Examples included team members assisting each other with 
customer issues and technical issues, sharing knowledge (which is further addressed later 
in this chapter), exchanging pleasantries about family activities, celebrating a coworker’s 
birthday with cupcakes, ordering Girl Scout cookies to support a coworker’s daughter, 
and, finally, their extension of that camaraderie to the researcher during her time with the 
team.  
A lot of cohesion here. Really, I’ve yet to see anyone who I really don’t get along 
with at all. You know everyone gets along great with each other. Our group 
specifically is about 15 to 20 people and everyone seems to get along very  
well. . .I’m very happy working here. Or for that matter I think people generally, 
in general I think with our group everyone really tries their best to be here. We 
don’t have any shirkers by any means. Everyone seems to really like coming to 
work and they do their job good and if they can be here at all they are usually 




I think we’re a really good group. I mean I like the people that I work with and 
I’m comfortable asking for help when I need it. I think it’s because it’s such a 
small group that we are really connected and we know what’s going on with each 
other and so that feeling of comfort is there. (P20) 
 
Ok I’d say that the, you know, the attitudes around our group for the most part 
that I can tell is positive. We have a, I think everybody has a high level, high 
value system from their background, wherever they came from so everybody 
wants to do the best job, everybody wants to do the best job that they can for our 
group and for [manager]. (P17) 
 
In addition to the high value systems noted by the participant above, the majority 
of participants had direct experience in customer service before joining the contact center 
team and this focus on service was evident from their responses. “I would say. . .helping 
the customer the best I can and feeling that I am doing you know everything I can to 
make sure the customer is satisfied” (P18). 
I think success is being able to answer a call, complete the call, and answer it in a 
quick manner and to make sure that when they get off the phone they know the 
customer was happy and was satisfied that they knew what they were talking 
about and they were able to assist. (P14) 
 
Ok well something that I have definitely set as a foundation for this department is 
number one first and foremost is servicing our customer and really being able to 
take care of them and their needs but in order to do that we have to create an 
environment where our team members or our agents are happy. So really 
providing an atmosphere where they feel comfortable so that their attitude can 
really be a good one within the team, with their team members, with their 
coworkers, the environment that they work in and then that will ultimately reflect 
on our customers. (P6) 
 
They [senior employees] had a way when things were looking discouraged they 
would say things like it’s for the children. So no matter what anybody else was 
doing to make you mad, you understood that it was for the children, it’s for the 
better good of your ultimate customer as a service to the children, the schools, the 
state department, and everything else but ultimately it’s for the children. (P4) 
 
I would define success [as] being able to make a positive impact on either internal 
or external customers. . .if you are able to look at yourself and say that you were 
able to provide the best information to them. . .you know you are trying to do the 
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best for the customer and you are showing over the phone that you are caring 
about their issue and they are just not another number and the idea of making 
positive impact on someone. (P17)  
  
Organizational change ramifications. Although the participants indicated that the 
environment was fun and friendly and there was a desire to help each other as internal 
customers, some participants were frustrated with leadership support and staffing 
decisions that were related to the reorganization of the center. The topic of reorganization 
was discussed in 20 unique comments from the participant interviews, which was the 
second highest topic discussed within the category of culture thus emphasizing that it was 
very much on the minds of the participants. Supervisor and team lead positions were 
created and subteams were formed and some participants no longer continued to report 
directly to the manager. This reporting change continued to cause confusion with the 
staff. When asked to whom they reported, several participants noted that they were 
unsure or questioned why they reported to a specific supervisor when it did not appear 
that the supervisor understood the job duties of the particular participant.  
I kind of feel like my managers don’t really know, they’re not as technical as I am 
and they don’t know the processes as well as I do so they like to get in the middle 
of things kind of and it seems like they ask more questions and impede our 
progress more than anything so that’s one issue. (P2) 
 
It was evident that resistance to the organizational change brought on by the 
reorganization was still an issue and one that impacted the culture. As noted earlier in the 
dissertation, when routines, beliefs, values, and assumptions are undergoing change, it is 
an organization’s culture that is undergoing change as well. It seemed as if the 
reorganization had pushed the team into the first step of change, unfreezing, as identified 
by Lewin (1951/1997). It is during the first step, unfreezing, where the concept of 
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breaking away is applicable. This step sometimes requires deliberate action to shake the 
group from its complacency or inertia. An event must happen, like this reorganization, for 
the group to be motivated to change. The purpose of the reorganization, according to 
management, was to more appropriately align roles and responsibilities and ensure that 
dedicated staff were supporting key areas like knowledge management, systems support, 
and metrics and reporting. At the time of the study, it appeared that the team was still in 
Lewin’s second step of change, that of moving or still being in a transitory period, and 
there was lingering bitterness about the hiring decisions. 
I don’t really like to call it a transition period but I think we are having a longer 
transition period than I thought we would. . .just because so many people, you 
know we were just, we were all support specialists and now branching out and 
having all these new positions it has kind of been like a learning experience for 
what everyone’s job is and it’s kind of been hard too because it’s been kind of 
hard to keep everyone on the same page. But I think it’s still, just still a transition 
of getting used to certain people in the positions. (P14) 
 
I don’t know exactly know how much detail you want but the fact that the 
organizational changes [happened], there was a very distinct preference towards 
people who have been here longer, people who are closer to other people, not 
experience. (P13) 
 
You know and so there was a lot of problems and then when they had the 
interview process because before they just appointed people and they didn’t really 
tell people. But it was very difficult and now it’s even more difficult because now 
I’m actually one of those people so. . .I feel like I’m being viewed that same way 
that other people viewed people even though I applied. (P15) 
 
This dissent is not uncommon in periods of organizational change. “The implementation 
process is messy. Things don’t proceed exactly as planned; people do things their own 
way, not always according to the plan; some people resist or even sabotage the process” 
(Burke, 2002, p. 2).  
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Compounding the issue of reorganization was that the contact center had 
undergone a seismic year of change in 2008 with the acquisition of another company and 
the onboarding of a new national project. The response to these changes may have 
necessitated the reorganization. At a minimum, the management team believed it was 
needed and ultimately were aware that a period of adjustment would ensue. 
Yeah we’ve had some changes to that in the last six months but I don’t think 
that’s, you know in some cases we have had some situations were maybe we are 
dealing with that change right now with individuals that may not have adjusted as 
well, but overall I think it’s been a very positive change but it has not diminished 
the culture that we have of being close knit and helpful to one another. (P19) 
 
This awareness aligns with leadership’s responsibility to sustain culture, to sense a 
culture in trouble, and to subsequently regenerate the culture (Herman, 2007).  
But if elements of a culture become dysfunctional, it is the unique function of 
leadership to be able to perceive the functional and dysfunctional elements of the 
existing culture and to manage cultural evolution and change in such a way that 
the group can survive in a changing environment. (Schein, 2004, p. 23) 
 
With the reorganization, the acquisition of another company, and the implementation of a 
new project, knowledge loss issues were exposed at the parent level of the organization, 
at the contact center team level, and at the individual participant level. 
Cultural contributions to knowledge loss. As noted earlier in the definition of 
culture, traditions shape an environment and participants commented 19 times on the 
ways that corporate customs impacted their department. The parent organization has a 
custom of failing to capture standard operating procedures that can prevent accidental 
knowledge loss, particularly when it comes to outlining in contractual documents the 
very support that its contact center provides. 
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Sometimes you get program teams that write contracts and they. . .did not consult 
with the customer service teams. I mean it can be anything, their hours of 
operation, that’s been messed up before where we had extra support in places 
where it wasn’t even needed [but] because the contract said we would be there, 
we were there. (P4) 
 
So it seems like the culture is do whatever it takes to get that particular contract, 
fulfill it, and move on. And it seems like we do a lot of the same things over and 
over and over again but we don’t say we do the contract this way and do it. Group 
B is going to reinvent everything instead of taking what group A [did] and 
following it and so on and so forth for all the groups and all the contracts. So it 
seems like we are lots of busy little cells all doing the same thing but not 
coordinating. (P5) 
 
It’s just disjointed around here. . .but it can be a little chaotic and there’s so many 
parts of the organization that are doing their own thing and standards don’t, 
standards are an issue around here as far as they don’t really exist. . .no standard 
way to really role out a new product and the communication behind that. 
Sometimes it will just appear. Or here’s another one, we win a new program and I 
don’t know how we find out. The only way I know how to find out and that’s 
hopefully a manager will come to us and say hey we need to use you as a call 
center. You hope they understand there is a set up process. But there is no good 
succinct way to communicate that out to everyone, it’s different every time. So 
it’s a larger organization issue that impacts [us]. (P19) 
 
In addition to the lack of standards at the organizational level, at the team and 
individual level knowledge loss manifested itself through the reorganization as 
employees were moved into different positions. There was at once both a reliance on tacit 
knowledge to fill gaps in documentation or processes (failure to capture) and a resistance 
to tacit knowledge because it straightjacketed the team from shedding the old knowledge 
(i.e., the way it was done before) and embracing the new ideas and the new knowledge 
being created by the employees applying themselves to their new roles (unlearning). 
So like to me that just kind of took us back a couple steps because we had people 
who were knowledgeable and then now they’re not. But I just see that as a big 
loss, like a loss for our team because now we don’t have the, like the strength of 
someone who knows the ins and outs of knowledge and has done it for 2 years 
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and we are going to bring in new people of which I have confidence in those new 
people but it’s just going to take them a while to get up to that level. (P14) 
  
Even though this participant viewed the reorganization as causing a loss of tacit 
knowledge, there was still a note of positivity that showcases the overall attitude of the 
team that was evident not only in the interviews but in the observations as well. 
 Culture summary. The organizational culture at the time of the study was in 
upheaval due to reorganization, acquisition, and implementation of a new project, 
although the environment was characterized as fun and it was noted that there was a high 
level of camaraderie among the team along with a high level of respect for the manager. 
Direct observation confirmed the findings from the interviews and 93 unique comments 
were coded from the qualitative data. The environment was atypical of the average 
contact center because attrition was low and tenure was longer. In 2008, attrition in this 
contact center was 6% while the average attrition noted by the Customer Contact Council 
(2007) was 23%. The average tenure of agents in this contact center was 2.2 years 
compared to 1.5 years for other contact centers (Customer Contact Council, 2006). 
Moreover, the atmosphere was relaxed due to a less explicit focus on performance. 
Participants were concerned about the economic recession and sensitive to the 
reorganization. Knowledge loss occurred at the organizational level because standard 
operating procedures related to contracts were not traditionally captured. It occurred at 
the team and individual level because of attitudinal resistance to change. Knowledge loss 
was both accidental and purposeful and the source of knowledge was both old and new. 
The culture of the contact center and the organization contributed to dimensions of 





 One of the primary assumptions of this study was that knowledge loss occurs at 
the both the individual level and the organizational level. Therefore, it was necessary to 
probe participants about their own individual knowledge roles as well as the overall 
organization’s knowledge role. During coding of qualitative data, 102 unique comments 
were coded under the primary category of knowledge, which included themes of 
acquisition, use, transfer, and loss. Within the primary category, those 102 comments 
were coded to a specific subcategory: memory decay (37 comments), training (27 
comments), transfer (14 comments), failure to capture (11 comments), unlearning (9 
comments), and avoiding bad habits (4 comments). After categorizing and 
subcategorizing, the comments were analyzed by audience. That is, the comments were 
reviewed to determine attribution to management (manager, supervisors, and team leads), 
to support staff (systems support technicians and knowledge team members), or to agents. 
Of the 102 comments made, 41% were made by agents, 30% were made by support staff, 
and 29% were made by management. Although it appears based on the percentages alone 
that agents made a higher number of comments related to the category of knowledge, 
when compared against the number of participants in each category, the number of 
comments are in line with what would be expected across each participant category, 
which was validated via a chi-square goodness of fit analysis x2(2, N = 102) = 2.88, p = 
.23). This chi-square analysis prevents overemphasis on agent responses versus the 
responses of management and support staff. Table 8 provides a visual summary of the 


























  9 (9%) 
Avoiding bad habits   4 (4%) 
 
Tools and training. The agents in this inbound contact center answer customer 
questions using the Kaidara knowledge management system populated with knowledge 
base articles about state assessments, a central website populated with program summary 
information for each state assessment that is supported (e.g., test start and end dates, 
order dates for test materials, reporting information, and escalation paths for agents who 
need to reach other members of the organization supporting assessments), and user 
guides provided either by the state departments of education or by the part of the 
organization that provides assessment services to the state. Kaidara is linked to the 
contact center’s electronic tracking system so that agents can use Kaidara directly from 
the tool in which they record caller information, detail the topic of the call, and if 
necessary, escalate the call.  
 New agents initially receive 1-week of training that is a combination of online and 
instructor led training followed by 1-week of nesting where a senior member of the team 
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is with them as they take calls. Agents are trained on paper assessments or online 
assessments depending on business need. In the past, the contact center would train new 
agents on both types of assessments, but it found that it was not the best way to train. 
We just threw everything at them all at once. And that took more than a week that 
would probably take two weeks to do that plus then a week of actually sitting 
down with them and watching them as they actually take the calls. We found out 
that it was kind of an information overload for them. And so what we’ve done is 
we backed that off and trained them in the areas that we need the help the most 
when they are hired. (P17) 
 
Refresher training or follow-up training appeared to be limited and some participants 
requested more training when asked what would make their job easier. Unique comments 
about training from the participants totaled 27, which ranked second highest among the 
knowledge subcategories. 
Like making sure that each agent is proficient on each program or product that 
they are supporting and then so like if I’m not proficient, am I ok to go to my 
supervisor and say I need refresher training on this or you know I feel like I’m 
lacking skills to support this. What are you going to do to make sure that my skills 
are proficient or I feel comfortable supporting this? (P1)  
 
After training there wasn’t a whole lot. I mean there’s little ongoing trainings but 
typically, they tend to do them a little too far in advance to be effective. Ok. By 
the time we start getting the calls you’ve kind of forgotten it. A month has passed. 
I understand the point but just disagree with the implementation. (P3) 
 
 During observations, the researcher had the opportunity to review some online 
training documentation. An agent being observed was taking training on a new project in 
between phone calls. The portion of the training that was observed was focused on 
showing new users of the project website where to find specific information like reports 
and other user information. It was not easy for the agent to focus on the training for more 
than just a few minutes because the call volume was steady that morning. That coupled 
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with the fact that the actual project implementation was still weeks away may have made 
retention of the training materials difficult. Observation of the way in which the training 
was occurring and seeing the actual training materials validated the comments of the 
participants that the training program could benefit from additional attention. 
Typical callers and call topics. Typical callers include district test coordinators, 
superintendents, principals, teachers, and other administrative personnel from the school 
districts. Caller questions vary but some examples include questions about administration 
dates, material order and return dates, password resets for organization-supported 
assessment websites, and technical support for online testing or audio testing. Table 9 
provides categorization of the call topics captured during the 63 observed calls.  
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Table 9  
Frequency of Call Topics for Observed Calls 
 
Call Topic Example Frequency 
Administrative  Caller unsure of how to 
upload student data file; 




Materials Caller questioning how to 
order a Braille assessment 
 
16 (25%) 
Technical Support Caller requesting assistance 
because media player was 




Training Caller noting that school 
district offering training 
session, but session was full 




Misdirected Caller looking for other 




The top five call topics as categorized by the contact center and provided in the 




Table 10  





Security Caller wanting to validate 
that organization had 
received all materials and 




Ordering materials Caller questioning how to 




Returning materials Caller asking about how to 




Lost password Caller requesting password 4171 (9%) 
 
Reset password Caller requesting password 




A comparison between Table 9 and Table 10 shows some similarity in frequency. Calls 
about materials are about 25 to 30% of call volume while administrative issues like 
password resets, security verification, and file uploads are about 70 to 75% of the call 
volume. Segmenting the call topics in a more granular manner would provide the contact 
center with additional insight on specific topic frequency. For example, the call topic 
category of security constitutes 53% of the call volume in Table 10 yet is an extremely 
broad category by definition. 
The participants spoke of how widely the caller questions varied and that from a 
knowledge perspective, it was difficult to be fully prepared for all calls because of said 
variety. One participant stated, “I think the biggest challenge is knowing what I need to 




But a lot of times it’s a challenge when people ask, you know, I don’t want to say 
out of the box questions, but sometimes we get questions that are just you know, 
‘Why are you asking that kind of thing?’ We get a lot more than I’d like to say. 
And that’s kind of a challenge because you know the customer they want an 
answer like right now and you, there’s no way you can do it because it’s nothing 
you have ever heard before. (P9) 
 
As an example of a question that was out of the box, a teacher asked an agent during one 
of the observed calls if a parent could register for the teacher training. The agent 
indicated that the question was unusual and unexpected and that the answer to the 
question was not in Kaidara (January 22, 2009 observation). The call was escalated to 
another employee within the organization for resolution. 
In addition to the variety of questions that are asked, the contact center team 
supports a large number of individual projects. The number provided at the time of the 
study was that the team supported 120 different projects. When asked about the top three 
challenges impacting their work environment, this was one of the challenges brought up 
by the participants. Given the number of projects, it is understandable that discussion 
pertaining to memory decay was the top knowledge subcategory with 37 unique 
comments. 
I think the biggest challenge is the breadth of what we cover. We have 120 
different projects that we service. I don’t know, I should probably count them 
again but in that, you know there’s probably like 30 different programs with so 
many people involved. (P19) 
 
I think one [challenge] is just because there is so many products, programs that 
we are asked to support is being able to stay frontline with knowledge. You know 
like the only way we are able to give support is if the other groups within 
[organization] feed what we need to support them. (P1) 
 
This feeding or transferring of knowledge is a critical part of how the contact center 
services its customers and participants provided 14 unique comments on transfer. 
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Knowledge transfer. The subject matter expertise resides with various functional 
teams that are within the same organization, but under different management. These 
teams are called program teams and they provide knowledge to the contact center so that 
the agents can serve as front line contacts for customers who have questions or are 
experiencing technical issues. The contact center, therefore, relies on knowledge 
provided by various program teams. The program teams do have subject matter expertise, 
but they must also rely on knowledge provided by the state departments of education. 
The knowledge transfer process between the program teams and the departments of 
education was outside the scope of this study. Within the scope of this study was the 
knowledge transfer process between the program teams and the contact center, and it 
became clear early in the study based on the participant interviews that a key contributing 
factor to knowledge loss in this organization was due to the program teams’ failure to 
transfer knowledge to the contact center that was linked to a cultural resistance to 
unlearning, which is described more in detail later in this chapter, and linked to contract 
standardization, which was discussed in the previous section on culture, that permeated 
the program teams and the organization at large. The situation, although not ideal, 
seemed to be generally accepted as the way things were and embedded into the culture. 
Contact center management talked of changing the situation, but the difficulty of doing 
this was evident.  
You know we’re working on it, but I think the number one thing that would make 
my job easier and would make everybody else’s job easier is if the program teams 
were really highly dedicated to making sure we had the knowledge we needed and 
that they were also available when we need them during peak spring to help out 




I would say the communication with those groups is sometimes is a bit lacking. I 
wouldn’t say it’s lacking but sometimes it’s slow to come I guess I would say. We 
seem to find out a lot of things after the fact. (P18) 
 
Although there were known issues with the program teams providing knowledge 
to the agents that directly and negatively impacted them because they were unable to 
service their customers, many participants were also quick to defend the program teams. 
While being candid in their responses about the lack of support and sharing that some 
specific program teams were known for being nonresponsive, the participants recognized 
that the teams were busy and had multiple obligations that they believed prevented them 
from being proactive providers of knowledge. 
It is not utmost and foremost on their mind. They have so many things going on 
that we find that, and I will admit that it has gotten better but, you know it’s not 
their focus. [They are] not out there getting their knowledge and then when they 
need to, particularly in spring when those are the busiest days. So there’s that gap 
of us not able to create that knowledge and needing and requiring those of what 
we call technical experts available to us to create that technical knowledge. (P19) 
   
Really the coordination of all that effort is the biggest challenge because you 
know you get the program team busy doing something or they are out of town or 
you know whatever activities they are doing if they don’t have time to put the 
answers in for those questions then we’re not going to be able to fulfill that 
smallest requirement. (P5) 
 
The current culture seemed to support program teams’ nonresponsiveness and reactive 
approach to providing knowledge. At the time of the study, improving the relationship 
between the contact center and the program teams was important to the contact center.  
I think you know being able to, whether virtually or over the phone with some of 
the program team members, to establish a better relationship would be the most 
useful tool to me. Well, I would like for you know myself and the program team 
to be able to almost work in tandem so that when they get information it 




To effect cultural change, it may be necessary to show executive management how this 
impacts the center’s performance, which is discussed more in detail later in this chapter. 
Moreover, gaining awareness of how knowledge loss occurs, why it occurs, and 
pinpointing specific areas of attention related to knowledge loss, like failure to capture, 
unlearning, memory decay, and avoiding bad habits can help the organization focus its 
knowledge management efforts.  
 Knowledge loss: failure to capture. When applying Martin de Holan et al.’s 
(2004) mode of forgetting matrix to the results, failure to capture knowledge was a 
contributing factor to knowledge loss and was evidenced in 11 unique comments made 
by participants. According to Martin de Holan et al., failure to capture knowledge is 
classified as accidental knowledge loss as opposed to intentional knowledge loss, which 
is linked to unlearning. In the contact center, there was more intentional knowledge loss 
occurring than accidental knowledge loss because of resistance to unlearning, but 
accidental loss due to failure to capture was present. According to Martin de Holan et al., 
failure to capture is often related to new knowledge or tacit knowledge that has not been 
made explicit and institutionalized within the organization. When asked about knowledge 
loss and forgetting, participants indicated that they often relied on the experience and 
tacit knowledge of others when they were not sure how to complete a task, which is 
similar to the findings of Kuhn and Jackson (2008). “But sometimes they’ll come to me 





So he actually was with this group before [manager] took it over and he’s great. I 
mean he knows the ins and outs, the everything that goes on behind the scenes. 
He’s very technical because of how he came along with this group. . .you know 
when you know all those behind the scenes things because you came from the 
bottom up. So he’s very good. (P7) 
 
This reliance on tacit knowledge generally works because attrition is low in the contact 
center and the tenure of the agents is long, but if experienced agents leave the group, 
knowledge loss could be amplified by the departure of this tacit knowledge, which is 
what happened when one team member left for another position within the organization: 
Well when I took over this position the knowledge that I had was basically in 
somebody else’s head for the most part. But in quite a few tasks that we had so, 
that was a struggle. You know I got as much information as I could from him 
when [he] left but his movement to the other department was pretty quick so he 
really didn’t have a whole lot of time to take me through things and train me. So 
what I’ve had to do is get knowledge piecemeal. (P2) 
 
The organization may need to consider how to make more of the tacit knowledge explicit 
to prevent knowledge loss. In addition, it seemed that the attrition on the program teams 
may have been higher than that experienced in the contact center so attrition at the 
subject matter level was also impacting the knowledge capture process. 
New program team employee turnover. Like if you get a new, if you have a 
replacement on the program all of the sudden you are not getting updates in 
knowledge. I think a big part of it is our internal customers knowing what we 
need and when we need it and how important it is to us. And it’s not really, well it 
might be looked at as forgetting knowledge but its knowledge that was never 
provided to us for some reason. (P4) 
 
 The lack of cultural reinforcement to provide knowledge and the lack of 
standardization prevents knowledge from being institutionalized in the organization. It 
was noted earlier in this chapter that participants felt as if the organization was 
reinventing the wheel with each project. The example below provided by one of the 
137 
 
participants shows how this lack of standardization to onboard a project can cause 
problems and how it can put a significant level of stress on the team. 
Last week well we learned [that the] group needed to support a weekend project, 
which is not typical for us. The program team was not ready; they did not have 
their knowledge in Kaidara yet. So we had to struggle with them being on the 
phone quite a bit getting somebody to help them get their knowledge in. And then 
we ended up, we finally ended up saying hey you put the question and answer in 
and we’ll worry about flagging it and categorizing it for you. And then the other 
piece they were missing was they didn’t make sure the phone system was going to 
be available and open for them. For that day. . .that’s probably the most 
frustrating part when it’s not all falling together. There are several of us that kind 
of go nuts. (P12) 
 
Accidentally forgetting to ensure telephony systems were available for a weekend project 
illustrates the failure to capture mode of forgetting from Martin de Holan et al.’s (2004) 
matrix. This participant hoped that this lack of preparation would lead to lessons learned 
that would prevent the situation from happening again. There were examples, however, 
that the organization failed to capture knowledge gained from these lessons learned. 
 One prevalent example brought up by several participants was related to online 
training provided by the program teams to teachers, district coordinators, and other 
administrative personnel. Trainees would receive an e-mail that would contain a 
hyperlink to the online training. This link was often incorrect and as the time of the 
training drew closer, calls to the contact center would increase because trainees would be 
experiencing difficulties accessing the training because of the incorrect hyperlink. This 
was not a one-time occurrence. This was a systemic issue that was occurring with the e-
mailed hyperlinks. It appeared to be a problem with the third-party vendor that the 
organization used to deliver its online training; however, it did not appear that steps were 
being taken to resolve the issue to prevent it from happening again. 
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Well typically, when they send out webinars for the various trainings and they 
usually have the wrong link in the e-mails. That seems to be an ongoing  
issue. . .well everybody who’s attempting to log into the training can’t because 
they click on the link and it’s not a URL that they can just type in and it’s just this 
click here, literally. So they have to call us. So we get a little busy around then. It 
usually starts because at least one person will click on it an hour early so we get 
plenty of notice before it is really critical. But you just think somebody 
somewhere would check the link prior to the day of training. I think it’s been 
going on for about a year now. . .but I would think since it seems to be an ongoing 
issue somebody can check it and then know it’s wrong and then just send out 
another e-mail. Saying hey, the first link is broke and here is the correct one. 
Personal opinion, I don’t know maybe it’s not that simple. (P3) 
 
During call observations on January 22, 2009, this situation occurred. A caller 
indicated that her user identification and password were not working for the online 
training session. Another agent overhead the observed agent talking to the caller and told 
that agent that the initial hyperlink was incorrect and that he should send the caller the 
new hyperlink. The agent communicating this information noted that the hyperlink had 
been corrected in Kaidara and that the agent could find the correct link there. While 
Kaidara had been updated with that particular knowledge, agents expressed frustration 
with the lack of routine knowledge available, which seemed to indicate the lessons 
learned from previous administrations were not being captured and institutionalized. 
I know in the past there’s been times when even like the simplest solutions are not 
in there. Like when they know and their moment is coming up the solution should 
already be in there like what do I do when I missed enrollment, what do I do when 
I missed the pick up date. Those are just general knowledge that for every cycle of 
testing they should already be there. (P20) 
 
While accidentally forgetting to capture lessons learned illustrates the failure to capture 
mode of forgetting, intentionally deciding not to share knowledge illustrates the 
unlearning mode of forgetting with knowledge that is explicit and that type of loss was 
also present in the contact center under study. 
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Knowledge loss: unlearning. Organizational employees may not consciously be 
aware of unlearning or resistance to learning, but evidence of it was found in nine unique 
comments made by participants. Organizations cannot just will unlearning onto its 
employees. “Creating and sharing knowledge are intangible activities that can neither be 
supervised nor forced out of people. Thus, it is necessary for organizations to provide a 
learning culture, infrastructure, and appropriate incentives to generating and 
disseminating knowledge” (Hsu & Shen, 2005, p. 354). One of the reasons why the 
program teams may be resistant to sharing knowledge is because there are no incentives 
for disseminating knowledge, which is an issue that is shaped by the organizational 
culture. During a discussion with a member of management, the manager commented that 
the program team members responsible for knowledge sharing are the program 
coordinators. The program coordinators are “at the bottom rung of the totem pole so to 
speak so them helping the customer is something they want to do because it may be the 
only positive feedback they receive on the job” (E. Herman, personal communication, 
January 30, 2009). This meant that sometimes the program coordinators purposefully 
held onto knowledge so that they could help the customers and receive that recognition 
for helping solve the customers’ problems. They wanted the contact center to have to 
escalate the calls rather than providing knowledge through Kaidara.  
People like to hold on to knowledge. They don’t like to share it sometimes. It’s 
just like it’s their way of futilely holding on to power. That was a huge problem 
with the program team was there would be stuff they knew about that they 
wouldn’t tell us about. It’s just yeah, it’s like we’re trying to standardize 
everything but every program, every person kind of feels that the loopholes. . .are 




 Many of the participants were conscientious about answering customer questions 
correctly and adamant that they would not provide an answer that was incorrect or at 
which they had guessed. 
For not being able to answer a call like our policy is if you don’t have the answer 
and you weren’t able to find knowledge we don’t, we don’t answer it because we 
don’t ever want to give a wrong answer, we don’t ever want to imply that we 
knew when we didn’t. (P14) 
 
I always call them to confirm like if I think I know the answer I’m not going to 
tell them and then have it come back on me that I gave them the wrong answer. 
So I always call them to just double check. (P20) 
 
This process was evident during observations as the program teams were involved in 32 
out of the 63 calls observed, whether it was a direct escalation to a program team or 
whether it was the agent verifying an answer with a program team member before 
providing that answer to the customer. The agents were careful to document who from 
the program team provided the answer: “I would put per the program team this is the 
answer” (P14). 
Even when knowledge was found in Kaidara, there seemed to be limited 
accountability on behalf of the contact center team to ensure that the knowledge was 
current. When asked how the team ensures that the knowledge is current, many 
participants responded that they do not ensure the knowledge is current because it is not 
their responsibility. The burden of responsibility was on the program teams. While this 
response is understandable given that the program teams are the subject matter experts, it 
does not foster a group solution, or an organization-wide solution, to the knowledge loss 
problem. There was definitely a sense of self-preservation on behalf of the agent. “It’s not 
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up to us to you know, it’s not up to the agents to review that knowledge it’s up to the 
programs and if they put the wrong information there it’s not our fault” (P16). 
So it kind of falls back on them [the program team], if we are providing 
information that is out of Kaidara and that information is not updated then the 
responsibility falls back on the program team and not on us. (P6) 
 
Because the program teams are responsible for making sure that the knowledge is 
up to date and if one of my agents gives somebody an answer with the knowledge 
base article that is correct and it’s the wrong answer that is not that agent’s fault. 
They’re doing what they were trained to do. (P18) 
 
We [cannot] ensure knowledge is current because there really is no mechanism. 
We can send e-mails to program teams going hey can you please verify that this is 
current. They might look at it. There’s no way of ensuring that they will do it. 
That’s essentially the gist of it. . .but I’ve always thought knowledge in the 
articles as being a cover your ass. I did what was on there. I did the information as 
a great little cover your ass kind of thing. (P15) 
 
When contact center management was asked how the team ensures the knowledge is 
current, it was noted that it was the responsibility of the knowledge team. But when the 
same question was asked of the knowledge team, it was noted that it was the 
responsibility of the program team. Culturally, to minimize knowledge loss in the contact 
center, there needs to be mutual accountability among the contact center team and the 
program teams.  
 One way to promote accountability among the contact center agents is to ensure 
that they are using the processes that have been established for them to provide Kaidara 
knowledge articles and possibly establish some performance goals around submission. 
Although several participants talked about the availability of this process, it did not 
appear to be a widely adopted process.  
In the last. . .oh I don’t know month and a half, two months there’s not been one 
single article put in the review queue. Now people mention stuff and send us 
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feedback for that and then we kind of push back on them and say ok well go 
ahead and write an article. They don’t do it. They could take time if they wanted 
to and there is a methodology, which they can, we call aux time. And then there is 
a form that they fill out and just like say their name, how much time they spent, 
and what they did essentially. They don’t do it. (P15) 
 
During observations, when it appeared that an agent could have taken the 
initiative to submit an article, the agent assumed that someone else on the team had 
already done so. It did not appear that this assumption was validated by the agent so it 
was unknown if any of the other agents had actually taken the initiative to submit the 
article. Therefore, although the program teams may seem like they are the primary 
contributors to knowledge loss in the contact center, there is an aspect of loss that resides 
at the agent level as well that is perpetuated by bad habits. Although only four unique 
comments are attributed to avoiding bad habits from the qualitative coding, the actions 
seen during observation validated that bad habits were problematic in the contact center. 
Knowledge loss: avoiding bad habits. In Martin de Holan et al.’s (2004) mode of 
forgetting matrix, bad habits are linked to intentional knowledge loss. The bad habits 
observed at the contact center or gleaned from the interviews included not submitting 
knowledge articles, outdated knowledge in Kaidara, and although rare, providing answers 
to customer questions before validating the answer in Kaidara. Per Martin de Holan et al., 
“organizations, like people can learn bad habits—routines, practices, ideas and values 
that are counterproductive” (p. 50).  
One of the counterproductive practices was the inclusion of outdated knowledge 
in Kaidara. During the observations, it was noted on several calls that when the agent 
searched for information in Kaidara, information for 2007 or 2008 administrations would 
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appear and the knowledge contained within would not be applicable to the 2009 
administration. That is not to say that all knowledge in previous administrations was 
outdated. When asked if some of the knowledge was still applicable, one participant 
responded: 
Not very often but sometimes that is. . .like maybe the process for doing 
something like with [state] and how they log in. It’s the same way they log in for 
the last 3 or 4 years. So the article is a little old but. Even still sometimes they will 
update them anyway but I have seen articles out there that are still valid articles 
but they are from 07. (P13) 
 
Removing outdated articles was supported by participants: 
 
So. . .this would help when we do a search for a certain topic then we are, our 
search results will come up with current articles rather than being clouded you 
might say with a mix of old and irrelevant articles that may be for a year or 2 past 
test administration even though it’s from [state] you know and then it slows down 
my scanning of the articles to see which one would most fit the customer’s 
question. (P17) 
 
It drives me crazy that there are the old ones [articles] in there. I think they need 
to be expired because the information may still be there and they always make a 
great template for the new information but you don’t want to give someone 
information from 2006 because Tuesday, January 13th might actually be 
Thursday, January 13th then. (P16) 
 
To ensure that the information that they are providing is current, most agents rely 
on the article’s date stamp. The agents learn early in training to check the date stamp and, 
more importantly, to check Kaidara and validate the information before providing it to a 
customer. There were a few occurrences, however, when agents admitted to the bad habit 
of giving the answer before checking Kaidara. In those situations, when the agent 
discovered that erroneous information had been provided, the mistake was corrected by 
calling the customer back and providing the correct information. 
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Even though I gave that [administration] date out and had it in my head you had 
to go to the actual article and click on it because that’s what populates the ticket. 
Well toward the end of the week I had actually been giving that date, I actually 
went ahead and gave that date out before I read it because it had been ingrained in 
my head. . .then when I went to find the article. . .I was like oh my gosh the date 
had been extended. . .I actually then called this customer back immediately. I said 
I’m so sorry I didn’t realize that there was an extension and you now have until so 
and so. (P7) 
 
Sometimes the process of contacting the program teams to validate information 
does not work. During the second day of conducting interviews at the contact center, one 
of the participants, when asked to discuss the top three challenges impacting the work 
environment, noted that there was a challenge that morning with incorrect knowledge that 
had been provided to customers the day before. The answer in Kaidara was correct, but 
an agent had received verbal information from a program team and used that information 
over the documented answer. When it was discovered that the verbal answer was only 
partially correct and that the full documented answer in Kaidara was correct, all of the 
tickets had to be searched and those customers had to be contacted to correct the 
knowledge that was provided the previous day. 
The answers that went out yesterday were both verbal ones from one person to 
another. . .then that got passed on from that agent to another. . .and then when 
they found that the database carried the correct information it was then brought to 
me to go ok do we call everyone, what do we do. We’ve already decided what to 
do. I’ve contacted the program team to find out specifically what was the right 
information and then I went through and we found all the tickets and split the list 
in half and I called half and [another agent] called half. (P16) 
 
Overall, knowledge loss caused by bad habits was minimal and less pervasive 
than the knowledge loss caused by failure to capture and unlearning. However, the 
responses provided by the participants can provide the organization with some areas on 
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which to focus to ensure that knowledge loss through this mode is minimized and that 
intentional bad habits are avoided. 
Knowledge loss: memory decay. When it comes to knowledge loss caused by 
accidental memory decay, remembering passwords was the most cited example by 
participants and a frequent call topic during observations as noted previously in Tables 9 
and 10. “Forgot how to do something? Gosh. Like forget a password? When I came back 
from vacation, I forgot half my passwords. In that situation. . .I had to go to the 
administrator and have him reset the password” (P18). “I forgot my login because I 
haven’t been in [software]. I couldn’t remember the password and user ID so we can 
actually open a support request and they’ll reset your password” (P7). In other examples 
of memory decay, participants noted that they either suddenly remembered what they had 
forgotten or turned to a peer for assistance.  
I put in a request for adding new employees on the. . .directory and I forgot to add 
the extension numbers. . .I also found out that not all of the new employees that 
we [hired] in December were added to the directory so I included that information 
as well. (P11) 
 
So I asked my co-worker that sits next to me because he’s actually going to be a 
lead and he knows specifically what’s going on with the whole [state] program. 
So he kind of helped me out with that and I was able to help out the customer. 
(P20) 
 
The reliance on peers, which was also present during the call observations, was consistent 
with other research as noted by Downing (2004). “It is usually easier for workers to ask 
someone they know and trust a question rather than relying on printed manuals or calling 
someone outside their communication network” (Holman, Epitropaki, & Fernie, 2001, as 
cited in Downing, p. 174). 
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 Knowledge summary. Similar to knowledge loss caused by bad habits, knowledge 
loss caused by memory decay had less of an impact on the contact center’s ability to 
serve its customers than the knowledge loss caused by failure to capture and unlearning.  
It appeared, however, that it was easier for participants to provide examples of memory 
decay or forgetting than it was for participants to provide examples of unlearning as 
categorization of the interview data revealed 37 unique comments about memory decay 
versus 9 comments about unlearning. This may be attributable to participants’ inability to 
recognize in themselves a resistance to new knowledge or a resistance to additional 
learning. Participants did recognize the impact from failing to capture current knowledge 
but did not take action to capture knowledge as witnessed during observation.   
Avoiding bad habits and recovering from temporary memory decay are 
knowledge loss areas that can reinforced at the team and individual level. It is the 
knowledge loss areas of failure to capture and unlearning that must be supported at the 
organizational level with appropriate leadership backing to effect cultural change. 
Because the loss experienced at this contact center regarding failure to capture and 
unlearning had a direct impact on the organization’s performance, showing upper level 
management the impact to performance can foster more widespread leadership support. 
Performance 
 
Several qualitative interview questions probed how job performance was 
measured for participants and quantitative data were available from the three months 
worth of metric data that were provided. During coding of qualitative data, 61 unique 
comments were coded under the primary category of performance, which included 
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themes of success, individual and team evaluation, and customer satisfaction. Within the 
primary category, those 61 comments were coded to a specific subcategory: evaluation 
(29 comments), success (15 comments), standards (8 comments), technology (5 
comments), and customer satisfaction (4 comments). After categorizing and 
subcategorizing, the comments were analyzed by audience. That is, the comments were 
reviewed to determine attribution to management (manager, supervisors, and team leads), 
to support staff (systems support technicians and knowledge team members), or to agents. 
Of the 61 comments made, 39% were made by support staff, 36% were made by agents, 
and 25% were made by management. Although it appears based on the percentages alone 
that support staff made a higher number of comments related to the category of 
performance, when compared against the number of participants in each category, the 
number of comments are in line with what would be expected across each participant 
category, which was validated via a chi-square goodness of fit analysis x2(2, N = 61) = 
2.05, p = .35). This chi-square analysis prevents overemphasis on support staff responses 
versus the responses of management and agents. Table 11 provides a visual summary of 
the coded data for the category of performance. 
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Table 11  
















  8 (13%) 
Technology 
 
  5 (8%) 
Customer satisfaction   4 (6%) 
 
Metrics. The performance metrics provided by the contact center included one 
quality-based performance metric that was related to first call resolution, three 
productivity-based performance metrics that were related to average speed of answer, 
average handle time, and after call work, and data related to attrition and the top five call 
topics. What was atypical about this contact center was the lack of quality-based 
performance metrics for agent accuracy, adherence, and customer satisfaction. Although 
only three interview questions were specific to performance measurement, participants 
provided 29 unique comments about how their performance was measured (or was not 
measured as shown by the responses). By reviewing the data that were provided in 
combination with the knowledge obtained from interviews and observations, it appeared 
that some changes in the contact center could positively impact the performance metrics 
of first call resolution and average handle time.  
First call resolution. The importance of first call resolution as a contact center 
performance metric was discussed in chapters 1 and 2. First call resolution, where an 
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agent is able to resolve the caller’s question or issue without having to escalate the call, 
increases efficiency and improves customer satisfaction. At the contact center under 
study, the performance goal is a first call resolution of 80%. The contact center is unable 
to reach this performance goal due in large part to the lack of knowledge provided by the 
program teams. Specifically, in the performance metrics data provided by the contact 
center, the first call resolution percentages for March, April, and May of 2008 averaged 
71%. Of the 63 calls that were observed, the first call resolution percentage was much 
lower at 51% (32 calls). The data provided by the contact center does not reflect the 
number of times that the program teams had to be contacted before the call was resolved 
so the actual percentage of calls resolved through use of the agents’ direct desktop 
resources may be much lower. For the calls that were observed, 38% (24 calls) were 
escalated or transferred to the program teams. Table 12 provides a summary of how the 
63 observed calls were resolved. 
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Table 12  
First Call Resolution Percentages for Observed Calls 
 




First call/first contact Caller requested 
information on when 




Escalation to Program 
Team 
Caller questioned specific 




Transfer or referral to other 
department 
Caller needed assistance 
from technical support or 




aNote that 21% of these calls required an initial contact with the program team because information was not 
captured in agent resources and 6% of these calls were resolved because the customer self-served while on 
the phone, meaning that they resolved their issue without agent assistance during the course of the call.  
 
If additional knowledge was available to the agents from their desktops, first call 
resolution percentages might increase. 
 Average handle time. The performance goal for the contact center’s average 
handle time is 4 minutes. The average provided in the performance metric data was 
almost 8 minutes (7.496). From the call observations, it appears that hold times are 
driving up average handle time. In each of the 13 calls observed where the agent either 
consulted with a member of the program team and then returned to the customer or 
consulted with a member of the program team and then transferred the customer to that 
person, the caller was placed on hold while the consultation was occurring. Similar to 
first call resolution, if the agents had more knowledge available to them directly from 
their desktop, the hold times could be reduced thus reducing average handle time and the 
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cost per call. At a minimum, the contact center may want to look at hold time versus 
actual handle time to ensure that it is focusing appropriately on the metric. For example, 
although 4 minutes is the goal, perhaps with the technical nature of some of the calls and 
the complexity of knowledge, that length of time is not appropriate and the actual average 
should be higher at 6 minutes or more. By more closely analyzing that metric, the contact 
center may change its average handle time goal and be closer to realizing a true cost per 
call.  
 After call work. During after call work, agents have released the caller either by 
ending the call through resolution, escalation, or transfer and are documenting brief notes 
about the nature of the call. The performance goal for the contact center’s after call work 
is 2 minutes and the average provided in the performance metric data was 3 minutes 7 
seconds. It is unclear why agents are not able to meet the 2 minute goal because when 
asked, several participants stated that 2 minutes was more than enough time to complete 
after call work. Perhaps this target, like the average handle time target, is not realistic and 
needs to be reviewed. Perhaps there needs to be more of an individual focus on average 
handle time to ensure those agents that are driving the metric up are being coached on 
effective after call work performance. The way in which the contact center shared 
performance data with the agents had some agents concerned that they were being 
lumped together in one group and that the group metric did not reflect their individual 
metric. 
So I just always wondered like where we had fallen off the boat and so I feel like 
maybe if they were addressing whoever or the people who were causing that issue 
individually maybe something would happen because when you send an e-mail 
out to the team saying improve ACW [after call work] and I have like a minute 
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then I’m like well I’m already improving ACW. . .so that was one area where I 
thought it could be a little more individualized. (P14) 
 
 Individual performance. Coaching individuals on performance issues 
seemed to be hit or miss at the contact center although the intent to do coaching and more 
closely monitor performance was both vocalized by management and supported by the 
agents. “Holding everyone to a proficient standard that you know the customer is getting 
the same level of support from every agent. That somehow somebody is able to say yes 
all my agents are proficient in this” (P1). 
We have not had enough staff to do that [call monitoring] on a regular basis. That 
would be a, is an excellent way to determine if we are providing quality service. It 
just takes a lot of effort, a lot of labor. We still will do it it’s just, every year we 
say oh yeah we are going to spend the time but then we never have the staff built 
up. So we hope this year we will be able to do that. (P19) 
 
For agents I think that would be nice to be like a daily thing, like giving some 
kind of feedback or an exact thing to work on, or like getting compliments are 
nice to get every once in a while because I know that they just get like, like we get 
the weekly e-mail saying that [agent] improved ACW like as a team and I feel 
like it should be a little bit more and specific to each person. Like giving them 
individual e-mails or just say hey work on this. (P14) 
 
The acquisition and the addition of new agents and a new project had drawn focus away 
from performance although there were mechanisms in place to review call tickets, 
monitor calls, and do more individual coaching with the agents. “The only thing we’re 
consistently measured on is whether we are logged in on time. That’s the only thing we 
receive constant feedback on. And even then it’s not even constant” (P13). 
I just I mean the [contact center] has just exploded in the last half year so all those 
things that they planned on doing, these meetings or whatever, the training you 
know they just can’t do it. The level of support that we have to have to be on the 




As Terry (2007) noted, “It is logical that when faced with the decision to answer a 
customer call or attend training, answering the call will always win” (p. 371). 
Some participants were frustrated by outdated technology that was available that 
impeded their performance with customers. Five comments were collected regarding this 
topic and the primary point of frustration was not having updated versions of software 
and other technology. As one participant noted, “If they have MAC 1.7 and I have MAC 
1.3, you’re not going to work very good” (P8).  
Many participants, when asked how their performance was measured or 
monitored, were unsure or gave differing answers. Some talked about how performance 
was measured by first call resolution or after call work time. Some talked about how they 
were measured by their attendance and being on time to work. Others talked about how 
they were measured on how completely they filled out their call tickets. Others simply 
guessed at the metrics for the team. “I guess probably being able to give the correct 
answer but I don’t know that we’re measured on that” (P1). “Well we get the 
performance charts I think weekly. I don’t think anyone has listened in on me for close to 
a year. So I don’t think anybody worries about me so much” (P3). “I don’t think we’re 
there yet. That’s one of the things we are working on is how do we measure our group for 
success and there’s not a concrete answer for that question” (P12). 
Yeah well, I know that there are metrics tracked for like first call closure. There’s 
also knowledge base usage. However, I don’t know what‘s kept track of. I don’t 
know what rewards or punishments are in place for not meeting things. I know 





Contact center management did want to be more consistent in monitoring calls, 
completing ticket reviews, and supporting the performance of the agents, and eight 
comments were made about standardization during the interviews. They did not, 
however, want to promote a typical contact center culture.  
We also, we’ve got lots of call stats and sources that come in during the day and we 
try not to measure people on that. Because one of the things that we found that it does 
is it causes people to want to compete and we realized that some people are going to 
go faster and some people are going to go slower and we don’t want the slower 
people to think that the way they are doing it isn’t you know isn’t as good as the 
people that are doing it quicker. So we don’t want competitions between people 
because we’ll get people just saying oh yeah thanks and hanging up and not doing a 
full job just to get a number of calls. . .you know so we kind of try to build towards 
the middle and not an extreme one end of the spectrum to the other. (P5)  
 
In order to ensure that they are running a cost-effective contact center, however, they may 
need to narrow their focus on individual rather than group performance to improve 
efficiency through lower average handle time and lower after call work. They also need 
to work on identifying a way to measure customer satisfaction. Only four comments were 
made about customer satisfaction, which is somewhat surprising giving the customer 
service nature of contact center work. Yet when asked about success, which yielded 15 
unique comments, all of the comments linked success to a high level of customer 
satisfaction. 
Customer satisfaction. Currently, the contact center is measuring customer 
satisfaction by customer complaint. With the implementation of a new project, there was 
a customer satisfaction survey that was being implemented with the project that the 
contact center management team was hopeful could be applied to other projects. Until 
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that is successful, the primary way of knowing if a customer was satisfied or dissatisfied 
was if they, the customer, reported it.  
Well I have to say that it’s really not measured. Because you kind of have to take 
it that they are doing their part or portion of their job, that they are answer the call 
and giving them the correct answer. Probably the best way to measure that is if 
the person calls back and says well this is wrong and I don’t feel that’s probably 
the most accurate way or the most efficient way but other than having someone 
else coming back and checking every ticket and every call, I’m really not sure 
how we would do that. So we kind of rely on customer complaints. (P5) 
 
Trusting that the agents are doing their job means that “customer service levels [are 
dependent] upon the de facto ‘ownership’ that CSRs took of their own call handling 
processes” (Russell, 2007, p. 138, emphasis in original). There is no proactive outreach to 
measure customer satisfaction and this seemed to be supported culturally. As one 
member of management noted, “The quality stuff is not as critical if the screamers can be 
kept to a minimum” (E. Herman, personal communication, January 30, 2009). Although 
this person supported efforts to put measures in place to gauge customer satisfaction, it 
appeared that this was not supported by higher levels of management. Research has 
shown, however, that a better understanding of the customer satisfaction experience and 
their threshold for wait times can reduce contact center overstaffing thus lowering the 
overall cost of the operation (Braff & DeVine, 2009). “Most companies that analyze their 
service levels carefully find that some wait times have become more important to 
customers than others and that overstaffing to hit service targets that customers don’t care 
about is costing them money” (¶8). 
Performance summary. Issues with knowledge are impacting the organization’s 
performance metrics. First call resolution is less than the 80% target and average handle 
156 
 
time is higher than the 4 minute target because knowledge is not accessible directly from 
the agents’ desktops. After call work is averaging 1 minute higher than the target of 2 
minutes. The growth of the contact center derailed a consistent quality monitoring 
program but agents want that detail and want additional feedback from management as 
evidenced from the 29 comments about evaluation. The level of overall customer 
satisfaction was unknown. Although the contact center wanted to stay away from creating 
a typical contact center culture, more attention may need to be placed on individual 
performance and customer satisfaction to ensure that targets are met and customers are 
getting the knowledge that they need. As one member of management noted, “There’s no 
VP [vice president] at the customer service level asking the kinds of questions you’re 
[researcher] asking about metrics and quality” (E. Herman, personal communication, 
January 30, 2009). This may be causing a disconnect in customer service between the end 
user and the organization and a disconnect in the way employees feel about how the 
organization values the customer service knowledge that they have to contribute to 
performance improvement.   
I think it’s important for the larger organization and for upper management to 
truly understand how critical customer service is and what the end user 
experiences. I think we could get a lot of benefit out of that and here’s one 
example is I think we should be involved in product development because these 
products come out and their created and then all of a sudden we’re looking at 
them going why did they do this because the end user is, the customer is going to 
think blah because we think like the customer. (P19)   
 
Primary Research Question 
The primary research question asked about knowledge loss in the contact center 
and the operational impacts. In this contact center, knowledge loss occurred primarily 
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because of failure to capture and resistance to unlearning. Subject matter experts failed to 
provide knowledge to the contact center and agents failed to adopt processes to add 
knowledge to the Kaidara knowledge management system and there was no mutual 
accountability. Neither the subject matter experts nor the agents were incented by the 
organization to capture and share knowledge. That is, they received no positive 
reinforcement, no financial incentive, and no performance incentive to contribute. 
Memory decay and bad habits contributed minimally to knowledge loss. Because attrition 
was low, participants were able to rely on the tacit knowledge of their peers when they 
forgot how to complete a task. Remembering passwords was one of the most frequent 
responses when participants were asked about memory decay and the contact center 
fielded a lot of password questions from its customers as evidenced by the call 
observations and the performance metric data. Keeping outdated knowledge in its 
Kaidara knowledge management system was a bad habit practiced by the contact center 
and sometimes participants did not check Kaidara before providing responses to customer 
questions, which resulted in callbacks to customers to correct erroneous answers.    
 Operationally, first call resolution targets, average handle time targets, and after 
call work targets were not being met because of knowledge loss. For first call resolution 
and average handle time targets specifically, lack of knowledge on the agents’ desktops 
limited their ability to resolve calls and caused customers to be kept waiting. Whether 
that caused satisfaction issues with the customers was unknown because no customer 
satisfaction mechanism was in place. Agent performance was loosely tracked through 
review of call tickets, call monitoring, and adherence to first call resolution, average 
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handle time, and after call work time. Agents were unsure of exactly how their 
performance was measured and indicated that they wanted more individualized feedback 
and recognition.  
 Culturally, there was intent to operate this contact center differently than other 
contact centers, which is why there was not a strict program in place for quality 
assurance. Focusing on individual performance improvement, however, could improve 
the cost effectiveness of the call center through reduced average handle time and reduced 
after call work time. Populating Kaidara with knowledge, whether from the subject 
matter experts or the contact center team, is still a primary driver of positively impacting 
those two metrics as the agents need to have that knowledge available at their fingertips.  
 When the qualitative data were analyzed and coded into categories and 
subcategories, the environment of the contact center, the loss of knowledge through 
memory decay, and individual performance evaluations received the most comments in 
the primary categories of culture, knowledge, and performance respectively. Although 
agents enjoy the casual environment of the contact center, they want more individual and 
more consistent evaluation of their performance and they want everyone held accountable 
to performance standards. They recognize memory decay as an area of knowledge loss, 
but have less recognition of failure to capture, and almost no recognition of unlearning 
and avoiding bad habits or how it negatively impacts their environment. 
 Subquestion 1. Three subquestions were associated with the primary research 
question. Subquestion 1 asked where knowledge loss occurred at the individual or 
organization level. Knowledge loss occurred at both the individual level and the 
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organizational level. At the individual level, there was attitudinal resistance to change. 
Subject matter experts did not want to share knowledge because it reduced their power 
and took away the limited on-the-job recognition that they received. Agents did not 
regularly take initiative to recommend or write knowledge articles. At the organizational 
level, standard operating procedures were lacking for project start-ups and contractual 
uniformity.  
 Subquestion 2. Subquestion two asked about the contributing factors to 
knowledge loss. Contributing factors to knowledge loss included culture, leadership 
support, the breadth of projects supported, and limited follow-through from lessons 
learned. The culture seemed to support the division between the contact center and the 
program teams, which fostered knowledge loss. Although leadership support was strong 
at the contact center level, executive level support seemed limited and there was no 
executive level customer service position to promote the contact center work and focus 
on better performance outcomes for operational efficiencies. The sheer volume of 
projects supported contributed to knowledge loss. With 120 projects, memorization was 
not possible; therefore, it was necessary to have a knowledge management database from 
which to access knowledge. Continued issues with project implementations showed that 
lessons learned from previous events were not institutionalized or made standard.  
 Subquestion 3: Subquestion three asked how knowledge loss influenced the 
contact center’s productivity and quality metrics. Because knowledge was not readily 
available to the agents, first call resolution was lower than targeted while average handle 
time and after call work time were higher than targeted. Quality metrics related to call 
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accuracy and customer satisfaction were absent thus leaving a sizable gap in performance 
knowledge.  
 Mode of forgetting matrix. Martin de Holan et al.’s (2004) mode of forgetting 
matrix, which was used as the conceptual framework for this study and shown in Figure 
1, enabled knowledge loss to be segmented into specific dimensions and to be understood 
from the perspective of accidental or intentional loss and new knowledge or old 
knowledge. In this contact center, knowledge loss was both accidental and purposeful and 
the source of knowledge was both old and new. Table 13 provides examples taken from 
this study for each dimension. 
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Table 13  






Examples from the Study 
 
As Observed in the Study 
Memory Decay Forgetting how to 
complete a task and asking 




Interviews: 37 unique comments 
regarding memory decay 
 
Observations: 30 unique calls about lost 
passwords and password resets 
 
Documentation review: Focus on 
finding user identification information 
in the new project training, which 
anticipated issues with user logon and 
credentials 
 
Performance Metrics: 8,230 calls in 1-
year period for password issues 
Failure to 
Capture 
Reliance on tacit 
experience because 
explicit knowledge not 
available 
Interviews: 11 unique comments 
regarding failure to capture 
 
Observations: 23 calls transferred to 
program team because current 
knowledge not in Kaidara 
 
Documentation review: Limited use of 
e-mail to transfer knowledge not 
captured in Kaidara; word of mouth 
was preferred transfer method 
 
Performance metrics: 8 minute average 










Examples from the Study 
 
As Observed in the Study 




reorganization and cultural 
changes 
Interviews: 9 unique comments 
regarding unlearning 
 
Observations: 18 unique calls regarding 
a particular state where the program 
team provided no project knowledge to 
the contact center  
 
Documentation review: Training was 
available for new project, but refresher 
training/other training materials limited 
for existing projects 
 
Performance metrics: 71% first call 












Interviews: 4 unique comments 
regarding avoiding bad habits 
 
Observations: 6 unique calls where 
assumptions were made that some other 
person had requested that the updated 
knowledge be added to Kaidara and the 
agent took no further action 
 
Documentation review: Some 
knowledge exchanged in e-mails rather 
than added to Kaidara 
 
Performance metrics: Goal for 







Chapter 4 included a detailed description of the field research activities that 
involved interviews and observations and the receipt of performance metric data that 
contributed to the body of knowledge that was available for analysis. The role of the 
researcher, as the primary data collection instrument, was discussed. Results were then 
discussed through the three broad categories of culture, knowledge, and performance. 
Within these three broad categories, specific findings were shared that showed where loss 
occurred at the individual and organizational level, what factors promoted and prevented 
the event, and the relationship between loss and performance.  
The culture of this contact center was atypical because of a diminished focus on 
performance metrics that created a more relaxed atmosphere and because of a lower than 
average attrition. Overall, participants spoke highly of leadership support and found the 
environment to be positive, although there were concerns about the economy and about 
the recent reorganization of staff that had taken place. Using Martin de Holan et al.’s 
(2004) mode of forgetting matrix as the conceptual framework to pinpoint specific areas 
of loss showed that knowledge loss that had considerable impact on performance was 
primarily caused by failure to capture, unlearning, and avoiding bad habits, while 
knowledge loss due to memory decay, although evident, had less of an impact on 
performance. Loss was largely purposeful and magnified by old knowledge that cluttered 
the primary knowledge resource tool for agents. Chapter 5 includes a summary of the 
study, the conclusions that were drawn, recommendations for further research, and 
implications for social change.  
 
 




This chapter includes a summary of the research, conclusions about the findings, 
recommendations for action and further study, researcher’s reflection, the implications 
for social change, and concluding statement. 
Summary 
 
The problem addressed in this study concerned the low awareness that 
organizations have of how knowledge loss occurs in their environment, how it impacts 
their performance, and how its omission in the routine practice of knowledge 
management by the organization creates knowledge gaps. The purpose of this mixed 
model case study was to understand where and why loss occurred and to examine 
implications on performance metrics, which might help create better performance outcomes 
within organizations engaged in the practice of knowledge management. In addition, the 
purpose of the study was to contribute to literature related to knowledge loss, knowledge 
management, and contact center work by offering research directly related to those areas. 
The contact center was selected as the organization under study because the 
concept of knowledge loss had not been explored in this particular type of organization 
and because the contact center is a highly dynamic and knowledge intensive environment 
currently undergoing prolific changes regarding knowledge complexity and performance 
measurement, which offered an opportunity to explore the intersection of knowledge 
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management, learning management, organizational culture, organizational change, and 
organizational performance.  
The primary research question asked about knowledge loss in the contact center 
and the operational impacts. More specifically, three subquestions associated with this 
primary question concerned where knowledge loss occurred at the individual and/or 
organizational level, what the contributing factors were, and how it influenced the contact 
center’s productivity and quality metrics. The case study research design enabled an 
exploration of the subtleties, nuances, and contextual situations inherent in knowledge 
management processes, including knowledge loss and knowledge discard, which are 
intimately connected to organizational culture, organizational change, and human 
involvement. 
To further focus this study, Martin de Holan et al.’s (2004) mode of forgetting 
matrix served as the conceptual framework. Applying this framework to the present study 
demonstrated the mode of forgetting and the source of knowledge as valid dimensions of 
knowledge loss. It also served to pinpoint specific areas of attention for the contact center 
organization and its knowledge management practices.  
The findings indicated that contributing factors to knowledge loss included 
culture, leadership support, the breadth of projects supported, and limited follow-through 
from lessons learned. Knowledge loss occurred primarily because of failure to capture 
and resistance to unlearning. Operationally, first call resolution targets and average 
handle time targets were not being met because of knowledge loss. Culturally, there was 
intent to operate this contact center differently than other contact centers, which is why 
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there was not a strict program in place for quality assurance. Knowledge loss occurred at 
both the individual level and the organizational level. At the individual level, there was 
attitudinal resistance to change. At the organizational level, standard operating 
procedures were lacking for project start-ups and contractual uniformity.  
Conclusions 
 
 Chapter 1 began with a discussion of the infoglut, which is a term that Baker 
(2006) used to describe situations where organizations had captured significant amounts 
of knowledge, but were then overwhelmed by it. Although the contact center under study 
was not overwhelmed with current knowledge in its knowledge management database 
and its agent resources, it was weighed down with outdated knowledge that was 
frustrating for agents and had the potential to increase the search time for agents to find 
relevant knowledge thereby increasing average handle time and cost per call. This shows 
that equal attention must be given to knowledge discard in knowledge management 
frameworks that to date have focused on generation, capture, and storage.  
 Previous research on knowledge loss demonstrated that knowledge loss impacted 
organizational performance and that factors attributed to knowledge loss included 
accidental forgetting, purposeful resistance to new knowledge, lack of leadership support 
or reinforcement, and disuse (Benkard, 2000; Darr, Argote, & Epple, 1995; Ibrahim, 
2005; Martin de Holan & Phillips, 2004; Martin de Holan, Phillips, & Lawrence, 2004; 
Thompson, 2007). As shown in Table 13, this study supported the findings of the 
previous research. Organizational performance metrics in the contact center related to 
first call resolution and average handle time appeared to be impacted by knowledge loss 
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and the factors attributed to knowledge loss were linked to leadership support, failure to 
capture, resistance to unlearning, and practicing bad habits. 
 Knowledge management requires a blended stream of attention to technology, 
culture, and people (Davenport & Prusak, 2000; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). While 
technology and leadership can foster knowledge transfer, organizations cannot solely rely 
on one or the other and this study upheld that premise. The contact center had 
implemented a knowledge management solution that was linked directly to its ticket 
tracking software that made it easy for the agents to search for knowledge while they 
were servicing the customer. Moreover, the leadership support in the immediate contact 
center was high and knowledge transfer within the immediate contact center was 
occurring with some frequency. To operate successfully, however, the contact center 
relied upon knowledge transfer from various program teams within the organization and 
that was not happening. Impeding this transfer of knowledge to the contact center was a 
cultural resistance to unlearning and contract standardization that permeated the program 
teams and the organization at large. Therefore, although technology was in place and 
leadership support was present in the immediate contact center, the culture worked 
against the knowledge transfer process, which led to knowledge loss in this organization. 
 The problem addressed in this study concerned the low awareness that 
organizations have of how knowledge loss occurs in their environment and how it 
impacts their performance. Although there was high awareness in this organization that 
the program teams were failing to transfer knowledge, there was low awareness of how 
this actually impacted performance. Although targets had been set for first call resolution 
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and average handle time, the performance metric data provided by the organization 
showed that the targets were not being met and this was evidenced during the onsite 
observations as well. Agents were unable to answer customer questions because 
knowledge was not available through the direct resources that they were to use. Of the 63 
calls observed, first call resolution averaged 51% compared to the target of 80%. And in 
21% of those cases, the agents had to consult with the program teams before being able to 
provide the customer with a response. While these consultations were occurring, the 
caller was on hold, which was driving up average handle time almost 4 minutes above the 
target. 
 The targets established by the contact center for first call resolution and average 
handle time may not be appropriate given the changes that are happening globally in the 
contact center environment. According to the Customer Contact Council (2007), there is 
a shift “toward complexity. . .not only driven by a migration of ‘easier’ contacts to self-
service but also by an increase in customer expectations” (p. 4, emphasis in original). 
Given the complexity of knowledge, more time may be needed by the agents to address 
the caller’s questions. An 80% first call resolution target may not be achievable if agents 
are not prepared to handle this complexity (Hillmer et al., 2004). Before the contact 
center can focus on those questions, the knowledge loss caused by failure to capture and 
unlearning must be addressed to more fully understand how the agents can perform in an 




This study offered the opportunity to see elements of Lewin’s (1951/1997) three-
step organizational change model in action. The contact center had undergone 
reorganization and it seemed as if the reorganization had pushed the team into the first 
step of change, unfreezing, as identified by Lewin. It is during the first step, unfreezing, 
where the concept of breaking away is applicable. This step sometimes requires 
deliberate action to shake the group from its complacency or inertia. An event must 
happen, like this reorganization, for the group to be motivated to change. The purpose of 
the reorganization, according to management, was to more appropriately align roles and 
responsibilities and ensure that dedicated staff were supporting key areas like knowledge 
management, systems support, and metrics and reporting. At the time of the study, it 
appeared that the team was in Lewin’s second step of change, that of moving or being in 
a transitory period, and there was lingering bitterness about the hiring decisions. This 
dissent is not uncommon in periods of organizational change. “The implementation 
process is messy. Things don’t proceed exactly as planned; people do things their own 
way, not always according to the plan; some people resist or even sabotage the process” 
(Burke, 2002, p. 2).  
 Resistance to change perpetuated intentional knowledge loss in this environment 
because program teams were reluctant to transfer knowledge because it reduced their 
power and took away the limited on-the-job recognition that they received. Agents did 
not regularly take initiative to recommend or write knowledge articles. There was no 






As described in chapter 4, the researcher’s experience with the site under study 
was positive and it served to reinforce her decision to use the qualitative case study 
methodology. Engaging in the environment gave the researcher the opportunity to see 
issues in practice and promoted knowledge sharing from the participants because she was 
onsite. The researcher understands that every case is unique and that the same receptivity 
shown to her here may be different in other cases.  
The researcher made known that she was a knowledge manager in a contact 
center environment, which may be perceived as a source of bias. All precautions were 
taken to limit bias and properly present the results of the research. The researcher was 
aware, however, of the significant cultural differences at the case under study regarding 
the de-emphasis on individual performance metrics, which is atypical in the contact 
center culture. Although there were similarities between the case study organization and 
the researcher’s organization, the cultures were vastly different, which supports Schein’s 
(2004) assessment:  
One of the most mysterious aspects of organizational culture is how it comes to be 
that two companies with similar external environments, working in similar 
technologies on similar tasks and with founders of similar origins, come to have 
entirely different ways of operating over the years. (p. 225) 
 
Even though performance metrics were limited, they still provided a point of 
triangulation with the qualitative data and aligned with the mixed method research design 
chosen by the researcher. 
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Recommendations for Action 
 
The results of this study demonstrated that Martin de Holan et al.’s (2004) mode 
of forgetting matrix can be used collaboratively with the interview questions available in 
Appendix B to pinpoint areas of knowledge loss in organizations. This enables 
organizations to focus their efforts on areas of loss that are most prevalent rather than 
trying to address all modes of forgetting, which include failure to capture, memory decay, 
unlearning, and avoiding bad habits. It also enables organizations to understand the kind 
of support that might be necessary to minimize loss.  
For example, if knowledge loss is found to be caused predominantly by memory 
decay, organizations may need to support technology that allows users to automatically 
reset their passwords when they forget them or support technology that allows a single 
user identification and password for all of an organization’s resources to make it easier 
for the customer to access knowledge. Implementation of this type of technology should 
be considered by the organization under study to reduce password reset calls thus 
enabling the agents to handle more complex, critical calls and reducing the high labor 
cost of answering relatively simple password questions. If knowledge loss is caused 
predominantly by failure to capture, organizations may need to support efforts to make 
tacit and experiential knowledge explicit. For contact centers, this can happen through 
additional on the job training, mentoring, and coaching. If knowledge loss is caused 
predominantly by bad habits, organizations may need to support more rigorous 




The organization under study needs to implement some type of incentive program 
that rewards employees for avoiding bad habits and contributing knowledge to the 
Kaidara database. A simple reward and recognition program that acknowledges through 
verbal or written channels those employees or teams that share knowledge can be 
effective, particularly in an environment where this type of feedback is desired. 
Management can choose to recognize knowledge contributors privately through e-mail or 
publicly through team meetings, newsletters, or other corporate communication vehicles 
for no to low cost. In time, the organization, with feedback from the employees, can 
determine if additional incentives, including performance-based financial incentives, 
would be an appropriate next step in continuing to motivate employees to share 
knowledge. At present, a pat on the back from management would go a long way in this 
organization in motivating employees, particularly the subject matter experts, to share 
knowledge. Praise for their work efforts should not be coming from external sources 
only.  
Executive leadership in this organization must put an end to fiefdoms and ensure 
that cross-functional teams are working toward a common goal of servicing its customers 
satisfactorily and cost-effectively. To that end, this organization must establish and make 
known what those goals are and how the individual, the team, and the organization will 
work toward achieving those goals. Establishing an executive level customer service 
leader that is focused on customer satisfaction and the cost-effectiveness of how the 
organization services its customers might be helpful. For organizations in general, an 
incentive program might help those whose knowledge loss is caused predominantly by 
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unlearning as well, but it will require a significant amount of leadership support and 
organizational change because resistance to unlearning and bad habits can be embedded 
into the very culture of an organization, its attitudes, values, assumptions, and traditions.    
With the almost limitless storage capacities available today, organizations must 
incorporate knowledge discard into their knowledge management cycles and must 
recognize that even with a mature model of generation, capture, and storage, knowledge 
loss can still occur. Specifically, chief knowledge officers, knowledge managers, and 
those engaged in knowledge management practices must be aware of the presence of 
knowledge loss. For contact centers in particular where one additional minute of call time 
can result in millions of dollars in additional labor hours, identifying areas of knowledge 
loss and working to minimize those areas can potentially improve the bottom line. The 
amount of improvement will depend on how the changes in the contact center 
environment related to knowledge complexity and first call resolution impact costs over 
time. 
Recommendations for Further Study 
 
 This study pulled together the body of literature related to organizational 
forgetting and knowledge and extended that literature by offering additional insight into 
how and where knowledge loss occurs and how it impacts organizational performance. 
Focus was placed on understanding knowledge loss that occurred with organizational 
members with more permanent, continuous tenure. That is, this research was more 
focused on knowledge loss due to a changing environment with workers that persisted in 
the organization. This direction was chosen because literature about knowledge loss 
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caused by attrition was more prevalent, but it does not help organizations address 
knowledge loss issues perpetuated by employees whose tenure contributes to and shapes 
the cultural environment. More research needs to be done in this area to more fully 
explore the intersection of knowledge management, organizational culture, organizational 
change, and organizational performance.  
 This study offers researchers and practitioners a conceptual framework from 
which to operate in order to pinpoint areas of knowledge loss. Applying the framework to 
additional studies or applying the framework in practice may lead to more meaningful 
understanding of accidental and intentional knowledge loss and create a body of 
knowledge on ways in which loss can be minimized, whether that be through technology, 
culture, human capital, or some combination thereof.  
 Further research needs to show more empirically the connection between 
knowledge loss and organizational performance. Because the case under study in this 
research was limited in the data that it could provide, strengthening the quantitative 
component of future mixed model studies or conducting pure quantitative studies may be 
necessary to gain additional attention to this phenomenon, particularly at the executive 
level. In addition, further research should examine the efficacy of contact center metrics 
to ensure that organizations are focused on metrics that are proven to positively impact 
performance and customer satisfaction and to ensure that the metric thresholds (e.g., 
average handle time target, after call work time target) are accurately set given the 
complexity of the call. Four minutes may no longer be a realistic target for average 
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handle time at the organization under study because of the nature of the customer’s 
question and the complexity of the answer. 
 This study focused exclusively on the contact center agents and the department in 
which they worked. Researchers should consider broadening the participant pool to other 
key organizational members to allow for additional insight. For example, interviewing 
additional executive level staff may have provided alternative cultural viewpoints that 
may have contributed to a more comprehensive study.    
Examining what motivates employees to share knowledge or populate 
information and data into knowledge management tools is also worthy of further study. 
Determining success factors and best practices specific to knowledge workers and 
knowledge intensive organizations can position chief knowledge officers, customer 
service executives, and management staff to quickly implement an effective reward and 
recognition program. This could lead to a higher number of employees submitting 
content into an organization’s knowledge management tool and lead to an increased 
exchange of knowledge throughout the organization. Moreover, organizations may find 
that they can implement a program at minimal cost because employees desire 
psychological and social benefits over financial benefits.  
Moving forward, coming to some type of consensus regarding knowledge loss 
and the terminology surrounding it will be necessary. Even if researchers choose to use 
the term organizational forgetting instead of knowledge loss, cross-referencing the article 
with relevant or predominant search terms can pull the body of research together in a 
more cohesive fashion. Despite the lack of consistency in terminology, research on 
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knowledge loss should not be undermined by it. Continuing research on knowledge 
management and its various dimensions, like knowledge loss, is important and worth 
discussing, as is showing its practical value. 
Social Change Significance 
 
Previous studies identified that knowledge loss impacts organizational 
performance (Benkard, 2000; Cha, 2007; Darr et al., 1995; Ibrahim, 2005; Martin de 
Holan & Phillips, 2004; Martin de Holan et al., 2004; Thompson, 2007). Building upon 
those studies, this study explored the phenomenon of knowledge loss, where it existed 
and why, what factors contributed to it, and how performance metrics were influenced 
because of it, in the highly dynamic, knowledge intensive environment of the contact 
center organization. This appeared to be the first study to apply the mode of forgetting 
matrix (Martin de Holan et al., 2004) to a contact center environment. This study 
contributes to the ongoing dialogue about the phenomenon of knowledge loss, what 
dimensions of loss and forgetting are prevalent, and organizational performance 
implications, thus bridging a gap in the literature. 
The social change significance of this research is that it increases knowledge loss 
awareness, pinpoints specific areas of loss, and illustrates knowledge loss’s rightful place 
in knowledge management models for better performance outcomes. Specifically, the 
results of the study demonstrate that more awareness must be given to knowledge loss 
because it has direct implications on contact center organizational performance and cost 
per call. Moreover, knowledge loss at the organizational level because of lack of 
standardization and failure to learn from experience puts fiscal sustainability and the 
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ability to generate new revenue at risk, which can lead to social change issues of 
downsizings, layoffs, and organizational closures.  
Purposeful knowledge loss must be embedded into knowledge management 
frameworks and institutionalized as part of everyday knowledge and learning 
management practice. Failure to incorporate purposeful knowledge loss lengthens time to 
customer resolution because employees are unable to quickly locate relevant knowledge 
amid outdated knowledge and increases the risk that employees will abandon knowledge 
management systems due to obsolescence thereby significantly reducing any return on 
investment of these systems, which are expensive to implement. 
The findings can lead to meaningful discussion about the place of knowledge loss 
in knowledge management models and how to manage accidental or purposeful 
forgetting using a combination of culture, human capital, and technology. The findings 
also provide some illumination on the ways to strategically structure an organization to 
minimize forgetting and call into question whether attitudinal resistance to change may 
be linked to the types of people employed in contact center positions and the pay that is 
provided in said positions to transfer knowledge that is becoming increasingly more 
complex, which is worthy of further study. For contact center organizations, 
understanding knowledge loss and ways to mitigate it can influence organizational 
performance and ensure that those working on the front lines with the customers are 
building brand loyalty through exceptional customer service that is directly supported by 





Knowledge loss is often overlooked in knowledge management frameworks, yet it 
costs organizations money, personnel, efficiency, and customer service, which previous 
studies have demonstrated on a limited scale (Benkard, 2000; Darr et al., 1995; Martin de 
Holan et al., 2004; Thompson, 2007). In a knowledge intensive environment like the 
contact center, if knowledge is lost or not assimilated, accuracy, consistency, adherence, 
and handle time can be negatively impacted. Multiplication of these issues can impact 
overall customer service and profitability. Minimizing loss first requires awareness. 
Individuals are aware of knowledge loss through routine memory decay and failure to 
capture, but are not always consciously aware of knowledge loss through unlearning and 
avoiding bad habits. Organizations are not aware of how loss impacts their service and 
their performance. Once they become aware, minimizing loss requires leadership support, 
cultural change, and knowledge management frameworks that include purposeful 
knowledge discard so organizations are not overwhelmed by what they worked so 
diligently to capture. Researchers and practitioners have an opportunity to develop 
knowledge management frameworks where knowledge discard is equal to generation, 
capture, and storage, and where knowledge loss can be identified in order to help 
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APPENDIX B: CASE STUDY INTERVIEW FORM 
 
Contact Center Interview Form 
 
Participant Name: ___________________________ Date: _______________ 
 
Role (circle one):  Manager  Agent  Support Staff 
 
Demographics and Job Duties 
 
1. How long have you been with the organization in your current role? 
 
 
2. What previous background and experiences do you bring to this particular position? 
 
 
3. What do you see as your primary role and responsibility in this position? 
 
 
4. Describe a typical workday.  
 
 
Contact Center Environment 
 
5. Describe the culture here. (Culture is defined as a set of attitudes, values, 
assumptions, and traditions that directly shape an environment). 
 
 
6. Tell me about the kind of leadership support that you receive in your position from 
your manager and/or from the organization. 
 
 
7. What are the top three issues that are impacting your work environment today? 
 
 
8. What knowledge, information, and/or tools do you need to be successful in your job 
and how do you define success? 
 
9. What knowledge, information, and/or tools do others in your department need to be 
successful in their job here and how do you define success for those individuals? 
 
 
10. Tell me about how your performance is measured or monitored. 
 
 
11. Tell me what you would need from the people, tools, and/or knowledge available to 
you in this job to perform better.
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Knowledge Access and Knowledge Need 
 
12. What information do you rely on during a normal working day? (Nelson, 2007) 
13. What is the source of information and how do you access it? (Nelson, 2007) 
14. If you have questions, where do you go for answers? (Nelson, 2007) 
15. Who regularly asks you questions? What types of questions are asked? (Nelson, 
2007) 
16. Who do you interact with most frequently (i.e., what individuals or departments) and 
for what reasons? (Nelson, 2007) 
17. What type of knowledge do you find or would you find valuable in helping meet your 
department’s mission and objective (i.e., what would make your job easier)? (Nelson, 
2007) 
18. What is the most important type of knowledge, information, or data the organization 
could provide that would give you the greatest benefit overall on a day-to-day basis? 
(Nelson, 2007) 
19. What do you view as the most significant challenge to obtaining and managing the 
knowledge you need to accomplish your assigned duties? 
Knowledge Loss 
 
20. What amount or percentage of your time do you spend trying to find knowledge so 
you can perform a routine or structured task? (Nelson, 2007) 
21. What amount or percentage of your time do you spend finding knowledge for others 
in your work environment? (Nelson, 2007) 
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22. Tell me about a time when you weren’t sure how to complete a task or answer a call. 
What happened?  
23. Tell me about a time where you forgot how to do something on the job. What was it 
and what did you do? 
24. How do you share what you know with other coworkers? For example, if you learn 
something new while helping a customer, how do you let other coworkers know so 
that they can help a customer in the same situation? 
25. How is your performance measured on your ability to answer customer questions 
correctly and completely? How do you ensure that the knowledge you have is 
current? 
26. How do the people, processes, and tools that you use ensure that you have the 
knowledge that you need to do your job? 
27. Describe a situation where the answer to a customer question may have changed 
because new information was known about the problem. How did you remember this 
new information? How do you forget the old information? 
28. How fast do you feel the answers to customer questions change? How do you 
handle these changes? 
29. Tell me about the administrative aspects of your position as far as collecting 
customer information or recording the specifics of a call. 
30. How do you know which know administrative processes to follow in your job? What 
happens if the processes change? How do you know?  
31. Describe any other examples that you feel are related to forgetting information on the 




APPENDIX C: ONSITE OBSERVATION FORM 
 














Observation of how Agent is Using Desktop Knowledge Resources: 
_are scripts being accessed 
_is agent looking at previous call history or customer profile to assist with call 
_is agent using online system to provide responses and in what way specifically 









Observation of how Agent is using Personnel Knowledge Resources: 
_is agent asking another agent for assistance 
_does agent need to transfer issue to another agent and why 











Observation of Customer Service Queues used by Agent: 
_is caller placed on hold or mute while agent researches the question(s) 
_is agent describing steps to resolution to caller while researching 









Observation of Affective Queues by Caller: 
_based on caller’s affective queues, does the agent seem to be assisting the caller in 
resolving the issue 
_is the caller showing signs of satisfaction or frustration 










Observation of After Call Work by Agent: 
_is agent entering notes into the desktop knowledge system and what is the level of 
detail 
_is agent describing call to another agent because of information learned or exchanged 
with caller and/or other agents  




APPENDIX D: TRANSCRIPTION EXAMPLE 
 
Dissertation Interview 




I: Ok it’s January 15th and I’m here with [participant] who’s a Product Support Specialist. 
We have a signed consent form on file so we’re going to go ahead and start the interview. 
Tell me how long you’ve been with the organization in your current role? 
 
P: About [number] years. 
 
I: Ok and tell me what background and experience do you bring to this particular 
position? 
 
P: I was in [background].  
 
I: Ok. What do you see as your primary role and responsibility in this position? 
 




P: And helping with any needs they have. Documenting everything for our company’s 
purposes and I guess answering all the questions as much as possible. 
 
I: Ok.  
 
P: If I can’t answer them then I send them on to someone else that can. 
 
I: Ok. Describe a typical workday. And I know in the world today there’s not necessarily 
a typical workday. 
 






I: Just walk me through a day.
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P: I get in. I log in. I open up all the programs that I need for the day and get them all 
ready. I look to make sure that there is no information out there that is needed for the day, 




P: Whatever notifications that we get and then when the call comes in, which depends on 




P: But when they call in I take a call, let them know who you are, ask what the issue is. 





P: Using our database of knowledge that we have and from there ending the call. Filling 




P: That’s pretty much the simplified version. 
 
I: So tell me, I know you guys are getting into your busy season, what’s a busy day like? 
I mean how many calls is that potentially? 
 




P: 50 you know and that can vary obviously. Even when it’s busy, you have days where 




P: 50 is a good round number.  
 
I: Ok what about like in the summer when you’re not busy? 
 
P: Maybe three or four calls a day if that. It really slows down quite a bit. 
 




P: I usually have either side projects or technically we’re supposed to be doing like other 
things we need to work on otherwise we kind of surf the net sometimes but not that much 
though. 
 
I: Ok do you guys ever get authorized time off? Like where you can, if you’re slow you 
can take time off where you don’t have to use vacation and its unpaid time off. Do they 
ever offer that? 
 
P: No, no. 
 
I: Do you think people would take advantage of it if they did? 
 
P: I think so. 
 
I: Ok. When you are on the calls of you know 50 calls, I mean is it really like you’re at 
your desk and you get your two breaks and your lunch but otherwise you’re on the 
phone? 
 
P: Pretty much yeah. If you have to run to the restroom or something like that but or 
granted after so much you just need a little break so you can log out and go take a little 
walk or something. But otherwise, you are pretty much on the phone back-to-back. 
 
I: Ok and what’s the busy season? I mean are we in it right now? 
 
P: Not quite. Usually the fall, basically the fall and spring. Like when school starts up 
they are very busy and then again in the spring. We’re ramping up now and usually 








P: Otherwise, like let’s say it might be like a 20 to 25 calls roughly. 
 
I: Ok. And then for the fall is it September – October? Or August – September? Does it 
depend? 
 
P: They say August but usually it’s September before it starts getting a little bit busier. So 
September – November that range. 
 






I: (Laughs) Well that was the quickest answer I’ve had. Let me tell you how I’m defining 
culture for the purposes of my research, I’m defining culture as a set of attitudes, values, 
assumptions, and traditions that shape an environment. So I’m going to write down that 
you said fun and you can talk about the culture of the group and or and or both. 
 








P: You know everyone gets along great with each other. Our group specifically is about 
15 to 20 people and everyone seems to get along very well. There is a lot of camaraderie. 




P: It makes the day go by much quicker. 
 
I: Ok. What about [organization]? 
 








P: It’s a good company to work for. You know anything from how they treat their 
employees, they reward their employees well, the benefits are great. It’s you know, it’s a 
good company in general to work for I believe and I think you know I think they are 
staying ahead of the game as far as the economy goes.  
 
I: Ok.  
 
P: As far as culture I think, I don’t know if it’s because of being in [this city] but it seems 
like it’s a little more liberal.  
 
I: Ok.  
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P: And you know but it’s a very liberal environment. You can where (pause) was I going 
with that? I forgot where I was going (laughs). 
 
I: That’s fine. Tell me about the kind of leadership support that you receive in your 
position from your supervisor, manager or from the organization? 
 




P: A huge amount of support from our manager. Basically, [she] is the type who does a 




P: But she also leads in a great way too. Gets things done and enables us to get our jobs 
done correctly and the supervisors, which is a step below her, they do a great job too. 
They let us know when things are happening and if we come to them with any issues they 




P: I can’t say enough good about them. 
 
I: Ok and who are you reporting to now for your sup? 
 
P: It would be [supervisor]. 
 
I: Ok. Is he traveling this week? 
 
P: Yes, he’s in [city].  
 
I: Ok. What are the top three issues that you think are impacting your work environment 
today? 
 




P: Or issues? 
 




P: I would say I don’t know that this is really an issue but weather. It’s just been causing 
a lot of people to either miss work or with children or what have you and it’s not a 
problem yet because of the fact that it’s not terribly busy yet. Boy I’m really struggling 
with this one, there’s no real issues affecting our team per say. Not in a negative way. 
You know I think in general the economy has everyone a little on edge. 
 
I: Ok.  
 
P: But that being said, I’m sorry I don’t know of any other issues. 
 
I: That’s ok, there’s no right or wrong answers. 
 
P: I know that (laughs). 
 
I: If we had a week like this in February let’s say the last week of February and we had 
this kind of a week what would you guys do? Do you just work through it with the call 
volumes? 
 
P: Yep, that’s really all you can do. You just work through it and you know I more than 
some others out there, I think I try to have a positive attitude about it and say hey you 
know we are going to be getting calls either way so you know it’s going to be back-to-
back. It’s just, because a lot of times we have other I guess outlying areas like for 
instance, [satellite location] and so we have people there, [satellite location], what 
happens is those people generally pick up a little bit more of the volume than they would 




P: Or for that matter I think people generally, in general I think with our group everyone 








P: Everyone seems to really like coming to work and they do their job good and if they 
can be here at all they are usually here. 
 
I: Ok. What knowledge information or tools do you need to be successful in your job here 




P: As far as tools and knowledge that we would use we have our Kaidara, which basically 
it’s a FAQ. It has all of our knowledge base for all of our states that we cover and the 
programs for each state and that’s very vital because anytime that the program team has 
anything coming up they let us know about any issues going on for each state and they 
post it out there and let us know so that way when people call in about those issues then 
we can go ahead and just let them know right away. Otherwise other tools I guess you 
could say, our supervisors do a good job on getting us trained on anything new that’s 
coming out and the program team does as well and that is a huge help as well too. As far 
as how I define success, I don’t know maybe it’s a little bit different than most people but 





P: You know if you can go home everyday not hating your job and if you can make 
enough money to survive because the way that I look at it if you are happy then you are 
successful in your own mind. You know everyone has different levels of success. Some 
people can make $9 successful. Others would say just living is successful. I’m more 
towards that side. 
 
I: Ok. What about other people? So same question but thinking about others, what 
knowledge information or tools do others in your department need to be successful in 
their job and how do you define success for those individuals? So I know that there is the 
knowledge team, you know there’s the support services team, there’s the management 
team, tell me what they need to do their jobs and then how do you define success for 
those people? 
 
P: Well a lot of our knowledge a lot of times comes from the customers in a sense that 
sometimes we don’t realize our issues until the customer lets us know that there’s an 
issue. 
 
I: Ok, ok. 
 
P: So granted obviously there are times when you know there’s something coming up that 
we may know but we don’t realize how bad it is but many times when there is an issue 
that people are calling in about they a lot of times catch us off guard but we don’t realize, 





P: As far as success for other people I don’t know how to answer that question. I think 
everyone in general here kind of has the same feeling as far as success its very, it’s not an 





P: I think other people may see success as making good in your job and making good 




P: I know that’s probably not the answer you were looking for. 
 
I: No right or wrong answers. Tell me about how your performance is measured or 
monitored? 
 
P: Basically there’s several ways, first off the number of calls we take. If someone is only 




P: Also the how long you are on a call, we generally have a mark of four minutes for the 




P: And you’re, you are judged based on that when it comes to reviews and what have 




P: I guess the obvious one is making sure you’re not doing something you shouldn’t be 





P: But they are really, I don’t want to say easy going because that’s not the right word but 
they’re very open to how you do your job I guess. That might not be the right words but.  
 
I: Ok.  
 
P: You know not lax but it’s they I just can’t find the right words. 
 
I: Ok. So they are very open to how you do your job. 
 
P: Yes they work with people and they work with how you do, I pointed out we have a 
standard but as long as you hit those standards you are doing ok. 
201 
 
I: Ok. And how often are you getting feedback on performance?  
 
P: As long as there’s no issues with how you are doing your job you get like an annual 
review. If there are issue then you get more. There was a, when I first started there was a 
point where every two weeks I had a meeting with somebody because I was not meeting 
[metrics] but that being said that ended and it kind of doesn’t get talked about. They don’t 
hold anything against you. They do a really good job of once they see you are back on 
track then they just leave you alone. 
 
I: Ok. Tell me what you need from people, tools, or knowledge available to you in this 
job to perform better? 
 
P: I think we get pretty much everything we need. Now sometimes it would be nice if we 
could get, if the, because we, I’m not sure if you are familiar with it but there’s us and 





P: In some sense as far as what needs to be done for each state and what rules they have 
for each state, sometimes we don’t get the information we need to. Like if there’s an issue 
going on for instance if there’s a training in that state that is going to be upcoming 









P: But otherwise they do a really good job of trying. We pretty much have everything we 
need. 
 
I: Ok. Tell me what information you rely on during a normal working day. 
 




P: A lot of times the people around us like your coworkers are a wealth of knowledge. 
Someone may just have had a call about the exact same thing that you did and we talk 
over the wall and they say contact the program team. Our management does a really good 
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P: Yeah and a lot of times it’s that and even on the internet. Many times I have gone out 
to search for information on the internet about a certain school and trying to find certain 
information or what have you. 
 
I: Ok. So the source of the information and how you access it, going back to the last 
question, you are obviously using Kaidara. 
 
P: Sure, Kaidara, like I said just your coworkers right around you, sometimes we get on 
IM [instant message] to like talk back and forth. Like if you are in the middle of a call 
sometimes we IM and say hey are you talking to so and so state and this just happened 
and otherwise again the internet again is a good source. 
 




I: When you are talking about coworkers is that really just the coworkers here? How 
much are you interfacing, virtually interfacing with the agents in [satellite location]? 
 




P: [Satellite location] maybe a little bit more because they take some of the same calls but 
unless there’s a major issue or some sort of issue, the other ones we really don’t talk to 




P: E-mail we use here and there too. I should point that out, I forgot about that. E-mail is 
the tool we also use because sometimes things get noted, they sometimes will post things 










P: Otherwise as far as we don’t talk to the others a whole lot.  
 
I: Ok. If you have questions where do you go for answers? 
 








P: Which would be either [supervisor] and [supervisor] or [manager]. With [manager’s] 
office being five feet away from me I usually just pop my head in there real quick and 
she’s very easy to, she’s very good at answering a question for you and if she doesn’t 
know she’ll find out for you. 
 
I: Ok. Who regularly asks you questions and what type of questions are asked? 
 
P: As far as you mean the calls I get? 
 
I: It could be calls or (pause) 
 
P: Well generally as far as when people call in it’s usually district coordinators, 
principals, or teachers, superintendents, people from the districts. And you want to know 
what types of questions? 
 
I: What types of questions, yes.  
 
P: It could be anything from looking for the dates of like when there’s a certain window 
for enrolment to when are we getting our materials to tactical questions like how do they 




P: Or you know people complaining. We get that too. We get the gambit of people calling 
in. 
 
I: What do you do with complaints? 
 






P: You know you have to understand that they’re, a lot of times when they are calling to 
complain they usually have reasons so you just try to find the root issue but generally 
what has people complaining is generally something that is passed on to the program 
team and that’s their kind of their responsibility to take it on and granted I have listened 
to a lot of people rant and rave at me and you just take it. It’s just your job but you know 
it’s never gotten to the point where anyone is very angry and swearing and things like 
that. That may have happened once or twice but again you just have to work with people 
and try calming them down. That’s again, that’s where my experience comes into play is 
dealing with people. I can usually talk them down, usually (laughs). 
 
I: Ok. Who do you interact with most frequently? That is what individuals and 
departments and for what reasons? 
 
P: It would probably be besides coworkers and managers, and again are you speaking in 
regards of customers or are you speaking at [organization]? 
 
I: At [organization]. 
 
P: At [organization] it would probably be depending, program team members depending 
on which effort and whoever has those windows going as far as their programs. So for 
instance [state] may have their busy season might be right now and we talk to them a lot 
because if the knowledge isn’t out there then we talk to them about things. We get a lot of 
calls for individual type things and people call for these odd things that there wouldn’t be 








P: Some are not but. 
 
I: When a team is not good what does that mean? Or what does good mean? 
 




P: Because there are some program teams that are kind of known for not really 






P: Basically what we have to do then is just put a service ticket out for that caller or for 





P: Many callers are fine with that but some are not. They want the issue taken care of 




P: Again from our aspect that’s what it seems like. I don’t know if that’s actually the 
case. For the most part that’s pretty rare for that to happen but there are some out there 
that are known to be like that. 
 
I: Ok. When something is active, like something is going on for a state that is active, how 
frequently are you interacting with the program team? You know I’ve heard that there 
[are] escalation paths so if you can’t find it in the knowledge base you would go to the 
program team. I mean is that like on a day when you are taking 50 calls how many times 
are you interacting with the program team? 
 




P: And again it depends, a lot of it depends on the kinds of questions you are getting. If 
you are getting a lot of the same questions over and over you may only have to talk to 
them once or twice and you know if you are getting the same question after that you can 
answer it yourself. You don’t have to worry about going back to the program team. Other 
times when you have those really odd days where you know people are calling about 
little one item things that you probably aren’t going to hear about again and there is not 
reason to have a ticket out there, or I mean sorry no reason to have an article out there. So 
on those days you would talk to them a little bit more. But like I said most of them don’t 
seem to mind at all or if they do they don’t show it. 
 
I: Ok. How do you decide if you feel like something needs to be added to the knowledge 
database? 
 




P: Like lets say, and a lot of it happens with talking to your coworkers you know like Joe 
Shmoe next to me might say I’ve had three or four calls about that same issue you are 
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dealing with right now and I would say yeah I’ve actually had three or four myself and 
then somebody else is saying yeah we need a ticket out here on that. So usually if it 
hasn’t been done already then you put a ticket in or you just put a little note out there 




P: And then someone from the knowledge base team will take a look at it and get the 
answer for it and get the KB [knowledge base] out for it right away.  
 
I: Ok got it. What type of knowledge do you find or would you find valuable in helping 
meet your department’s mission and objective. To simplify the question, what would 
make your job easier? 
 








P: A lot of times when the issues come it it’s usually because of things that they really 




P: Or if it just came out of nowhere anyway so no one would know they wouldn’t have a 
chance to get it. Granted there are times, there was times in the past not so much now 
where information, they would have, the program team would have to approve articles to 
go out and where things are either not getting approved in time or they sit on it for a little 
while or our knowledge team would just not get to it when we would be busy or what 
have you but really there’s no issues with that right now. 
 
I: Ok. So this is getting a little bit more specific about knowledge, what is the most 
important type of knowledge information or data that the organization could provide that 
would give you the greatest benefit overall on a day-to-day basis? 
 
P: Updates, anything that is currently happening just to keep us updated on that right 






P: As far as in general terms, when windows are opening and closing as far as testing 
windows or enrollment windows or whatever happens to be happening have it posted out 
there either in an article or on the, one of the websites that we use quite frequently is the 
[website]. What it is basically is just a, it’s a company site and there is a lot of 
information that goes on that site and it would be helpful sometimes if they would put the 
dates to those updates listed on the site because they are supposed to be on there but 
sometimes those dates need an update if that makes any sense. 
 




I: What do you view as the most significant challenge to obtaining and managing the 
knowledge you need to accomplish your duties? 
 
P: Challenge challenge I don’t know of anything. As far as challenges go sometimes it 
can be a little frustrating when people are asking questions that are not let’s say doesn’t 
fit into any article and you can’t get a hold of the program team and so you are kind of 
left out there just to kind of and that’s where you kind of, it makes you a little antsy 
because you just at that point just leave it out there to the program team and they’ll 
respond back to that once they find that. But a lot of times it‘s a challenge when people 
ask you know I don’t want to say out of the box questions but sometimes we get 
questions that are just you know why are you asking that kind of thing (laughs). We get a 




P: And that’s kind of a challenge because you know the customer they want an answer 





P: And that’s by no means the fault of anyone on the program team or what have you but 
it’s just when they ask these questions they are oddball questions. You know not that 
there is nothing wrong with the customer per say it’s just they ask questions that there is 




P: I mean there’s a point to them but obviously. 
 
I: Ok. What amount or percentage of your time do you spend trying to find knowledge so 
you can perform a routine or structured task? 
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P: Out of, and I’ll base this on a typical call. So like out of a four-minute call with two 




P: You know that being said during slow times a lot of times I’ll go through the Kaidara 
and just to kind of review those for updates. So if we notice there is a, like for instance if 
we know that we have [state] is having some testing coming up we may go out there a 




P: Just to see you know, we generally have a feel for, a lot of times we get the same calls 
over and over about certain issues and we just like to know ahead of time like if we know 
what the answers or what the questions are going to be a lot of times we go look in the 
knowledge articles and if we see that we make sure that we know ahead of time we’re 
going to be asked this and so this is what we are going to be saying to people. 
 
I: Ok.  
 
P: So we just take that time and that way we know where to go look right away as 




P: But that’s generally what we would do. 
 
I: Ok. What amount or percentage of your time do you spend finding knowledge for 
others in your department? 
 




P: You know just like I said we all help each other out at different time and that being 
said there is a lot of times where we may already know it as opposed to having to go look 
around for it and we just say oh it’s so and so or this is the answer right away. And you 








I: Ok. If you, are these generally conversations going on after the call? Like do you ever 
have a customer on hold and you are like hey have you ever heard about this? 
 
P: Yep.  
 
I: And then it sounds like from what I understand that you have to mark in the service 
center ticket that you used you know certain knowledge from the database. So how does 
that work if your co-worker gives you an answer? 
 
P: A lot of times I will either put in you know after speaking with or I spoke with so and 
so you know the service support team. 
 
I: So you put it in the ticket. 
 
P: Yep and I just note the information out there and that being said you know if it’s 
something that is coming from a co-worker it’s usually they point you to where oh that’s 




P: And then you find out where that was and you add that KB to the ticket. Otherwise 




P: And then you contact them. But yeah that’s [it]. 
 
I: Ok. Tell me about a time when you weren’t sure how to complete a task or answer a 
call, what happened?  
 
P: Well I just had that happen actually. Basically a lot of times what will happen again 
when you get the call like where it’s just some off the wall thing, like every once in a 
while I’ll get a call. On the one hand usually I’d say about 95% of the time someone is 
available to help you with it or you just say hey, a lot of times I’ll just turn around and 
say hey what do we do with so and so and it’s really you know that’s really vague right 
there. But like for instance, how do I set up, someone is calling and they want to know 
how to set up a test for a program that we have and they usually will say I’ll take the call 
or just go to this article and I’ll show you where it is at. That’s most of the time what will 
happen. 
 
I: Ok. Tell me about a time where you forgot how to do something on the job. What was 




P: You know and I probably shouldn’t say this but almost every week I always forget my 
timesheet. I don’t know that that’s really something that really matters but actual work 
related. 
 
I: What do you have to do in the situation with the pay system?  
 
P: We are supposed to call the helpdesk, which is not fun. It’s in [country] and they don’t 
understand what we are saying. You are not supposed to have them out but I do because I 




P: But otherwise as far as, I’m trying to get something I actually had an issue a couple of 
days ago where I was trying to transfer and for some reason I could not transfer. It’s not a 
big deal but I just had to stop and think ok what do I do. It’s basically I needed to find the 
number that they need to call in and it’s an odd situation because you basically tell the 
person it’s like you know I can’t transfer you to a person that is within my company and 
you know many people get angry about that because they have to hang up and redial. It 
sounds like simple thing but people get upset about that. 
 
I: Right. How do you share what you know with other coworkers? For example if you 
learn something new while helping a customer how do you let other coworkers know so 
they can help a customer in the same situation? 
 




P: We would just send an e-mail out to all the people in our office here to let them know. 
Otherwise it would just be saying hey did you guys know about this. 
 
I: Ok, verbally? 
 




P: Or submitting an article in Kaidara but usually for me that’s the last step because it’s 
either already out there or it’s going to be put out by the program team. 
 
I: Ok. How, we talked about performance a little bit earlier but more specifically now 
how is your performance measured on your ability to answer customer questions 




P: They track first call closure. What that is is basically how often you are able to actually 




P: And you are graded on that exactly what the other people say I don’t know, I’ve never 





P: But again those things do happen and it’s a minor issue I would say as far as from 
what I understand. I’m sure it’s more important to the higher ups but its not going to 
affect us a whole lot per say. 
 
I: Ok. How do you ensure that the knowledge you have is current? 
 
P: Wow I don’t know a lot of times we generally have a good feel for what’s supposed to 
be out there. Generally within the Kaidara articles they should have like a reference to 
which testing it’s for. Obviously we are dealing with spring 09 right now and if you are 




P: I should say all the articles have the date that they were updated in there. So I mean if 
there is something in there that hasn’t been touched in a year and a half it’s probably not 
a good article in which case you would look for something else that would be out there. 
And it’s very possible there may be another article out there that is similar. That is one 
issue I guess I could say is that sometimes they don’t get rid of old stuff. 
 
I: Ok who is they? 
 
P: The knowledge base team. There is a lot of information in there from like all the way 
back to like spring of 08 that is still out there that we don’t need to have out there but it 
just clutters it all up. Again not a big deal because you just don’t click on those things but 
yeah occasionally you find articles out there where you say why would I be looking at 
that. Occasionally also you will see that there may be an article that is a year old but it 
may be the only thing out there and that’s when you go to the program team and say hey 
this seems a little old is that still the case? And then we go that route. 
 








P: Not very often but sometimes that is. Like if it’s an ongoing issue, I’m trying to think 
of an example off the top of my head like maybe the process for doing something like 
with [state] and how they log in. It’s the same way they log in for the last 3 or 4 years. So 
the article is a little old but. Even still sometimes they will update them anyway but I 
have seen articles out there that are still valid articles but they are from 07. 
 




I: How do people, processes, or technology that you use ensure that you have the 
knowledge that you need to do your job? 
 
P: There is and I hate to say this but we have a knowledge base team who that is basically 
their job to ensure that all the knowledge they get from each of the program teams from 




P: Also our managers they do a really good job for us too. If there is an upcoming 
window for instance for like a, like [state] for example their testing is coming up soon so 
what they’ll do is they will schedule a training with the program team and make sure that 
we are updated and make sure we are aware of any upcoming issues or things that change 
from last year and note it that way. That usually kind of covers it all right there. 
 
I: Ok. Describe a situation where the answer to a customer question may have changed 
because new information was known about the problem. How do you remember the new 
information and how do you forget the old information? 
 
P: Well you know I’m not saying this is the right way but a lot of times I do it in my head 
but what you are supposed to do, but what you should do is if there is an article about 
something and you say hey this is all wrong then what you should do is get feedback on 
that article which would go to the knowledge base team. They would do the research on it 











P: A lot of times if there are some people that I deal with on a regular basis like certain 
states like [state] we’ve been dealing with [state] the last few months constantly and you 
get some of the states that are calling in day after day after day and a lot of times they 
will ask the same questions so you get kind of used to knowing and if something has 
changed from like if they asked a question about enrollment for instance back a few 
months ago and I know the answer has changed from the program team I would just 
basically say ok that’s not what it is anymore by repetition basically because I have been 
giving out the same answer over and over again and after that I kind of tend to forget the 
old information. Like I said not the best way to do it but it works for me. 
 
I: Ok. How fast do you feel that the answers to customer questions change and how do 
you handle those changes? 
 
P: Changing as far as they call in with a question and the information I have is not correct 
is that what you? 
 
I: Well just you guys have this knowledge base so or you have this body of knowledge 
how often is that information changing? 
 




P: Not very often but usually year to year information changes like as a whole and they 




P: Because again like I said you know there are things that change from year to year. 
Whether the state they determine they want things done differently and so we redo 




P: It’s usually working with the right team so. 
 
I: Ok. Tell me about the administrative aspects of your position as far as collecting 
customer information or reporting the specifics of a call? 
 









P: And we have a little button, basically a find button and if their information does not 





P: The district and school, well district at least and sometimes the school depending on 








P: Those are usually the things we try getting from them and mainly its just the reason 
being is that way we can you know if we need to contact them again or if we get 
disconnected then we can get right back with them. We don’t have to say oh this person 
called and they are out there, that way we can contact them back right away. Or for that 
matter if we needed to follow up like if we put a service ticket out for the customer we 
need information to get back to them. 
 
I: Ok, ok. How do you know if the administrative, wait let me ask this again. How do you 
know which, how do you know which administrative processes to follow in your job? 
What happens if the processes change? 
 
P: Generally first and foremost we get a memo, either an e-mail or a memo or our 
management will come out to us to let us know. But otherwise usually by e-mail just to 
say hey here’s a heads up this has changed we don’t do this anymore we do this instead.  
 
I: Ok. Describe any other examples that you feel are related to forgetting information on 
the job or not having the information that you need to answer questions and perform well. 
 
P: Well a lot of times you know and again there are some states that do better than others 
as far as getting the articles out there and by that for example I’ll use [state] as an 
example because they do a very good job of really all the information that is out there 
you know that they have it’s out there in an article. And again the only reason we ever 






P: It does not have to do with any of the categories. Where we have other states where 
you know there’s hardly any knowledge out there and they don’t really do a very good 




P: Whether it be they have no idea what questions will be coming in or if they just you 
know some programs they just don’t have much information that they get from the state. 
 
I: Ok so do you think they are dependent on the state sometimes for their information? 
 




P: And you know depending on the state and also it appears sometimes from us, we give 
them information. Like for instance just yesterday another example, [state] was taking 





P: And we called the program team and say hey this link is not working and they said oh, 
ok. And then what they did was in about five minutes they had a work around and a new 




P: And they sent an e-mail out plus with the e-mail they also sent an IM out to the 
different like [satellite location], those satellite sites so that way everyone was aware of it. 
 
I: Ok. What do you think can be done for some of the states that are just kind of known 
for not providing the information or if there’s just more of a struggle whether it’s that 
they don’t know what questions are going to come in or they don’t have information from 
their state? Is there a solution? 
 
P: Well at least as far as we do I mean it’s as much information that we can glean from 
the customer and we go with that. If we find more information but more often than not 
we just open up tickets like if there’s an issue out there and basically with the volume of 
tickets they are get eventually they realize that this is an issue that they have to find 






P: That seems to be the solution. They take care of the issues.  
 
I: Ok, ok. 
 
P: Or submitting feedback about an issue as well. You know if they are seeing you know 
20 people suddenly asking about this certain thing then they’ll go to the program team 
and say hey we didn’t know about this. 
 
I: And is they the? 
 
P: I’m sorry the KM [knowledge management] team, I’m sorry. 
 




I: Ok anything else? 
 
P: Nope I think that’s it. Good luck. 
 
I: Thank you. 
 
 
APPENDIX E: OBSERVATION FORM EXAMPLE 
 
Contact Center Observation Form 
 
Date: ____January 22, 2009___________ 
 
 
Nature of the Call (Caller Question(s)): 
 
 






Observation of how Agent is Using Desktop Knowledge Resources: 
_are scripts being accessed 
_is agent looking at previous call history or customer profile to assist with call 
_is agent using online system to provide responses and in what way specifically 




Agent is not looking up previous call history, but is looking for program team 






Observation of how Agent is using Personnel Knowledge Resources: 
_is agent asking another agent for assistance 
_does agent need to transfer issue to another agent and why 
_does agent have to return caller’s call at later time 
 
 
Program team instructing agent to specific website; however, agent does not 








Observation of Customer Service Queues used by Agent: 
_is caller placed on hold or mute while agent researches the question(s) 
_is agent describing steps to resolution to caller while researching 
_is agent using appropriate greeting and closing with caller 
 
Standard greeting and closing used. 
 
Caller was put on hold while agent conferred with program team and again when 
the agent tried to re-contact the program team. 
 
The enrollment order period is Spring 2009. Agent confirmed that it was Spring 
2009 and the caller questioned this. The agent was frustrated and noted to the 
researcher while the caller was on hold that no training had been provided on this 
and agent did not know why the program team would not take the call. When the 
agent contacted the program team, the agent expected the program team 
member to take the call but that did not happen. Instead, the program team 
referred the agent to the support website, which the agent could not access 
because no logon credentials had been provided. 
 
The agent attempted again to call the program team. Two attempts were made 
with no response. When unable to reach the program team, the agent instructed 
the caller to send an e-mail to the program team to order the practice tests.  
 
 
Observation of Affective Queues by Caller: 
_based on caller’s affective queues, does the agent seem to be assisting the caller in 
resolving the issue 
_is the caller showing signs of satisfaction or frustration 
_what other affective queues are being used by the caller that might pinpoint how call is 
going 
 
Caller was sighing saying “Oh, I’ve got to go through all that mess?” The caller 
did not want to have to go to the website to order the practice tests. 
 
 
Observation of After Call Work by Agent: 
_is agent entering notes into the desktop knowledge system and what is the level of 
detail 
_is agent describing call to another agent because of information learned or exchanged 
with caller and/or other agents  
_is agent capturing any new information for inclusion into a knowledge database 
 
 
The agent was going to alert supervisor and manager to the fact that the program 
team did not take the call.
 
 




% Answered in 20 
Sec or Less After Call Work Avg Handle Time 
First Call 
Closure Attrition 
Mar 42 2:31 7:10 69% 0% 
Apr 41 2:53 8:00 72% 0% 
May 62 2:37 7:39 73% 3% 
      
      
 Attrition (RFT)     
2007 0%     
2008 6%     
      
      
      
      
      
 
Top Call 
Subjects     
 Subject Tickets (Year)    




















   
 
 






(256 Total  
Comments Coded) 
































Events or circumstances that 
shaped attitudes, values, 
assumptions and traditions 
 
 
Event or circumstance 
primarily driven by the 
nature of the work; of 
specifically doing 
business as an inbound 
contact center 
 
Event or circumstance 
primarily driven by the 
current economy (e.g., 
reduction in state 
education budgets) 
 
Event or circumstance 
primarily driven by the 
corporation (e.g., new 
timekeeping system, new 
project implementation) 
 
Event or circumstance 
primarily driven by 
managerial or supervisor 
support in the execution 
of tasks 
 
Event or circumstance 










































(256 Total  
Comments Coded) 

































Evidence of knowledge 





Adherence to or 




Evidence of standard or 
routine knowledge that 
was readily available to 
the participants, but not 
transferred 
 
Events that occurred 
related to forgetfulness, 
whether accidental or 
purposeful 
 
Formal and informal 






engaged in exchanging 
knowledge  
 
Actions that exhibited 
non-compliance with 
provided operating 
procedures or directions 











































(256 Total  
Comments Coded) 

























Measures of success, 
evaluation procedures, 
standards, supporting 




Evidence of customer 
satisfaction whether 
anecdotal or data driven 
 
Evidence of individual 
and team performance 
ratings and feedback 
 





Definitions of success for 
individuals, team, and 
company 
 






























APPENDIX H: ONSITE OBSERVATION DATA 
 
 
Total Calls Observed: 63 
Total Hours of Observation: 16 
 
 
Type of Call 
 
Description Frequency 
Cold transfer to other 
department 
Agent was unable to resolve 
issue because customer 
needed to speak with a 
different department; those 




First call resolution Agent was able to resolve 




First call resolution with 
program team contact  
Agent was able to resolve 




First call resolution where 
customer resolved the issue 
The customer resolved own 




Program team escalation Agent was not able to 
resolve the call and the call 
was escalated to the 
program team  
 
18 
Warm transfer to program 
team 
Agent was not able to 
resolve the call and the call 
was directly transferred to a 




-32 (51%) first call resolution although 7 of the 32 (21%) involved contact with the 
program team and 2 of the 32 (6%) were resolved by the customer 
-24 (38%) calls escalated or transferred to program team 
-7 (11%) calls transferred to other departments
224 
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